Lea Nakamura
FIRST HAWAIIANAbout Lea Nakamura
Lea M. Nakamura, age 59, is Executive Vice President and Chief Risk Officer (CRO) of First Hawaiian, Inc. and First Hawaiian Bank, serving since July 2023; she joined the Bank in 2014 and previously held treasury and risk leadership roles after a 25-year career at Bank of Hawaii culminating as Senior Vice President . She holds a B.S. in Foreign Service (Economics/Asian Studies) from Georgetown University and a Certificate in Applied Mathematics from the University of Illinois Urbana–Champaign . Under her risk leadership umbrella, FHB delivered 2024 net income of $230.1M, diluted EPS of $1.79, net interest margin of 2.95%, non‑accrual ratio of 0.14%, net charge‑offs of 0.10%, and CET1 of 12.80%; Q4 2024 deposits increased by $94.5M while reducing public time deposits by $100M .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| First Hawaiian, Inc./First Hawaiian Bank | EVP & Chief Risk Officer | Jul 2023 – Present | Leads enterprise risk framework design, implementation, and oversight; member of Bank Senior Management Committee . |
| First Hawaiian, Inc./First Hawaiian Bank | EVP & Treasurer | Mar 2018 – Sep 2023 | Led treasury, funding, and balance sheet risk, supporting ALM and liquidity . |
| First Hawaiian, Inc./First Hawaiian Bank | Enterprise & Market Risk Manager | Sep 2017 – Mar 2018 | Advanced market and enterprise risk oversight . |
| First Hawaiian, Inc./First Hawaiian Bank | Trade Finance and Swaps (responsibility) | 2014 – 2017 | Managed trade finance and swaps activities after joining the Bank in 2014 . |
| Bank of Hawaii | Various positions, most recently Senior Vice President | 1989 – 2014 | Treasury lines/functions leadership across risk and balance sheet disciplines . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hawaii Economic Association | Director | n/a | Professional economics association leadership . |
Company Performance Context (Relevant to CRO Mandate)
| Metric | FY 2024 Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Net income ($M) | 230.1 | Includes net after-tax loss on securities sale; reinvested in higher-yielding securities . |
| Diluted EPS ($) | 1.79 | Company measure . |
| Net interest margin (%) | 2.95 | Up 3 bps YoY . |
| Non‑accrual loans/leases (%) | 0.14 | Credit quality indicator . |
| Net charge‑offs/avg loans (%) | 0.10 | Credit cost indicator . |
| CET1 capital ratio (%) | 12.80 | +41 bps YoY . |
| Q4 2024 deposit change ($M) | +94.5 | Public time deposits reduced by $100M (-39%) . |
Fixed Compensation
- Individual base salary, target bonus %, and actual bonus for Ms. Nakamura are not disclosed (she is not listed as a 2024 Named Executive Officer). The Company reviews executive base salaries annually, aligning to role, experience, performance, and market data .
Performance Compensation
- Annual Bonus Plan design (company-wide executive framework): 50% Core Net Income, 20% Asset Quality Metric, 30% Individual Performance; the Compensation Committee set a broader payout range in 2024 (Core Net Income threshold lowered to 90% of target; max raised to 110%) . 2024 NEO outcomes: financial components paid at 150% of target; CEO’s individual factor 115% (other NEOs 120–150%); Ms. Nakamura’s specific targets/payouts were not disclosed .
| 2024 Metric | Weight | Target | Actual | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Core Net Income | 50% | $228.399M | $252.847M (110.7% of target) | 150% of component . |
| Asset Quality Metric | 20% | Payout grid: ≤0.50% = 150%; 0.75% = 100%; 1.00% = 50%; >1.00% = 0% | 0.16% | 150% of component . |
| Individual Performance | 30% | Qualitative categories (strategy, financial, risk/regulatory, talent, IR) | Not disclosed for Ms. Nakamura | CEO 115%; other NEOs 120–150% . |
- Long-Term Incentives (design applied to executives under Omnibus/LTIP):
- PSUs (60% of 2024 grant): 3-year cliff vest; 70% ROATE vs compensation peers; 30% ROATA vs peers; +/-25% TSR modifier vs KBW Regional Bank Index; capped at 200%; no upward TSR modifier if absolute TSR negative .
- RSUs (40% of 2024 grant): vest in equal annual installments over three years .
- Historical: 2022–2024 PSU awards paid at 125.1% of target; this disclosure pertains to NEOs . Ms. Nakamura’s specific LTI grants/outcomes were not disclosed.
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership | 12,172 shares as of Feb 27, 2025 (<1% of 126,195,936 shares outstanding) . |
| Vested vs. unvested breakdown | Not disclosed for Ms. Nakamura in the proxy . |
| Options | Company historically has not granted options and has no plans to grant them, reducing option-related selling pressure . |
| Pledging/Hedging | Company policy against pledging; awards are non-assignable and may not be hedged; robust clawback policies apply to cash and equity . |
| Ownership guidelines | Directors: 5x annual cash retainer; CEO: 6x base; other NEOs: 2x base (Ms. Nakamura not listed as an NEO; no individual guideline status disclosed) . |
Employment Terms
- Role tenure: CRO since July 2023; joined Bank in 2014 .
- Executive Severance Plan (Bank-adopted; eligibility by Compensation Committee designation): if designated and terminated without cause or resigns for good reason within 2 years after a Change in Control (double trigger), cash severance equals 2x highest base salary plus 2x average actual bonuses over prior two years, one year of health benefits, and outplacement; outside a Change in Control window: 1x highest base and 1x average actual bonus; definitions of cause/good reason/change in control are specified . Accelerated vesting treatment for awards under the 2025 Omnibus Plan applies on qualifying termination within 2 years post-CIC (double-trigger), with performance awards at least at target or actual-to-date . The proxy confirms NEO participation; it does not state whether Ms. Nakamura is designated under this plan .
- Clawbacks and award transfer limits: Awards are subject to Company clawback policies; awards are non-assignable and cannot be hedged; transfers to third-party financial institutions are prohibited without stockholder approval .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: The annual bonus framework emphasizes Core Net Income and asset quality—directly relevant to CRO stewardship—while LTI uses relative ROATE/ROATA with TSR modifier, balancing profitability and risk management; 2024 financial components paid at 150% of target, reflecting outperformance on core income and asset quality .
- Selling pressure: Company eschews options, reducing exercise-driven selling; RSUs generally vest over three years and PSUs cliff at three years, which can concentrate selling around vest/settlement dates; specific award/vesting dates for Ms. Nakamura were not disclosed, limiting precision on timing .
- Ownership/skin-in-the-game: Ms. Nakamura beneficially owns 12,172 shares (<1%); while absolute ownership is modest, Company policies restrict pledging/hedging and impose clawbacks, supporting alignment; executive ownership guideline status is not disclosed for non-NEOs .
- Retention/M&A dynamics: If designated under the Executive Severance Plan, double-trigger CIC benefits and post-termination treatment of equity reduce retention risk during strategic transactions; lack of disclosure on her plan participation is a transparency gap .
- Governance signals: Say‑on‑pay approval exceeded 98% in 2024, indicating broad investor support for the compensation program design that would also influence CRO incentives .