Jeffrey Castelli
AMICUS THERAPEUTICSAbout Jeffrey Castelli
Jeffrey P. Castelli, Ph.D., age 53, is Chief Development Officer (CDO) of Amicus Therapeutics (FOLD) since May 2020, and has been with Amicus since July 2005, previously serving as Chief Portfolio Officer and Head of Gene Therapy . He holds a B.S. from West Chester University and a Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania, with authorship on publications and patents in rare disease drug development . Company-level performance metrics tied to executive pay include a 108% corporate bonus multiplier for 2024 driven by Galafold net product sales of ~$458.5M and non-GAAP profitability, among other goals . The 2022 PRSU cycle paid out at 88.6% of target, with three-year absolute TSR at -12.1% but at the 72.7th percentile vs the Nasdaq Biotechnology Index (payout capped at 100% due to negative TSR) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Health Advances LLC | Healthcare Strategy Consultant | Not disclosed | Strategy consulting across biotech and orphan drug development |
| Neose Pharmaceuticals Inc. | Business Development | Not disclosed | Corporate and BD experience prior to Amicus |
External Roles
No external directorships or public company board roles are disclosed for Dr. Castelli in the proxy .
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year compensation (fiscal-year reported amounts):
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | $451,025 | $464,721 | $491,807 |
| Bonus ($) | $221,938 | $352,049 | $263,494 |
| Stock Awards ($) | $1,630,358 | $1,972,703 | $1,862,083 |
| Option Awards ($) | $715,701 | $843,196 | $785,678 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $36,681 | $39,093 | $39,834 |
| Total ($) | $3,055,703 | $3,671,762 | $3,442,896 |
Additional fixed elements and benefits:
- Year-end base salary: $492,880 as of Dec 31, 2024 .
- Perquisites included in 2024 “All Other”: 401(k) employer match $16,493, HSA $800, life insurance $1,231, executive health $4,500, financial consulting $16,810 .
Performance Compensation
Annual cash incentive mechanics and 2024 payout:
| Component | Target | Actual Metric | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|
| Target bonus % of base | 45% | Corporate multiplier: 108% | $263,494 |
| Individual multiplier | Up to 133% (NEOs) | Castelli 110% based on R&D strategy, regulatory/reimbursement submissions (incl. NICE), and contribution to Galafold Hatch-Waxman litigation | Incorporated in payout calc |
2024 PRSU program structure:
| Metric | Weighting | Measurement Period | Vesting/Payout Terms |
|---|---|---|---|
| TSR vs Nasdaq Biotech Index | 50% | 3-year (2024–2026) | 0–200% with percentile schedule; capped at 100% if absolute TSR negative |
| Revenue Goal | 30% | 3-year (2024–2026) | 0–200% based on Board-set confidential targets |
| Pipeline Goal | 20% | 3-year (2024–2026) | 0–200% based on Board-set confidential targets |
2024 equity grants (grant date 1/2/2024):
| Award Type | Shares/Units | Exercise Price | Vesting Schedule | Grant Date Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Options | 99,073 | $14.24/sh | 25% at 1-year; 1/36 monthly thereafter; 10-year term | $785,678 |
| RSUs | 57,392 | N/A | 25% per year over 4 years | $817,262 |
| PRSUs (TSR tranche) | Target 14,348 | N/A | 3-year performance (2024–2026) | $636,190 |
| PRSUs (Revenue tranche) | Target 8,609 | N/A | 3-year performance (2024–2026) | $245,170 |
| PRSUs (Pipeline tranche) | Target 5,740 | N/A | 3-year performance (2024–2026) | $163,461 |
Settlement of 2022 PRSUs (performance period ended 2024):
| Performance Goal | Weight | Outcome | Payout % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pompe approvals (U.S., EU, U.K. + 2 markets) | 20% | Achieved target | 100% |
| Pipeline strategy | 10% | Board submission without approval | 25% |
| Profitability (Non-GAAP NI) | 15% | $74M vs $100M target | 74% |
| People & Culture | 5% | Revised goal achieved | 100% |
| Relative TSR (3-year) | 50% | -12.1% absolute; 72.7th percentile vs NBI | 100% (capped) |
| Aggregate payout | — | — | 88.6% of target |
| Castelli PRSUs (2022) | Target 59,071 | Earned 52,338 | 88.6% |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership | 828,123 shares; less than 1% of outstanding |
| Shares outstanding (context) | 307,923,069 as of Apr 11, 2025 |
| Stock ownership guideline | Other Executive Officers must hold ≥1x base salary; 5-year attainment period; compliance on track |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited for directors, officers, and employees |
| Insider trading controls | Trades require pre-clearance; blackout periods; policy filed as exhibit to 2024 Form 10-K |
| 10b5-1 trading plans | Executives must use pre-established Rule 10b5-1 plans; waiting period enforced |
Outstanding equity and scheduled vesting (as of Dec 31, 2024):
-
Options (select series for Castelli):
- 50,000 @ $12.28 exp 6/1/2025 (exercisable)
- 50,000 @ $9.03 exp 1/4/2026 (exercisable)
- 39,762 @ $15.67 exp 1/3/2028 (exercisable)
- 82,644 @ $10.04 exp 1/2/2029 (exercisable)
- 107,575 @ $9.55 exp 1/2/2030 (exercisable)
- 45,409 @ $21.78 exp 1/4/2031 (987 unexercisable)
- 78,931 @ $12.11 exp 1/3/2032 (29,335 unexercisable)
- 60,108 @ $11.93 exp 1/3/2033 (65,354 unexercisable)
- 99,073 @ $14.24 exp 1/2/2034 (unexercisable; 2024 grant)
-
RSUs not yet vested: 7,204 (2021 grant), 29,537 (2022), 53,011 (2023), 57,392 (2024) with aggregate market values computed at $9.42 closing on 12/31/2024 .
-
PRSUs outstanding (unearned; scheduled vesting):
- PRSUs vesting Dec 31, 2025: 10,602; 3,535; 21,204; 35,340 units
- PRSUs vesting Dec 31, 2026: 11,479; 17,217; 28,696 units
2024 equity vesting/realization:
| Item | Amount |
|---|---|
| Shares vested (2024) | 109,090 shares; value $1,280,231 |
| Options exercised (2024) | None |
Employment Terms
Contracted severance and change-of-control provisions for Dr. Castelli:
| Scenario | Cash Salary Continuation | Bonus | Equity Acceleration | Benefits | Triggers |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination without cause (non-CoC) | 12 months base salary | Pro-rated target bonus | Equity otherwise vesting within 12 months accelerates | 12 months company-paid premiums | Release required; 12-month non-compete/non-solicit |
| Termination within 12 months post-CoC or resignation for good reason | 18 months base salary | Target annual bonus | All outstanding equity vests; PRSUs vest at target or greater as determined by Board | 18 months company-paid premiums | Double-trigger |
Quantitative estimates (as of Dec 31, 2024):
| Scenario | Salary ($) | Bonus ($) | Benefits ($) | RSU & PRSU ($) | Options ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Change-of-control termination | $739,320 | $221,796 | $56,576 | $2,592,544 | — | $3,610,236 |
| Termination without cause (non-CoC) | $492,880 | $221,796 | $37,717 | $1,174,391 | — | $1,926,784 |
| Death or disability | $0 | $0 | $25,144 | $2,155,772 | — | $2,180,916 |
Other terms:
- Retirement-eligible equity treatment requires age/service criteria; for PRSUs, prorated eligibility based on service, with options/RSUs continuing to vest as specified; only Ms. Rosenberg met criteria in 2024 .
- Clawback policy aligns with Nasdaq Section 10D; covers stock price/TSR-linked compensation with 3-year lookback .
- No tax gross-ups except for company-required relocations .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment is strong: 2024 long-term incentives split evenly among options, RSUs, and PRSUs; PRSUs tied to TSR, revenue, and pipeline metrics with rigorous caps and multi-year horizons, reinforcing shareholder alignment and reducing short-term bias .
- Retention economics appear robust: double-trigger CoC protections (18-month salary, target bonus, full equity acceleration) and meaningful unvested RSUs/PRSUs (multi-year vesting through 2025–2026) lower near-term departure risk but can increase transaction-related dilution if a deal occurs .
- Insider selling pressure outlook: 2025–2026 scheduled RSU/PRSU vesting and options expiring in 2025–2026 may create supply overhang; however, strict 10b5-1 plan usage, blackout windows, and anti-hedging/pledging policies mitigate opportunistic selling risk .
- Execution signals: 2024 corporate multiplier at 108% reflected commercial strength and non-GAAP profitability; 2022 PRSUs paid at 88.6%, with TSR outperformance vs NBI despite negative absolute return, indicating relative performance emphasis in incentives .