Peter Schultz
About Peter O. Schultz
Peter O. Schultz is Executive Vice President – East Region at First Industrial Realty Trust (FR), age 62, serving as EVP since March 2009 after progressively senior roles since 1998; prior to FR, he was President and Managing Partner of PBS Properties, Inc. and held marketing and sales leadership roles at Pickering Group and Morgantown Properties . FR’s compensation framework ties Schultz’s pay to performance via annual FFO per diluted share/Unit, same store NOI growth, fixed charge coverage, and multi‑year relative TSR against the FTSE Nareit All Equity Index and an industrial REIT peer set, supporting alignment and long-term value creation . Company performance in 2024 featured 50.8% cash rental rate growth on leasing, 96.2% occupancy, 8.1% cash same store NOI growth, and dividend increases, while FFO per diluted share/Unit reached 2.65 and FR’s TSR translated to $136.6 on a $100 initial investment, indicating robust operational execution during Schultz’s tenure .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| First Industrial Realty Trust | Executive Vice President – East Region | Mar 2009–Present | Leads East Region operations, investments, developments, leasing; accountable for regional performance and portfolio optimization . |
| First Industrial Realty Trust | Senior Vice President – Portfolio Management | Jan 2009–Mar 2009 | Oversaw portfolio management processes and optimization prior to promotion to EVP . |
| First Industrial Realty Trust | Managing Director (East Region) | Nov 2007–Dec 2008 | Ran East Region with responsibility for strategy and execution . |
| First Industrial Realty Trust | Vice President – Leasing (East Region) | Sep 2004–Nov 2007 | Led leasing team, asset management plan implementation to drive occupancy/rent growth . |
| First Industrial Realty Trust | Senior Regional Director (Eastern PA/Southern NJ) | Jan 2001–Sep 2004 | Managed sub‑regional portfolio, leasing and operations . |
| First Industrial Realty Trust | Regional Director (Eastern PA) | Mar 1998–Dec 2000 | Directed Eastern PA portfolio operations . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| PBS Properties, Inc. | President and Managing Partner | Nov 1990–Mar 1998 | Led real estate platform; full P&L and capital deployment responsibility . |
| Pickering Group | Director of Marketing and Sales | Not disclosed | Commercial leadership in real estate marketing and sales . |
| Morgantown Properties | Director of Marketing and Sales | Not disclosed | Commercial leadership in real estate marketing and sales . |
| NAIOP | Professional affiliation | Current | Industry engagement and network in industrial/office properties . |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 (Current) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 415,000 | 434,000 | 451,500 | 488,000 |
| Target Bonus (% of Salary at 100% plan) | 200% | 200% | 200% | 200% |
| Actual Annual Cash Bonus ($) | 871,500 | 951,500 | 993,500 | N/A |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 28,298 | 32,438 | 36,538 | N/A |
| Perquisites/Benefits | Car allowance, term life, disability insurance; 401(k) match $20,700 for NEOs | Car allowance, term life, disability insurance; 401(k) match $20,700 | Car allowance, term life, disability insurance; 401(k) match $20,700 | N/A |
Additional policies: Clawback policy adopted Nov 1, 2023; covers incentive awards upon restatement . Hedging and pledging of FR securities prohibited; no options granted currently .
Performance Compensation
Annual Bonus Mechanics and 2024 Outcomes
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout for Metric | Plan Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FFO per diluted share/Unit | 50% | $2.67 | $2.73 (ex‑bonus accruals) | 125% | Cash, paid Q1 2025 |
| Same Store NOI Growth | 25% | 8.50% | 8.09% (committee calc.) | 80% | Cash |
| Fixed Charge Coverage Ratio | 10% | 4.46x | 4.70x | 125% | Cash |
| Discretionary Objectives | 15% | N/A | N/A | 100% | Cash |
| Overall Funding | — | — | — | 110% pool; Schultz Individual Cash % = 110% | Cash bonus paid $993,500 |
Individual performance objectives for Schultz: progress on investments/divestitures, completing and leasing developments, and East Region performance .
Long-Term Incentive Program (LTIP)
| Award Type | Grant Date | Form | Target Units | Max Units | Performance Period | Vesting Formula |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance-Based (TSR vs FTSE Nareit All Equity Index 46%; TSR vs LTI peer group 54%) | 1/02/2024 | Performance Units | 9,929 | 22,340 | 1/1/2024–12/31/2026 | 50% at 30th percentile; 100% at 50th; 225% at 75th percentile |
| Performance-Based (updated curve) | 1/02/2025 | Performance Units | 16,888 | 37,997 | 1/1/2025–12/31/2027 | 50% at 30th; 100% at 50th; 225% at 80th percentile |
| Time-Based Units | 1/02/2024 | Time-Based Units | 5,412 | N/A | 3-year ratable vest | Equal annual installments over 3 years |
| Time-Based Units | 1/02/2025 | Time-Based Units | 9,096 | N/A | 3-year ratable vest | Equal annual installments over 3 years |
Change-in-control treatment: time-based awards fully vest; performance awards vest based on actual performance through CIC date; retirement/death/disability accelerate per plan terms .
Outstanding and Vested Awards Status
| Status as of 12/31/2024 | Units | Value ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Unvested Time-Based Units | 10,661; tranches vest Jan 2025: 5,138; Jan 2026: 3,719; Jan 2027: 1,804 | $534,436 at $50.13 close |
| Unvested Performance Units (incl. accrued dividend equivalents) | 30,914 | $1,549,719 at $50.13 |
| 2025 Scheduled Performance Unit Vesting | 18,530 units (subject to performance) | N/A |
| 2026 Scheduled Performance Unit Vesting | 12,384 units (subject to performance) | N/A |
| 2024 Vested (Units/shares) | 15,218 units/shares | $775,880 value realized |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (Common/Units) | 207,350 |
| Ownership Guidelines | EVPs must hold 4x base salary; all NEOs currently in compliance |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited by insider trading policy |
| Options | None outstanding; company does not currently grant options |
| Alignment Mechanisms | Majority equity performance-based; relative TSR vs index and industrial peers; 3-year measurement |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms |
|---|---|
| Change-in-Control (CIC) Severance Cash | $3,841,500 upon termination without cause/for good reason in connection with CIC (lump sum within 45 days) |
| Medical Continuation | $21,215 estimated premiums for 12 months post‑termination (or cash equivalent) |
| Accelerated Equity on CIC | $1,963,908 (time-based full vest; performance-based vested based on achievement to CIC date) |
| Termination Without Cause (no CIC) | No cash severance under policy for Schultz (equity retirement/disability provisions apply per plan) |
| Non‑Compete | 2 years post‑termination (customer non‑solicit also 2 years) |
| Employee Non‑Solicit | 2 years |
| Non‑Disparagement/Confidentiality | Perpetual non‑disclosure/non‑disparagement |
| Life Insurance Coverage | $903,000 benefit |
| Clawback | SEC‑compliant incentive compensation recovery policy adopted Nov 1, 2023 |
Multi-Year Compensation (Summary for Schultz)
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | 415,000 | 434,000 | 451,500 |
| Stock Awards ($) | 791,468 | 928,899 | 955,310 |
| Non‑Equity Incentive Plan Compensation ($) | 871,500 | 951,500 | 993,500 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 28,298 | 32,438 | 36,538 |
| Total ($) | 2,106,266 | 2,346,837 | 2,436,848 |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- At‑risk pay is predominant: for NEOs, average at‑risk pay was 76.6% in 2024, with ~65% of equity performance‑based and ~35% time‑based, emphasizing TSR over three years vs index and peers .
- Annual bonus mix anchored to FFO/share (50%), SS NOI growth (25%), and fixed charge coverage (10%), plus 15% discretionary; FR funded 2024 pool at 110%, translating to Schultz’s 110% payout of his target .
- Company does not grant options currently; no option repricing risk; robust clawback policy mitigates restatement risk .
- Compensation benchmarking uses a defined REIT peer group; performance‑based peer group for LTIP includes key industrial REITs (PLD, REXR, EGP, TRNO, STAG, LXP, ILPT, PLYM) .
Performance & Track Record
| Indicator | 2024 |
|---|---|
| Cash Rental Rate Growth on Leasing | 50.8% |
| Year‑End Occupancy | 96.2% |
| Cash Same Store NOI Growth | 8.1% (ex certain accelerations) |
| Dividend Increase (2024) | 15.6%; Q1 2025 dividend $0.445 (+20.3% vs 2024 quarterly) |
| FFO per diluted share/Unit | 2.65 |
| Total Shareholder Return (Value of $100 investment) | $136.6 (Company TSR) vs $117.6 (peer index TSR) |
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 Say‑on‑Pay support ~95%; average ~92% across 2020–2024, indicating strong shareholder endorsement of pay practices .
Equity Ownership & Alignment Details
| Category | Amount/Status |
|---|---|
| Beneficially Owned Shares/Units | 207,350 |
| Unvested Time‑Based Units | 10,661 (vesting 2025/2026/2027 per schedule) |
| Unvested Performance Units | 30,914 (incl. accrued dividend equivalents) |
| Upcoming Performance Vesting | 18,530 on 12/31/2025; 12,384 on 12/31/2026 (subject to performance) |
| Ownership Guidelines Compliance | In compliance; EVP multiple = 4x salary |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited |
Employment & Contracts (Economics and Triggers)
| Trigger | Cash Severance | Equity Treatment | Benefits | Restrictive Covenants |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CIC + Qualifying Termination | $3,841,500 | Time‑based full vest; performance‑based vest at achieved levels | 12 months medical premiums $21,215 | Non‑compete 2 yrs; non‑solicit 2 yrs; perpetual NDA/ND |
| CIC only | — | Accelerated vesting value $1,963,908 | — | — |
| Death/Disability | — | Accelerated vesting per achievement through event date | Life insurance $903,000 | — |
| Termination without Cause (no CIC) | — | Retirement/disability vesting rules apply per plan documents | — | Non‑compete/non‑solicit durations as above |
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Schultz’s pay is heavily at‑risk with clear ties to FFO/share, SS NOI growth, capital structure (fixed charge coverage), and multi‑year relative TSR—supporting alignment with shareholder value creation and discouraging short‑term risk taking .
- Upcoming supply/vesting: Material scheduled vesting of performance units at year‑end 2025 (18,530) and 2026 (12,384) plus annual time‑based tranches may create episodic liquidity needs; anti‑pledging reduces forced‑sale risk, but monitoring Form 4 activity around vesting dates is prudent .
- Retention and change‑of‑control economics: Double‑trigger CIC severance at ~$3.84M plus accelerated equity can affect retention incentives in strategic transactions; non‑compete/non‑solicit terms mitigate competitive leakage risk .
- Governance quality: Strong say‑on‑pay outcomes (~95% in 2024), clawback in place, and no options/repricing reduce governance red flags; compensation benchmarking and clearly defined performance curves enhance predictability for investors .