Amy Schwetz
FLOWSERVEAbout Amy Schwetz
Flowserve’s CFO since February 2020, Amy B. Schwetz is a 50-year-old finance executive with prior CFO and operational finance leadership roles at Peabody and earlier public company audit experience at Ernst & Young . She holds a B.S. in Accounting from Indiana University and is a CPA; she also serves on Dril-Quip’s board (as disclosed at appointment) . During her tenure, Flowserve delivered strong operating improvements: 2024 revenue $4.6B (+5.5% YoY), adjusted operating income $538M (+31% YoY), ROIC 15.2%, and 1-year TSR 41.9% ; 2023 revenue $4.3B (+19.5% YoY), adjusted operating income $412M (+84% YoY), and 1-year TSR 37% .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Flowserve | SVP & CFO | 2020–Present | Finance leadership through operating model changes, margin expansion, and 3D strategy execution |
| Peabody Energy | EVP & CFO | 2015–2020 | Led finance for global coal producer through industry volatility |
| Peabody Energy | SVP Finance & Administration – Australia; Americas | 2012–2015 | Regional P&L/finance leadership |
| Peabody Energy | VP Investor Relations; VP Capital & Financial Planning; other senior roles | 2005–2012 | Capital planning, FP&A, investor engagement |
| Ernst & Young | Audit Manager | 1997–2005 | Public company audit and controls background |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dril-Quip, Inc. (NYSE: DRQ) | Director | As disclosed 2020 | Board service disclosed upon Flowserve appointment |
Fixed Compensation
- 2024 base salary (as of 12/31/24): $769,000; AIP target 90%; LTI target $2,000,000 .
- 2023 base salary (as of 12/31/23): $746,000; AIP target 80%; LTI target $1,800,000 .
- Initial hire (2020): base $650,000; AIP target 75%; LTI target $1,550,000; $250,000 sign-on (1-yr clawback), $750,000 time-vest RSUs (3-yr ratable), $500,000 make-whole cash .
| Component ($) | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary (SCT) | 693,963 | 734,416 | 762,808 |
| Stock Awards (Grant-date FV) | 1,705,192 | 1,928,159 | 2,082,128 |
| Non-Equity Incentive (AIP cash) | 442,109 | 1,062,304 | 941,256 |
| Change in Pension Value | 143,165 | 163,055 | 253,325 |
| All Other Compensation | 30,244 | 37,707 | 32,542 |
| Total | 3,014,673 | 3,925,641 | 4,072,059 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP)
- Structure and weightings (corporate): Adjusted Operating Income (50%), Customer Bookings (30%), Adjusted Primary Working Capital % Sales (20%); committee can apply strategic goals modifier ±15% .
- 2024 results (corporate executives): Quantitative 118% of target; strategic modifier +15% → final 136% .
- 2023 results (corporate executives): Quantitative 162% of target; strategic modifier +10% → final 178% .
| AIP Metric | Weight | 2024 Target | 2024 Attainment/Payout |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Operating Income | 50% | Pre-set | 111% payout |
| Customer Bookings | 30% | Pre-set | 128% payout |
| Adjusted PWC % Sales | 20% | Pre-set | 121% payout |
| Quantitative subtotal | — | — | 118% |
| Strategic goals modifier | — | ±15% | +15% → Final 136% |
| AIP Outcomes (Schwetz) | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Target Award ($) | 596,800 | 692,100 |
| Final Payout ($) | 1,062,304 (178%) | 941,256 (136%) |
Long-Term Incentives (LTI)
- Instrument mix (non-CEO): 50% PSUs and 50% RSUs; RSUs vest ratably over 3 years; PSUs over a 3-year performance period .
- PSU metrics and governance: 50% ROIC (annual goals averaged over 3 yrs), 50% FCF as % of Adjusted Net Income (annual goals averaged), plus ±15% rTSR modifier vs S&P 500 Industrials PPG; no positive modifier if absolute TSR is negative .
- Payout history: 2022–2024 PSUs paid at 76.7% of target (strong ROIC, below-threshold FCF; +15% rTSR at 81st percentile) .
| Schwetz LTI Grants | Grant Date | RSUs (#/$) | PSUs Target (#/$) | PSU Max (#/$) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Feb 9, 2024 | 24,746 / $1,026,959 | 24,746 / $1,055,169 | 56,916 / $2,362,006 |
| 2023 | Feb 17, 2023 | 25,951 / $931,381 | 25,951 / $996,778 | 59,687 / $2,142,166 |
Vesting Schedules and Upcoming Supply
- RSUs (program): 3-year ratable; 2024 RSUs vest on March 1 of the subsequent three years .
- Schwetz RSU cadence: 8,978 vested 2/15/2025; 8,990 vested 2/17/2025; 8,387 vested 3/1/2025; remaining scheduled 8,990 on 2/15/2026; 8,387 on 3/1/2026 and 3/1/2027 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership: 99,628 shares as of March 18, 2025; <1% of shares outstanding .
- Outstanding awards at 12/31/2024: 51,930 RSUs unvested ($2,987,013); PSUs: 20,659 (2022 cycle, settled at 76.7% in Feb 2025), 62,032 (2023 cycle at maximum display for SEC), 57,871 (2024 cycle at maximum display) .
- 2024 vest/realization: 50,110 shares vested; $2,135,272 value realized (RSU/PSU vesting) .
- Stock ownership guidelines: SVPs must hold stock = 3x salary; unvested RSUs count; PSUs don’t; compliance required within 5 years; as of 12/31/2024 all NEOs met guidelines .
- Hedging/pledging: Prohibited for officers and directors .
| Ownership Snapshot (12/31/2024 unless noted) | Amount |
|---|---|
| Direct/beneficial shares (3/18/2025) | 99,628 (<1% of class) |
| Unvested RSUs (#/$) | 51,930 / $2,987,013 |
| PSUs unearned (2022/2023/2024) (#) | 20,659 / 62,032 / 57,871 |
| 2024 shares vested (value realized) | 50,110 / $2,135,272 |
| Ownership guideline (SVP) | 3x salary; all NEOs compliant |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited |
Employment Terms
- Appointment: Named SVP & CFO effective Feb 24, 2020 .
- New-hire economics (2020): Base $650k; AIP target 75%; LTI target $1.55M; $250k sign-on (1-yr clawback); $750k RSU (3-yr ratable); $500k make‑whole cash .
- Severance (non‑CIC): 24 months’ base continuation; target AIP if threshold company performance achieved; pro‑rata PSUs; limited RSU continuation/cash-in-lieu within 90 days per grant cohort .
- Change-in-control (double trigger): For SVPs, cash severance = 2.0x (base + target AIP), pro‑rata AIP, full vesting at target of LTI, continued benefits for duration tied to multiplier; no excise tax gross‑ups .
- Clawbacks: Dodd‑Frank compliant recoupment for restatements (3‑year lookback) plus misconduct clawback covering AIP/PSUs/RSUs (3‑year lookback) .
- Insider trading policy: On file (10‑K exhibit); governs executive trading behavior .
Performance & Track Record
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue ($B) | 4.3 (+19.5% YoY) | 4.6 (+5.5% YoY) |
| Adjusted Operating Income ($M) | 412 (+84% YoY) | 538 (+31% YoY) |
| ROIC | 12.6% | 15.2% |
| 1‑yr TSR | 37% | 41.9% |
Additional incentive alignment signals: 2024 corporate AIP paid 136% vs 2023 at 178% ; PSUs (2022–2024) paid 76.7% reflecting strong ROIC but weaker FCF conversion, with +15% rTSR modifier at 81st percentile .
Compensation Structure Details
AIP Design (what it drives)
- Execution: Adjusted Operating Income (50%) .
- Growth: Customer Bookings (30%) .
- Efficiency: Adjusted PWC % Sales (20%) .
- Strategic priorities: ESG, portfolio, digitization via ±15% modifier .
LTI Design (what it drives)
- Long-term value/discipline: ROIC (50%) and FCF as % of Adjusted Net Income (50%); rTSR modifier ±15% vs S&P 500 Industrials .
- Risk controls: No positive rTSR modifier if absolute TSR is negative .
Governance, Peer Benchmarking, and Say-on-Pay
- Pay philosophy: Target market median with performance leverage; majority at‑risk .
- Compensation peer group updated and used for market context (AMETEK, Dover, Fortive, IDEX, ITT, Xylem, etc.) .
- Say‑on‑pay support: >93% in 2024 and strong support again in 2025 .
- Policies: No hedging/pledging; no dividend payments on unvested awards; no tax gross‑ups for executives; robust ownership guidelines and clawbacks .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and incentives: CFO pay is tied to ROIC, FCF conversion, bookings, and working capital efficiency—metrics that support durable margin and cash conversion; recent AIP over‑target payouts and sub‑target PSU outcomes (76.7%) indicate discipline around cash conversion despite strong ROIC and TSR .
- Retention and selling pressure: Upcoming RSU vesting tranches in 2026–2027 and recent vesting volume (50,110 shares, $2.14M in 2024) could create periodic supply but pledging/hedging prohibitions and ownership guidelines mitigate misalignment risk .
- Change‑in‑control economics: Double‑trigger CIC with 2.0x (base + target bonus) and full target vesting balances retention with shareholder protections (no gross‑ups), limiting windfall risk .
- Track record: Under Schwetz’s tenure, Flowserve’s revenue, margins (Adjusted OI), ROIC, and TSR improved meaningfully in 2023–2024, consistent with AIP/PSU designs; continued PSU dependence on FCF conversion suggests ongoing emphasis on cash quality and may temper equity realizations in weaker FCF years—supportive of capital discipline .
Overall, compensation design is shareholder‑friendly (ownership, clawbacks, no pledging/hedging), levered to cash and returns, with solid performance trajectory—supportive for alignment and moderate retention risk given performance-contingent PSU outcomes and scheduled RSU vesting .