Kevin O’Neill
CEO, Pharmaceutical Diagnostics at GEHC
Executive
About Kevin O’Neill
Kevin M. O’Neill (age 56) is President & CEO of Pharmaceutical Diagnostics (PDx) at GE HealthCare. He has led PDx since July 2017 (pre‑spin), and continued in the role post‑spin, with prior tenure as CFO of Life Sciences and President & CEO of GE Ireland & U.K. . O’Neill has 20+ years at GE across finance and operating roles; before GE he was Financial Controller at Eurostar . Company performance relevant to his remit: GE HealthCare delivered 2024 revenues of $19.7B, net income of $2.0B, adjusted EBIT of $3.2B, diluted EPS of $4.34, and free cash flow of $1.6B, reflecting execution on precision care and PDx/complementary imaging growth initiatives . In 2024 the company also advanced radiopharmaceuticals with a planned acquisition of the remaining 50% stake in Nihon Medi‑Physics (PDx distribution), supporting O’Neill’s business footprint .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| GE HealthCare (PDx) | CEO, Pharmaceutical Diagnostics | 2017–present | Scaled contrast media and radiopharmaceutical supply; integration with imaging portfolio . |
| GE HealthCare (Life Sciences) | CFO | 2013–2017 | Financial leadership for Life Sciences growth and portfolio . |
| GE Ireland & U.K. | President & CEO | 2018–2023 | Country leadership and stakeholder engagement across GE businesses . |
| GE (Energy Services/Healthcare) | Various CFO/finance roles | ~2000s–2010s | Regional and supply chain finance leadership; PDx finance . |
| Eurostar | Financial Controller | pre‑GE | Operational finance at European high‑speed rail operator . |
External Roles
Not disclosed in SEC filings reviewed for GE HealthCare –.
Fixed Compensation
- Base salary decisions for executives are set by the Compensation Committee, benchmarked to market, role/impact, and performance; specific salary figures for O’Neill are not disclosed in the proxy as he is not a Named Executive Officer (NEO) .
- Stock ownership requirements: CEO 6x salary; other executives 3x salary. Executives must retain at least 75% of net shares from vesting/exercise until guideline compliance .
Performance Compensation
| Element | Metric | Weight | Target/Design | Payout Range | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Bonus (Corporate) | Organic revenue ($M) | 50% | Target $20,200; Threshold $18,786; Max $21,614 | 50–200%; 2024 actual 93% corporate payout with +5% NPI Vitality and +5% Safety modifiers | Annual cash (paid after year-end) –. |
| Annual Bonus (Corporate) | Adjusted EBIT ($M) | 30% | Target $3,250; Threshold $2,763; Max $3,738 | 50–200%; 2024 actual payout 97% (adjusted for acquisitions) | Annual –. |
| Annual Bonus (Corporate) | Free cash flow ($M) | 20% | Target $1,800; Threshold $1,350; Max $2,160 | 50–200%; 2024 actual payout 73% | Annual –. |
| Strategic Modifiers | NPI Vitality (% of orders) | +/−5 pts | Innovation vitality | Applied to blended corporate/segment results – | Annual –. |
| Strategic Modifiers | Safety (injury/illness rate) | +/−5 pts | Safety outcomes | Applied to blended corporate/segment results – | Annual –. |
| LTI – PSUs | 2026 Organic revenue | 50% | 3‑yr performance (2024–2026) | 0–200% of target, with relative TSR modifier ±20% vs peer group –. | Cliff vest at end of 3 years . |
| LTI – PSUs | 2024–2026 Cumulative Adjusted EPS | 50% | 3‑yr performance | 0–200% of target, TSR ±20% –. | Cliff vest at end of 3 years . |
| LTI – Options | Stock price appreciation | — | Standard 10‑year term | Value only if stock rises | 1/3 at 18/30/42 months from grant . |
| LTI – RSUs | Time-based | — | Equity retention | N/A | 1/3 at 18/30/42 months from grant . |
Notes:
- Executive program emphasizes at‑risk pay, rigorous goals, TSR modifier, and capped payouts; no single‑trigger cash severance or equity acceleration in change‑of‑control .
- 2024 say‑on‑pay support was 92.6%, evidencing investor backing of pay design .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Guidelines: 3x salary for executives; 6x for CEO. 75% net shares retention until compliant; includes unvested RSUs (excludes PSUs) and certain deferred balances .
- Hedging/pledging: Prohibited for directors, executive officers, and all employees (short sales, derivatives, margin pledging) .
- Beneficial ownership: The 2025 proxy’s group footnote notes “59 shares over which Mr. O’Neill has shared investment power but sole voting power,” within the directors/executive officers group line item; individual O’Neill holdings are not separately tabulated as he is not a NEO or director .
- Ownership concentration: Top holders include Capital Research (12.7%), Vanguard (11.5%), and BlackRock (7.9%) as of March 31, 2025 .
Employment Terms
- Clawback: Mandatory (SEC/Nasdaq Rule 10D‑1) for material restatements, plus discretionary recoupment for misconduct or detrimental acts; applies to cash and equity incentives .
- Severance policy: Company seeks stockholder ratification (advisory) if any executive cash severance exceeds 2.99× base + target bonus; design intent is to limit severance inflation .
- Change‑of‑control: No single‑trigger cash severance or equity acceleration (double‑trigger required) .
- Insider trading policy: Codified; filed as Exhibit 19.1 to the 2024 Form 10‑K; trading windows, pre‑clearance and MNPI rules apply .
Performance & Track Record
- PDx strategic context: PDx supplies contrast/radiopharmaceutical agents across CT/MR/Ultrasound/SPECT/PET, with a complex regulated supply chain; complements imaging businesses, enabling precision diagnostics and therapy selection .
- 2024 strategic actions: Closed acquisitions of MIM Software and Intelligent Ultrasound; announced plan to acquire remaining 50% of Nihon Medi‑Physics to deepen radiopharmaceutical distribution (PDx adjacency) .
- Company‑level execution: Delivered 2024 Organic revenue of $19.7B and adjusted EPS focus consistent with PSU metrics; balanced growth, margin/cash priorities .
Board Governance (not a director)
O’Neill is an executive officer, not a director; board governance, committees, and director compensation disclosures are provided separately in the proxy for board members – –.
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and risk: Heavy weighting to long‑term equity (PSUs/Options/RSUs) supports alignment; shift to cumulative adjusted EPS for PSUs (from cumulative EBIT in 2023) tightens linkage to shareholder outcomes .
- Goal rigor: Annual bonus thresholds/targets/max for revenue/EBIT/FCF, plus innovation and safety modifiers, balance growth and operational discipline –.
- Governance safeguards: Robust clawback; no hedging/pledging; stock ownership/retention requirements; advisory cap on severance; avoidance of grant timing around MNPI .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Pledging/hedging: Prohibited—reduces alignment risk .
- Golden parachutes: Advisory cap at 2.99× on cash severance and no single‑trigger acceleration—moderates change‑of‑control windfalls .
- Regulatory exposure: PDx subject to stringent device/pharma regulation, global privacy/cybersecurity, export controls; China anti‑corruption campaign and stimulus delays affected orders in 2024, posing execution risk .
- Supply chain sensitivity: PDx/raw materials dependencies (e.g., iodine, helium, rare earths) and localization pressures can impact cost/availability –.
Investment Implications
- Alignment: O’Neill’s incentives align to profitable growth and TSR via PSUs and ownership/retention policies; prohibition on hedging/pledging is investor‑friendly – .
- Retention risk: Strong governance and equity vesting at 18/30/42 months plus 3‑year PSUs provide retention hooks; severance capped by policy reduces excessive payouts .
- Execution drivers: PDx expansion (e.g., Nihon Medi‑Physics) and radiopharmaceuticals integration with imaging should underpin growth; risks center on regulatory, supply chain, and China market dynamics .
- Trading signals: Annual vesting cadence and blackout policies likely cluster potential selling windows but 75% retention rule until guideline compliance dampens near‑term selling pressure for executives .