Markus Gloeckler
FIRST SOLARAbout Markus Gloeckler
Markus Gloeckler, 51, is First Solar’s Chief Technology Officer (CTO), appointed in November 2020 (co-CTO in July 2020). He holds a PhD in physics from Colorado State University and an undergraduate degree in microsystems engineering from Regensburg University of Applied Sciences; he joined First Solar in 2005 and has led thin film R&D, technology transfers (including GE’s 2013 IP), and multiple cell efficiency world records in CdTe PV . Recent company operating context includes Q3 2025 net sales of $1.6B, backlog of 53.7 GW valued at $16.4B, and raised 2025 EPS guidance to $14.00–$15.00, reflecting strong commercial execution amid industry volatility .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| First Solar, Inc. | Chief Technology Officer | Nov 2020–present | Leads thin film PV module technology; guides strategic R&D and roadmaps |
| First Solar, Inc. | Co-Chief Technology Officer | Jul–Nov 2020 | Transition role to CTO; leadership of module technology |
| First Solar, Inc. | SVP, Module R&D | n/d | Advanced module R&D; enabled world-record CdTe efficiency milestones |
| First Solar, Inc. | VP & Chief Scientist | n/d | Led R&D; oversaw 2013 GE thin film tech transfer to First Solar |
| First Solar, Inc. | Engineering roles (joined) | 2005 | Early engineering support after Series 2 module launch |
External Roles
- No external public company directorships or external roles for Mr. Gloeckler are disclosed in the 2024 10-K or 2025 proxy .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base salary earned ($) | 430,312 | 449,173 |
| Annual base salary rate (effective Mar 1, 2024) ($) | n/a | 452,000 |
| Target bonus (% of base) | n/d | 80% |
| Annual bonus paid – NEIP ($) | 448,191 | 97,101 |
Notes:
- 2024 bonus mechanics: corporate performance funded the pool (Adjusted NOI threshold: target ≥$900M; result $1.6B), but individual performance portion (40%) for NEOs, including CTO, was set to zero due to operating misses .
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Bonus Plan – Company Metrics and Results
| Metric | Weight | Target (if disclosed) | Result (if disclosed) | Payout Factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net cash – 2024 year-end | 10% | n/d | n/d | 0.65 |
| Global gender representation | 5% | n/d | n/d | 0.83 |
| Safety (“good catch” incidents per 100 employees) | 5% | 300 | 434 | 2.00 |
| Core Cost per Watt (CpW) produced | 20% | n/d | n/d | 0.00 |
| CuRe production | 20% | n/d | n/d | 0.69 |
| CuRe 2026 bundle demonstration | 20% | n/d | n/d | 0.00 |
| U.S.-made volume sold in 2024 | 10% | n/d | n/d | 1.00 |
| Net bookings | 10% | 17.5 GW (incl. 3 GW India) | 4.4 GW (0.6 GW India) | 0.00 |
Plan-level outcomes:
- Threshold metric achieved (Adjusted NOI); company performance payout factor 0.45; individual performance portion for NEOs reduced to zero, lowering actual payouts .
Long-Term Incentives (EPEP 2024–2026)
| Performance Metric | Weight | Vesting Mechanics |
|---|---|---|
| Module sales backlog for delivery after 2026 | 20% | 0.0–2.0x multipliers; vest post-certification of performance period (ends Dec 2026) |
| Average selling price (tech-driven uplift) | 25% | As above |
| CuRe module production volume (2026) | 25% | As above |
| Operating margin – 2024 | 10% | As above |
| Operating margin – 2025 | 10% | As above |
| Operating margin – 2026 | 10% | As above |
- 2021 and 2022 EPEP performance units were certified at ~maximum in Feb 2024 and Feb 2025, respectively, with shares delivered (net of tax), indicating prior outperformance against goals .
2024 Equity Grants – CTO (Granted Mar 6, 2024)
| Award Type | Shares/Units (#) | Vesting | Grant Date Fair Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs | 3,409 | 25% annually over 4 years | 540,054 |
| Performance Units (target) | 5,112 | 3-year performance (to Dec 2026) | 809,843 (target); $1,619,686 (max) |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Ownership Detail (as of stated date) | Value |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (Mar 20, 2025) | 17,594 shares; <1% of outstanding |
| Unvested RSUs (Dec 31, 2024) | 24,964 units; $4,399,656 market value at $176.24/share |
| Unearned PUs (Dec 31, 2024) | 18,786 units; $3,310,845 market/payout value at $176.24/share |
Alignment policies and practices:
- Executive share ownership guideline: 3× base salary for executive officers; five years to comply; as of Dec 31, 2024, all NEOs met or were on track .
- Insider policy prohibits short sales, buying or selling puts/calls/derivatives on Company stock, and purchasing Company securities on margin .
- 10b5-1/Item 408(c): In Q3 2025, one officer (CCO) adopted a 10b5-1 plan; no adoption by Mr. Gloeckler disclosed in that quarter .
Vesting and potential selling pressure:
- RSUs granted in 2024 vest 25% annually on each anniversary of Mar 6, 2024; older RSUs typically vest 20% annually over 5 years .
- Historical EPEP awards (2021/2022) paid at ~max in early 2024/2025, creating share deliveries; 2024–2026 PUs could create additional supply upon certification in 2027 (subject to performance and tax withholdings) .
Employment Terms
- Employment Agreement and related agreements (effective Aug 10, 2020; amended Jan 8, 2021) on file, including CIC, confidentiality/IP, non-compete/non-solicit .
- Severance (outside CIC): upon termination without cause, one year salary continuation, up to 12 months health benefits, and +12 months service credit for time-based equity vesting (not PUs); one-year non-compete/non-solicit period .
Estimated payments as of Dec 31, 2024:
- Termination without cause:
- Cash severance: $452,000; Health coverage: $25,555; Equity treatment: $517,617; Total: $995,172 .
- Death/Disability/Retirement:
- Cash: $161,835; Equity treatment: $2,777,719; Total: $2,939,554 .
Change-in-control (CIC) economics:
- Double-trigger for Mr. Gloeckler (termination without cause or for good reason within 2 years post-CIC): cash severance of 2× base + 2× bonus (greater of target or 3-year average), prorated target bonus, 18 months benefits, up to $20k outplacement; equity acceleration per plan terms .
- Estimated CIC qualifying termination payout (as of Dec 31, 2024): Cash $2,009,720; Accelerated equity $4,926,613; Benefits $38,333; Outplacement $20,000; Total $6,994,666 .
Clawback and perquisites:
- Company-wide clawback policy effective Dec 1, 2023, covering incentive comp tied to financial metrics, in line with SEC/NASDAQ rules .
- No executive perquisites typically provided to NEOs .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment remains strong: heavy weighting to performance units (EPEP) with multi-year operating and technology milestones; recent 2021/2022 EPEP cycles paid near max, indicating prior execution momentum .
- Execution risk flagged by 2024 bonus outcomes: zero payout on CpW reduction and CuRe 2026 bundle demonstration metrics, plus a zeroed individual performance component for NEOs, signal near-term delivery challenges on the technology roadmap—key to margin and ASP uplift objectives .
- Retention and supply overhang: sizable unvested RSUs ($4.4M) and unearned PUs ($3.3M) for the CTO create retention hooks; watch annual RSU vesting cycles and potential PUs settlement windows (post-2026) for incremental share supply, noting tax withholding netting .
- Governance safeguards: double-trigger CIC vesting, no excise tax gross-ups, robust hedging restrictions, and formal clawback reduce shareholder-unfriendly risks; say-on-pay support >94% in 2024 suggests investor alignment with compensation design .