Brent Stuart
President and Chief Operating Officer at FCFS
Executive
About Brent Stuart
T. Brent Stuart is President and Chief Operating Officer of FirstCash Holdings and age 55 as of the latest proxy; he joined FirstCash in September 2016 in conjunction with the Cash America merger and has 32 years of industry experience spanning consumer finance operations and lending . The Compensation Committee’s principal performance measures tied to executive pay include adjusted diluted EPS, adjusted net income, adjusted EBITDA, net revenue (gross profit) and relative TSR versus peers, with FY2024 company outcomes of revenue $3.39B (+8% y/y), adjusted EBITDA $558.4M (+9% y/y), adjusted diluted EPS $6.70 (+11% y/y) and strong relative TSR results over 3- and 5-year periods . Stuart’s pay mix emphasizes long-term alignment via performance-based and time-based restricted stock awards under the LTIP and a formulaic annual cash incentive under the APIP .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| FirstCash Holdings | President & COO | Sep 2016–present | Leads global pawn and consumer finance operations across five countries and AFF segment; execution emphasis on earnings growth and TSR-aligned metrics |
| Cash America International | President & CEO | Nov 2015–Oct 2016 | Led pre-merger operations; senior leadership through integration path into FirstCash |
| Cash America International | President & COO | May 2015–Oct 2015 | Oversaw operating performance and storefront lending operations |
| Cash America International | EVP–Chief Operating Officer | Jan 2015–Apr 2015 | Drove operational execution for U.S. retail services |
| Cash America International | SVP–Operations (U.S. retail services storefront lending) | Jul 2010–Jan 2015 | Scaled storefront lending operations; regional and national execution |
| Cash America International | Regional Vice President | Nov 2008–Jul 2010 | Multi-region operating leadership |
| Fremont Investment and Loan | Vice President | 2006–2008 | Consumer finance / mortgage leadership role |
| Nationstar Mortgage | Senior Vice President | 2004–2006 | Operations leadership in mortgage servicing/origination |
| Novastar Financial | Vice President | 2002–2004 | Consumer finance operating roles |
| CitiFinancial | Various leadership roles | 1994–2002 | Branch and regional leadership across consumer lending |
| Norwest Finance | Early career | from May 1992 | Entry into financial services and consumer lending |
External Roles
No external public company directorships or committee roles were disclosed for Stuart in the latest proxy filings reviewed .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 (Employment agreement effective Jan 1, 2025) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Base salary ($) | $776,620 | $815,451 | $848,069 | $897,592 |
| Target annual bonus (% of salary, APIP) | 125% | 125% | 125% | 125% |
| Actual annual bonus paid ($) | $1,414,905 | $1,581,788 | $1,072,012 | — |
Notes:
- APIP ranges: COO can earn between 0% and 200% of salary; target 125% .
- 2024 salary increase aligned with 4% merit budget; Stuart’s base salary rose to $848,069 .
Performance Compensation
Annual Performance Incentive Program (APIP) – FY2024
| Metric | Weighting | 2023 Actual | 2024 Target | 2024 Actual | Payout result |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted diluted EPS | 37.5% | $6.06 | $6.70 | $6.70 (100.0% of target) | Contributed to total APIP payout |
| Adjusted EBITDA ($000s) | 37.5% | $511,732 | $558,000 | $558,437 (100.1% of target) | Contributed to total APIP payout |
| Net revenue (gross profit) ($000s) | 25.0% | $1,507,239 | $1,624,000 | $1,629,532 (100.3% of target) | Contributed to total APIP payout |
| Stuart APIP outcome | — | — | — | — | 126% of salary; $1,072,012 cash award |
Design features: Formulaic outcomes; Compensation Committee prohibits discretion above maximum awards and maintains a clawback for restatements .
Long-Term Incentive Program (LTIP) – 2024 Grants and 2022–2024 Performance Cycle
| Award type | Performance metric | Weighting | Grant date | Target shares (Stuart) | Grant date fair value ($) | Vesting / performance period |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance-based RSAs | Adjusted net income | 25% | 1/31/2024 | 6,724 | $1,516,570 | Cumulative 1/1/2024–12/31/2026 |
| Performance-based RSAs | 3-year TSR vs. comp peer group | 25% | 1/31/2024 | 6,725 | Included above | Cumulative 1/1/2024–12/31/2026; threshold 25th, target 50th, max 75th percentile |
| Time-based RSAs | Service condition | 50% | 1/31/2024 | 13,449 | $1,543,542 | Three-year cliff vest on 12/31/2026 |
Performance cycle results: For the 2022–2024 LTIP period, adjusted net income and relative TSR paid “at or above target,” with maximum achieved, reflecting strong multi-year execution .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (as of Apr 17, 2025) | 94,174 shares; <1% of outstanding (44,364,566 shares outstanding) |
| Shares vesting within 60 days | None disclosed for Stuart |
| Stock ownership guidelines | 3× salary requirement; current multiple 18.6× salary (compliant) |
| Hedging/derivatives | Prohibited (short sales, puts/calls, other derivatives) |
| Pledging | Generally prohibited; exceptions granted case-by-case. Pledges disclosed for CEO and CFO; none disclosed for Stuart |
| Sale retention rule | Until compliant, must retain 75% of after-tax shares from vest/exercise; all NEOs met guidelines as of Dec 31, 2024 and proxy date |
Insider selling pressure and vesting overhang:
- Time-based RSAs cliff vest on 12/31/2026, creating a defined potential supply event at vesting; sales permitted only if guidelines remain met post-sale .
- Performance RSAs settlement depends on 2024–2026 adjusted net income and relative TSR versus peers, limiting vesting until outcomes are known .
Employment Terms
| Term | Key provisions |
|---|---|
| Agreement term | Employment agreements entered Feb 2022; amended Mar 3, 2025 to extend through Dec 31, 2026 |
| Base salary (effective 1/1/2025) | $897,592 (subject to annual review) |
| Target annual incentive | 125% of salary under APIP |
| Severance (no CIC) | Lump sum cash equal to 50% of salary + average annual bonuses for prior 3 years; COBRA subsidy continuation |
| Severance (CIC + qualifying termination within 12 months) | 200% of salary + average annual bonuses; pro rata annual bonus; accelerated vesting and full payout of time-based and performance-based equity at target or higher (Comp Committee discretion); lump sum health/welfare benefit equal to full monthly cost ×24 |
| Restrictive covenants | Non-compete and non-solicit for 36 months post-termination |
Potential payments table (as of Dec 31, 2024):
| Scenario | Cash severance ($) | Benefits continuation ($) | Health benefits lump sum ($) | Value of unvested equity ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination without cause / resignation for good reason | 1,102,152 | 48,021 | — | — | 1,150,173 |
| Death | — | — | — | 4,275,261 | 4,275,261 |
| Long-term disability | — | — | — | 4,275,261 | 4,275,261 |
| CIC + termination without cause / resignation for good reason | 4,408,608 | — | 64,028 | 4,275,261 | 8,747,897 |
Additional governance features:
- Clawback policy enabling recovery of short- or long-term incentive compensation upon required financial restatements .
- No supplemental non-qualified retirement or deferred compensation plans; perquisites for NEOs modest and club dues reimbursements discontinued for 2025 .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment is robust: APIP metrics and LTIP mix directly tie payouts to adjusted EPS, EBITDA, net revenue, multi-year adjusted net income, and relative TSR, with formulaic caps and an active clawback, reducing agency risk and promoting durable earnings growth .
- Retention risk appears low through 2026: Significant unvested equity exposure via 2024–2026 performance RSAs and a three-year cliff vest of time-based RSAs on 12/31/2026 creates strong retention, while non-compete/non-solicit run 36 months post-termination; however, vesting concentration at year-end 2026 could create post-vesting sale pressure depending on guideline compliance .
- Ownership alignment is high: Stuart exceeds stock ownership guidelines by a wide margin (18.6× salary) with no pledging disclosed, limiting forced-sale risk and signaling long-term alignment; sales remain constrained by retention rules until guideline compliance persists post-sale .
- Change-in-control economics are meaningful: Double-trigger severance equal to 200% of salary+avg bonus plus equity acceleration at target increases transaction incentives; while standard for peers, investors should factor in potential dilution/settlement impacts and executive optionality in strategic scenarios .
- Execution track record: Company posted 2024 adjusted diluted EPS +11%, adjusted EBITDA +9%, and net revenue +8%, with LTIP outcomes at/above target and maximum achieved for the 2022–2024 cycle, supporting confidence in operational cadence under Stuart’s COO remit; ongoing APIP rigor shows average COO payouts below maximum and near target levels historically, suggesting balanced goal setting .