Sign in

You're signed outSign in or to get full access.

James Beckwith

James Beckwith

President and Chief Executive Officer at FIVE STAR BANCORP
CEO
Executive
Board

About James Beckwith

James E. Beckwith, age 67, has served as President and Chief Executive Officer of Five Star Bancorp since 2003 and is a director of the Company and Bank . He holds a B.S. in Business Administration (Accounting) from San Francisco State University and is a graduate of Pacific Coast Banking School at the University of Washington . Under his tenure, FSBC has maintained steady profitability; recent S&P Global data show Net Income of $44.8m (FY22), $47.7m (FY23), and $45.7m (FY24), with revenues of $7.16m, $7.51m, and $6.45m respectively (see Performance table; values from S&P Global)*. The board separates the roles of CEO and Chair (independent chair: Robert T. Perry‑Smith), mitigating dual‑role governance risk .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
National Bank of the RedwoodsCFO and COOPrior to 2003Executive finance/operations leadership; foundational banking ops experience supporting subsequent CEO role
California Bankers AssociationChair (past)N/AIndustry leadership; policy and advocacy exposure
Sacramento Metro Chamber, Valley Vision, KVIEChair (past)N/ACommunity leadership; regional network and stakeholder engagement

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Greater Sacramento Economic CouncilPrivate Sector DirectorCurrentRegional economic development; business attraction and policy influence
Sacramento State Univ. College of Business Advisory CouncilMemberCurrentTalent pipeline; academic-industry linkage
California Chamber of CommerceDirectorElected 2024Statewide business advocacy; regulatory insight

Fixed Compensation

YearBase Salary ($)Target Bonus (% of Base)Max Bonus (% of Base)Actual Cash Bonus ($)
2022580,845 75% 100% 276,785
2023608,678 75% 100% 582,796
2024627,915 75% 100% 547,000

Additional items (2024): change in pension value (salary continuation agreement) was $(110,786) and other compensation $44,308 (auto, life insurance, 401(k) match, cell phone, club dues) .

Performance Compensation

  • Annual bonus structure (NEOs): Discretionary plan with individual and corporate goals; a portion payable in stock awards (generally vesting over time); subject to company clawback policy adopted Oct 2, 2023 . Stock options are not currently used; no new option-like instruments were granted in 2024 .
  • Long-term incentives (approved in 2025):
    • CEO PSU and RSA grants: PSUs $220,000 (grant date around Jul 28, 2025), RSAs $220,000; under 2021 Equity Incentive Plan .
    • PSU metric/payouts: 3-year average ROAA (to 12/31/2027) vs S&P Global Broad Market Index – Western Region peer set; payout at 60th/70th/80th percentile = 50%/100%/150% of target, vesting on 12/31/2027 if employed .
    • RSAs vest in equal annual installments over 5 years from grant date, service-based .
    • Similar program for other executives (PSUs/RSUs $100,000 each) approved Apr 17, 2025 .
  • Outstanding equity and vesting cadence:
    • 5/7/2021 grant: 25,713 unvested shares; 7-year equal annual vesting from one year after grant .
    • 2/7/2024 grant: 20,000 unvested shares; 5-year equal annual vesting from one year after grant .

Detailed LTI table

Award TypeMetricTarget/ThresholdsPayout CurveVesting
PSUs (2025 CEO award)3-yr avg ROAA vs S&P BMI – Western Region peersTarget at 70th percentile50% @ 60th; 100% @ 70th; 150% @ 80th+Vests 12/31/2027, subject to achievement and employment
RSAs (2025 CEO award)ServiceN/AN/A5 equal annual tranches from grant date
Legacy RS (2021 CEO award)ServiceN/AN/A7 equal annual tranches starting one year after grant

Equity Ownership & Alignment

  • Beneficial ownership: 486,381 shares (2.28% of outstanding as of Mar 21, 2025) .
  • Vested vs unvested near term: includes 6,429 shares vesting within 60 days and 35,284 shares not vesting within 60 days as of Mar 21, 2025 .
  • Pledging: 431,668 shares pledged as collateral to secure personal indebtedness (RED FLAG relative to alignment/forced-sale risk) . Company policy prohibits hedging and pledging absent board-approved exception .
  • Ownership breakdown (market-value references use $30.09 as of 12/31/2024):
    • 5/7/2021 unvested: 25,713 shares ($773,704) .
    • 2/7/2024 unvested: 20,000 shares ($601,800) .

Ownership table

ItemValue
Shares beneficially owned486,381 (2.28%)
Shares pledged431,668
Unvested shares (2021 grant)25,713; 7-year ratable vest
Unvested shares (2024 grant)20,000; 5-year ratable vest
Shares vesting within 60 days (as of 3/21/2025)6,429

Signals:

  • Time-based vesting in multiple tranches (5- and 7-year) creates periodic taxable events that can correlate with 10b5‑1 sales; executives may adopt 10b5‑1 plans per policy . Pledge introduces potential margin-call risk under adverse price scenarios despite policy restrictions .

Employment Terms

  • Employment agreement: Effective Jan 3, 2022 (initial 3-year term, then 1-year auto-renewals unless 60-day non-renewal notice) .
  • Target/Max bonus: 75% target; up to 100% maximum of base salary .
  • Severance: If terminated without cause or resigns for good reason, cash severance equals 24 months of then-current base salary plus bonus; subject to release of claims and “best-net” 280G cutback (no tax gross-up) .
  • Restrictive covenants: Confidentiality, employee non-solicitation, and non-disparagement obligations .
  • Salary continuation/SERP: $175,000 per year for 10 years commencing at age 65 (or certain earlier-termination scenarios based on service); upon change in control followed within 24 months by separation for good reason, same $175,000/year for 10 years beginning at age 65 .
  • Clawback: Company clawback policy adopted Oct 2, 2023 for erroneously awarded incentive compensation upon accounting restatements .

Board Governance

  • Role: Director since 2003; President & CEO .
  • Independence: Not independent (board majority independent; only Beckwith and David Nickum deemed non‑independent) .
  • Leadership structure: Roles separated—CEO (Beckwith) and independent Board Chair (Robert T. Perry‑Smith); no requirement for Lead Independent Director; board periodically reviews structure .
  • Committees: Audit (Perry‑Smith Chair; Kashiwagi; Reynoso), Compensation (Riggs Chair; Lucas; Ramos), Governance & Nominating (Allbaugh Chair; Deary‑Bell; Perry‑Smith); all committee members are independent .
  • Director pay: Beckwith receives no additional director compensation (officer-only compensation) .
  • Hedging/pledging policy: Prohibits hedging and pledging absent exceptions; also restricts margin accounts .

Director Compensation (as a Director)

  • Not applicable—no separate fees or equity for Beckwith as he is compensated as an officer .

Performance & Track Record

Company performance context (S&P Global):

  • Annual | Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 | |---|---:|---:|---:| | Revenues ($) | 7,157,000* | 7,511,000* | 6,453,000* | | Net Income ($) | 44,801,000* | 47,734,000* | 45,671,000* | Values retrieved from S&P Global.

  • Recent quarters | Metric | Q4 2024 | Q1 2025 | Q2 2025 | Q3 2025 | |---|---:|---:|---:|---:| | Revenues ($) | 1,666,000* | 1,359,000* | 1,810,000* | 1,966,000* | | Net Income ($) | 13,317,000* | 13,111,000* | 14,508,000* | 16,344,000* | Values retrieved from S&P Global.

Strategic execution highlights (qualitative context): management underscores growth in agriculture, manufactured housing/RV, storage, student housing (Berkeley), construction industries/deposits, Bay Area C&I/CRE, and government/nonprofit deposit niches per Q3’25 call commentary by Beckwith .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Shift toward performance equity: Introduction of PSUs tied to relative ROAA aligns LTI with multi-year profitability vs peers (payout 50–150% of target) .
  • Continued use of time-vest RS/RSAs: 5–7 year vesting promotes retention but can reduce performance sensitivity vs pure PSU mix .
  • No options/repricing: Company does not currently grant stock options, reducing risk of underwater option repricings (a positive governance signal) .
  • Clawback adoption: Post‑2023 clawback policy reduces risk of paying for misstated results .
  • Guaranteed vs at‑risk: CEO’s annual cash bonus remains discretionary and at‑risk, with stock components historically used (2024: stock awards reported at $439,400) .

Related Party Transactions (context)

  • Ordinary‑course loans/deposits with insiders are permitted and monitored; as of Dec 31, 2024, ~$14.5m loans outstanding to directors/executives/major shareholders and affiliates; no loans were nonaccrual, past due, restructured, or potential problem loans .

Equity Grant Detail (Unvested at 12/31/2024)

Grant DateUnvested SharesMarket Value (12/31/2024)Vesting Schedule
5/7/202125,713 $773,704 7 equal annual installments from one year after grant
2/7/202420,000 $601,800 5 equal annual installments from one year after grant

Employment & Contracts Summary

TermProvision
Agreement termEffective 1/3/2022; initial 3 years; auto-renew 1-year terms unless 60-day non-renewal
Target/Max bonus75% target; 100% max of base salary
Severance24 months base salary + bonus upon termination without cause/for good reason; release required; 280G “best-net” (no gross‑up)
SERP/Salary continuation$175k annually for 10 years at age 65 (or earlier based on service); similar benefit upon CIC + separation for good reason within 24 months
CovenantsConfidentiality; employee non‑solicit; non‑disparagement

Board Service Considerations (Dual-Role Implications)

  • CEO + Director (not Chair): Board has separated Chair and CEO; current independent Chair (Perry‑Smith) and independent committees provide oversight, mitigating common dual‑role concerns .
  • Independence: Beckwith not independent; board majority independent supports checks and balances .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment vs risk: The 2025 PSUs introduce clearer pay‑for‑performance linkage (relative ROAA), a positive for alignment. However, the large share pledge (431,668 shares) introduces forced‑sale risk in drawdowns; maintain vigilance for any pledge reductions or policy changes .
  • Retention and selling pressure: Multi‑year time‑vest RS/RSAs (5–7 years) create steady vest events that can lead to periodic 10b5‑1 sales; monitor Form 4s around anniversary dates to gauge supply dynamics .
  • Severance economics: 2x salary+bonus severance and a defined SERP provide retention but add cost in transitions; absence of 280G gross‑up and presence of a clawback are shareholder‑friendly mitigants .
  • Performance context: Net income remained resilient through FY24 and improved sequentially in 2025 quarters (per S&P Global); management targets niche growth segments (ag, MHC/RV, storage, government/nonprofit, Bay Area C&I/CRE), which can support TSR if credit/rate management remains disciplined .

Notes: *Values retrieved from S&P Global.