Christian Meisner
GENERAL ELECTRICAbout Christian Meisner
Christian Meisner is GE Aerospace’s Senior Vice President and Chief Human Resources Officer (CHRO). Age 55; education includes Villanova (undergraduate) and an M.A. in Labor & Industrial Relations from Michigan State; tenure ~1 year in the CHRO role since October 2023 . 2024 highlights include building the HR function for the standalone company, staffing senior leadership roles, conducting the first employee engagement survey, launching the “Takeoff Grant” broad-based equity program, and strengthening organization/talent reviews integrated with compensation and development . Executive incentives are aligned to annual metrics—revenue growth (20%), operating profit (40%), free cash flow (40%)—with a ±10% safety modifier; the Compensation Committee applied negative discretion to adjust total company performance from 174% to 165% given operational shortfalls, while safety metrics met targets (TRR 0.50; serious incidents 0; fatalities 0) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| GE Aerospace | SVP & CHRO | Oct 2023–Present | Established standalone HR function; led senior staffing; ran first employee engagement survey; launched Takeoff Grant; strengthened talent reviews integrated with comp/development |
| Kaiser Permanente | SVP & CHRO | 2020–2023 | Not disclosed in proxy |
| United Technologies | Corporate Vice President, Talent & Integration | 2019–2020 | Not disclosed in proxy |
| Otis Elevator | Chief Human Resources Officer | 2016–2019 | Not disclosed in proxy |
External Roles
No external public-company directorships or committee roles disclosed in the GE Aerospace proxy biography for Mr. Meisner .
Fixed Compensation
| Item | 2024 Amount | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $800,000 | Target annual program compensation table |
| Target Bonus % | 100% | Set by AEIP for SVPs |
| Target Bonus ($) | $800,000 | Target annual program compensation table |
| Actual AEIP Bonus Paid | $1,400,000 | Summary Compensation Table (Non-Equity Incentive Plan Comp.) |
| Total Annual Program Compensation | $5,673,380 | Salary + AEIP + annual stock awards + annual stock options |
Other Compensation & Perquisites (2024)
| Component | Amount |
|---|---|
| Company Contributions to Savings Plans | $24,150 |
| Company Credits to Restoration Plan | $40,354 |
| Other (car service, physicals, planning services, etc.) | $3,100 |
| Total All Other Compensation | $67,604 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Executive Incentive Plan (AEIP) Design and 2024 Outcomes
| Metric | Weighting | Target Framework | 2024 Result Context | Payout/Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue/Adjusted Revenue Growth | 20% | Targets set early in year; standalone GE Aerospace post Vernova spin; designed as “meaningful growth vs prior year” | Total company performance adjusted by Committee from 174% to 165% due to operational underdelivery despite strong financials | Meisner 2024 AEIP cash bonus paid: $1,400,000 |
| Operating Profit | 40% | Same as above | Near/at maximum performance; negative discretion applied | AEIP range 0–200% of target, plus ±10% safety modifier |
| Free Cash Flow | 40% | Same as above | Near/at maximum performance; negative discretion applied | Executives with total company responsibility (e.g., CHRO) are 100% based on total company metrics |
| Safety Modifier | ±10% | TRR, serious incidents, fatalities against pre-set targets | 2024 safety performance: TRR 0.50; serious incidents 0; fatalities 0 | Applied as a payout modifier |
2024 Grants of Plan-Based Awards (LTIP)
| Grant Date | Award Type | Shares/Units | Plan Range | Exercise Price | Grant Date Fair Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5/1/2024 | PSUs | Target 11,212; Threshold 1,121; Max 19,621 | 0–175% based on performance; 3-year program with relative TSR modifier | — | $1,749,969 |
| 5/1/2024 | Stock Options | 17,355 | N/A | $159.70 | $1,049,978 |
| 5/1/2024 | RSUs | 4,510 | N/A | — | $673,433 |
| 4/2/2024 | Spin-off Equitable Adjustment | — | Modification accounting for GE Vernova spin | — | $26,162 |
| 4/2/2024 | Spin-off Equitable Adjustment | — | Modification accounting for GE Vernova spin | — | $42,240 |
Vesting mechanics: Annual 2024 PSUs vest 100% on the third anniversary of grant date (subject to performance); 2024 options and RSUs vest 50% on each of the second and third anniversary of grant date; option prices reflect closing price on grant date .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (12/31/2024) | 0 shares; <1% of class; none pledged as security |
| Outstanding Options (Unexercisable) | 31,499 (12/1/2023 grant, $96.36 strike, exp. 12/1/2033); 17,355 (5/1/2024 grant, $159.70 strike, exp. 5/1/2034) |
| Outstanding RSUs | 13,611 (12/1/2023 grant); 4,510 (5/1/2024 grant) |
| Outstanding PSUs | 19,621 (5/1/2024 grant; subject to performance) |
| Market Value of Outstanding (12/31/2024) | Options: $2,341,522; RSUs/PSUs: $5,593,720 (death/disability/termination scenario intrinsic values are disclosed; see termination table) |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | Senior VPs: 3x base salary; 5 years to comply; RSUs and certain holdings count; all named executives are in compliance |
| Holding, Hedging & Pledging Policies | Must hold net shares from RSU/PSU vesting or option exercise until guideline satisfied; one-year holding for certain awards; no hedging or pledging permitted |
Upcoming Vesting Landmarks (Selling Pressure Windows)
- 12/1/2025: 50% vesting of 12/1/2023 RSUs and options (first tranche) .
- 12/1/2026: Remaining 50% vesting of 12/1/2023 RSUs and options (second tranche) .
- 5/1/2026: 50% vesting of 5/1/2024 RSUs and options (first tranche) .
- 5/1/2027: Remaining 50% vesting of 5/1/2024 RSUs and options, and PSUs vest 100% subject to performance .
Employment Terms
| Term | Details |
|---|---|
| Appointment | SVP & CHRO, GE Aerospace, offer letter August 2023; role effective October 2023 |
| Non-Compete / Non-Solicit | 12-month non-compete and non-solicitation covenants |
| Severance Plan Eligibility | U.S. Executive Severance Plan at 18 months of base salary; Meisner would receive $1,200,000 in a termination scenario modeled as of 12/31/2024 |
| Change-in-Control Treatment | Eligible for vesting of sign-on equity and 2024/2025 annual awards if terminated other than for cause, for good reason, death/disability, or in a CoC without a comparable offer; no single-trigger equity vesting for NEO equity awards |
| AEIP Pro-Rata Treatment | Pro-rata AEIP for year of termination if termination occurs after March 31 |
| Clawback | Board may seek reimbursement of incentive compensation for fraudulent/illegal misconduct or material inaccuracies tied to performance metrics/financials |
| Shareholder Severance Policy | Shareholder ratification required for any future executive cash severance >2.99x salary + target bonus; adopted Feb 2025 |
Compensation Peer Group (Benchmarking)
| 2024 Peer Companies |
|---|
| 3M; American Airlines; Boeing; Caterpillar; Delta Airlines; Emerson Electric; FedEx; General Dynamics; Honeywell; L3Harris; Lockheed Martin; Northrop Grumman; Parker-Hannifin; RTX; Textron; TransDigm; United Airlines |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: AEIP metrics (revenue growth, operating profit, free cash flow) with a safety modifier and Committee discretion demonstrate balanced incentives and governance discipline; 2024 negative discretion (174% → 165%) underscores willingness to temper payouts for operational underdelivery .
- Retention and selling pressure: Multi-year vesting (50/50 at years 2 and 3 for RSUs/options; PSUs at year 3) creates staggered liquidity windows in late 2025–2027 that can lead to periodic selling; however, mandatory holding until stock ownership guidelines are met and one-year post-vest holding on certain awards mitigate near-term selling pressure .
- Skin-in-the-game: Beneficial ownership shows 0 directly owned shares at year-end 2024 (<1%); nonetheless, outstanding RSUs/PSUs and policy counting of RSUs toward guidelines, plus 3x salary ownership requirement over five years, support increasing alignment over time; hedging and pledging are prohibited, reducing alignment risk .
- Downside protection and exit economics: Standardized severance (18 months base; $1.2M for Meisner) and CoC protections (double-trigger; no single-trigger equity vesting) balance retention with shareholder safeguards; clawback policy adds an enforcement layer against misconduct .
- Program competitiveness: Peer group includes major aerospace/industrial names; evolving severance approval policy (shareholder ratification above 2.99x cash) and transparent AEIP design should resonate with institutional governance expectations .