Alexander Bradley
FIRST SOLARAbout Alexander Bradley
Alexander R. Bradley, age 43, is Chief Financial Officer of First Solar (appointed October 2016; with the company since May 2008). He previously led Treasury and Project Finance, structuring/selling/financing over $10B and ~2.7 GW of development assets; earlier career at HSBC in investment banking and leveraged finance. Education: Master of Arts, University of Edinburgh. During his tenure, First Solar’s revenue rose from $2.71B in FY2020 to $4.21B in FY2024, and EBITDA recovered from a 2022 trough to $1.82B in FY2024, reflecting execution on Series 6/7 modules and margin expansion . EBITDA values marked with * retrieved from S&P Global.*
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| First Solar | VP Treasury & Project Finance; later CFO | 2008–present; CFO since Oct-2016 | Led/supported >$10B financing and ~2.7 GW assets; helped enable utility-scale PV growth and financing readiness . |
| 8point3 Energy Partners GP | Officer/board member | 2016–2018 | Governance and financing leadership for yieldco assets, supporting monetization of PV portfolios . |
| HSBC (London/New York) | Investment banking & leveraged finance (Energy/Utilities) | Pre-2008 | Capital markets expertise in energy/utilities that underpin FSLR financing discipline . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| 8point3 Energy Partners GP | Officer/board member | 2016–2018 | Oversight of yieldco strategy, cash flow stability, and investor communications . |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base salary ($) | 491,934 | 519,486 | 541,231; annual rate increased to $545,000 effective Mar 1, 2024 |
| 401(k) company match ($) | 12,200 | 13,200 | 13,800 |
| Perquisites | None disclosed; company states no executive perquisites typically provided |
Performance Compensation
Annual Bonus Plan (2024)
| Item | Target | Actual | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| Target bonus % of base | 90% | — | Plan target set at 90% |
| Threshold metric | Adjusted net operating income ≥ $900M | $1.6B | Threshold met; awards eligible |
| Company payout factor | — | — | 0.45 payout level based on metric results |
| Individual adjustment | — | — | Downward discretionary adjustment applied; individual component (40%) zeroed for NEOs, including Bradley |
| 2024 bonus paid ($) | — | $131,638 | Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation for Bradley |
Selected 2024 company metrics, weights, and performance:
- Net cash year-end (10%): payout factor 0.65
- Global gender representation (5%): 0.83
- Safety “good catch” incidents (5%): target 300 per 100 employees; achieved 434; payout 2.00
- CpW produced (20%): 0.00
- CuRe production (20%): 0.69
- CuRe 2026 bundle demonstration (20%): 0.00
- U.S.-made volume sold (10%): 1.00
- Net bookings (10%): target 17.5 GW (incl. 3 GW India); achieved 4.4 GW total, 0.6 GW India; payout 0.00
Equity Incentives (granted Mar 6, 2024)
| Award | Grant date | Units | Fair value ($) | Vesting | Performance metrics/period |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs | 3/6/2024 | 3,788 | 600,095 | Time-based; 25% per year on each of first 4 anniversaries, service-based | |
| Performance Units (EPEP) | 3/6/2024 | Target 5,681 (threshold 2,841; max 11,362) | 899,984 | Performance-based; 3-year period ending Dec 2026 | |
| EPEP 2024 metrics and weights | — | — | — | Backlog after 2026 (20%), ASP per watt from tech improvements (25%), CuRe production volume in 2026 (25%), Operating margin 2024/2025/2026 (10% each) |
Outstanding & vesting mechanics:
- RSUs: service credit of one year on termination without cause/death/disability per employment agreement; change-in-control treatment per CIC Agreement .
- PUs: double-trigger vesting if assumed; accelerate at greater of target or actual on qualifying termination post-CIC; pro-rated settlement on qualifying retirement after year one of performance period .
Multi-year Compensation Summary
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock awards ($) | 1,349,955 | 2,000,079 | 1,500,079 |
| Non-equity incentive ($) | 605,234 | 589,572 | 131,638 |
| Total compensation ($) | 2,459,323 | 3,122,337 | 2,186,748 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (common shares) | 45,717 (less than 1%) as of Mar 20, 2025; 107,240,417 shares outstanding |
| Unvested RSUs (aggregate across grants) | 37,392 units; market value $6,589,965 at $176.24 close on Dec 31, 2024 |
| Unearned PUs (aggregate across grants) | 19,776 units; payout value basis $3,485,322 at $176.24 close |
| Shares pledged | Not disclosed; company prohibits margin purchases and hedging, which reduces pledge/derivative risk |
| Stock ownership guideline | 3× base salary for executive officers; 5-year compliance window; executives met or were on track by Dec 31, 2024 |
Insider selling pressure indicators:
- Shares vested in 2024: 28,046; value realized $4,333,733 (market prices on vest dates) .
- Substantial unvested RSUs/PUs imply ongoing scheduled vesting; hedging/shorts/derivatives prohibited, limiting aggressive de-risking .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Key terms |
|---|---|
| Employment start dates | Company: May 2008; CFO appointment: Oct 2016 |
| Severance (without cause) | Base salary continuation 12 months; health benefits up to 12 months; 12 months service credit for time-based equity (not PUs); release required; similar for death/disability |
| Non-compete / non-solicit | Restricted period generally one year (two years for CEO); confidentiality/IP agreements in place |
| Change-in-control (CIC) | Double-trigger equity vesting (time-based and PUs) on termination without cause or resignation for good reason within 2 years post-CIC (Antoun exception noted); severance: 2× base salary + 2× bonus amount (greater of target or 3-year average), prorated target bonus, 18 months health benefits, up to $20,000 outplacement; release and clawback apply |
| Clawback policy | Section 10D-compliant; recovery of incentive comp for 3 completed fiscal years preceding restatement; applies to all Section 16 officers; covers any incentive tied wholly/in part to financial reporting measures |
| Hedging/derivatives/margin | Prohibited for all directors/associates, including executives (short sales, puts/calls/derivatives, margin purchases) |
| Tax gross-ups | None for excise under 280G; no legacy gross-ups for NEOs |
| Deferred compensation/pension | None (outside qualified 401(k)) |
Performance & Track Record (Company-level under Bradley’s tenure)
| Metric | FY 2020 | FY 2021 | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue ($) | 2,711.3M | 2,923.4M | 2,619.3M | 3,318.6M | 4,206.3M |
| EBITDA ($) | 573.8M* | 699.4M* | -11.0M* | 1,193.9M* | 1,817.2M* |
*Values retrieved from S&P Global.
Context:
- 2024 Bonus Plan threshold set to focus on adjusted operating income ($900M minimum; $1.6B achieved), with operational/commercial metrics balancing cost, technology adoption (CuRe), safety, bookings, and U.S.-made sales volume .
- Long-term EPEP metrics emphasize backlog quality beyond 2026, technology-driven ASP improvements, CuRe volumes, and sustained operating margins 2024–2026 .
Compensation Peer Group (Benchmarking)
- 2024 peer group: 28 U.S.-listed companies across semiconductors, renewable IPPs, electrical components, and select utilities (e.g., ON Semiconductor, Enphase, Generac, Lam Research, NextEra, AES, Xcel, etc.). Median revenues ~$4.0B; median market cap ~$13.9B (approved July 2023) .
- Targeting: TDC around 50th percentile; 2024 equity value targeted at 50th–75th percentile; typical LTI mix ~60% PUs / 40% RSUs (Antoun 80%/20%) .
Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 say-on-pay approval: over 94% of votes cast; annual vote cycle affirmed by 98% in 2023; the Board sustained pay philosophy and continued shareholder engagement .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Bradley’s incentives are anchored to adjusted operating income thresholds and operational/technology/commercial metrics, with strong emphasis on multi-year operating margin and backlog quality—supportive of long-run margin durability and pricing power .
- Retention and selling pressure: Significant unvested RSUs/PUs (37,392 RSUs; 19,776 PUs) and double-trigger CIC terms reduce forced selling and incentivize retention; 2024 vesting of 28,046 shares generated material liquidity but hedging/margin prohibitions constrain de-risking tactics .
- Governance quality: Robust clawback compliant with SEC/NASDAQ, no excise tax gross-ups, standard severance, and one-year non-compete terms mitigate shareholder-unfriendly practices and reduce alignment risk .
- Performance trajectory: Revenues and EBITDA have strengthened notably through 2024 under Bradley’s financial leadership, reflecting improved operating leverage and technology roadmap execution; continued EPEP focus on ASP uplift and margins should reinforce value creation if targets are met .