Thomas Westrick
About Thomas Westrick
Thomas J. Westrick is President and CEO, Patient Care Solutions (PCS) at GE HealthCare, a role he has held since the January 2023 spin-off (and since September 2020 within GE’s healthcare business). He previously led Global Quality, Medical, Regulatory Affairs and Global Research (2016–2020), was Chief Risk Officer (2010), and served as Global Controller and Chief Accounting Officer after joining GE’s healthcare business in 2003; earlier he spent 13 years in public accounting with Arthur Andersen and Deloitte. He holds a bachelor’s degree in accounting, risk management, and insurance from the University of Wisconsin–Madison and serves on its School of Business Dean’s Advisory Board .
PCS financial performance during his tenure shows revenue of $2.916B → $3.142B → $3.125B (2022–2024) and Segment EBIT of $341M → $383M → $347M, with margin of 11.7% → 12.2% → 11.1% (YoY −1% revenue, −9% EBIT in 2024, largely from lower Monitoring Solutions volume and FX) . Since the spin (1/4/2023), GE HealthCare’s TSR equates to $129.59 on a $100 initial investment by year-end 2024 (vs $127.98 at YE 2023) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| GE HealthCare (pre-spin) | CEO, Patient Care Solutions | 2020–2022 | Led PCS ahead of spin; positioned segment for standalone execution |
| GE HealthCare | Global Quality, Medical, RA & Global Research Leader | 2016–2020 | Drove quality, regulatory, medical affairs and research governance globally |
| GE HealthCare | Chief Risk Officer | 2010–2016 | Led comprehensive enterprise risk management program |
| GE HealthCare | Global Controller & Chief Accounting Officer | 2003–2010 | Built controllership/financial reporting for global healthcare business |
| Arthur Andersen; Deloitte & Touche | Audit and consulting (public accounting) | ~1990–2003 | Served complex global companies across audit and consulting |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| University of Wisconsin–Madison, School of Business | Dean’s Advisory Board | n/a | External advisory role connected to alma mater |
Fixed Compensation
GE HealthCare discloses individual pay details for Named Executive Officers (NEOs); Mr. Westrick was not an NEO in 2024/2025 proxy statements, so his base salary/target bonus were not itemized. Company-wide program context: executives (other than the CEO) are subject to a 3× salary stock ownership requirement and must retain at least 75% of net shares until compliant; hedging and pledging are prohibited .
Performance Compensation
Annual Bonus Framework (company-level design and 2024 results)
| Metric (Corporate) | Weight | Threshold (50%) | Target (100%) | Max (200%) | 2024 Actual | Metric Payout | Strategic Modifiers | Corporate Bonus Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Organic revenue ($M) | 50% | 18,786 | 20,200 | 21,614 | 19,624 | 80% | NPI Vitality +5%; Injury/Illness +5% | 93% |
| Adjusted EBIT ($M) | 30% | 2,763 | 3,250 | 3,738 | 3,216 | 97% | — | — |
| Free cash flow ($M) | 20% | 1,350 | 1,800 | 2,160 | 1,554 | 73% | — | — |
Notes
- For segment CEOs (example: Imaging), bonus metrics can incorporate segment goals (e.g., 60% segment/40% corporate). PCS-specific weightings for Mr. Westrick were not disclosed; company design and results are shown for context .
Long-Term Incentives (LTI) – design and vesting
| Vehicle | Weight | Performance metrics | Payout range | Vesting cadence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs | 50% | 2026 Organic revenue (50%); 2024–2026 Cumulative Adjusted EPS (50%); ±20% TSR modifier vs comp peer group | 0%–200% | Cliff vest after 3-year performance period |
| Stock Options | 25% | N/A (price appreciation) | N/A | 10-year term; vest in 3 installments at ~18/30/42 months |
| RSUs | 25% | N/A (time-vest) | N/A | Vest in 3 installments at ~18/30/42 months |
Design shift: PSUs changed from 3-year Cumulative Adjusted EBIT (2023 awards) to 3-year Cumulative Adjusted EPS (2024 awards), increasing sensitivity to bottom-line delivery; TSR modifier retained .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Insider transactions (selected)
| Date | Type | Shares | Price | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024-08-07 | Open market sale | 2,750 | ~$80.78 | ~$222,145 | https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/thomas-westrick-takes-money-table-sells-222k-ge-healthcare-techs-stock |
| 2024-08-07 | Post-sale holdings (reported) | 17,509 | — | — | https://marketchameleon.com/Overview/GEHC/InsiderTrades/ |
Policies and guidelines
- Stock ownership: CEO 6× salary; other executives 3× salary; hold 75% of net shares until compliant .
- Hedging and pledging: prohibited for directors, executive officers, and employees .
- Clawback: mandatory restatement recovery plus discretionary recovery for misconduct detrimental to the Company, consistent with SEC/Nasdaq rules .
- Beneficial ownership (proxy table) indicated no shares pledged for listed directors/NEOs; individual data for Mr. Westrick not included (he was not an NEO) .
Employment Terms
Severance and change-in-control (CIC) economics (Executive Severance Plan)
| Scenario | CEO | Leadership Team (includes segment CEOs) | Health benefits continuation | Outplacement | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Qualifying termination (position elimination/without cause/good reason) | 2.0× (base + target bonus) | 1.0× (base + target bonus) | CEO 24 months; others 12 months | CEO 24 months; others 12 months | Requires release; non-compete/non-solicit obligations; equity per plan terms |
| CIC + qualifying termination within 24 months (double trigger) | 36 months base + 2.99× target bonus | 24 months base + 2.0× target bonus | CEO 36 months; others 24 months | CEO 36 months; others 24 months | Equity accelerated if awards not assumed; otherwise per plan/agreements |
Additional governance constraints
- Board policy to seek non-binding stockholder ratification if any executive cash severance > 2.99× salary+target bonus .
- No excise tax gross‑ups; double‑trigger CIC equity vesting under LTIP; no option repricing without shareholder approval .
Performance & Track Record
PCS segment performance under Westrick (standalone GEHC basis)
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| PCS Revenue ($USD Millions) | 2,916 | 3,142 | 3,125 |
| PCS Segment EBIT ($USD Millions) | 341 | 383 | 347 |
| PCS Segment EBIT Margin (%) | 11.7% | 12.2% | 11.1% |
Context: 2024 PCS softness reflected lower Monitoring Solutions volume post prior-year growth and FX headwinds; Maternal Infant Care volume improved . Company-wide, 2024 revenue was $19.672B (+1%); net income attributable to GEHC was $1.993B .
Company TSR since spin (value of $100)
| Measure | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Company TSR (value of $100 invested on 1/4/2023) | $127.98 | $129.59 |
| Compensation Peer Group TSR (value of $100) | $100.66 | $113.61 |
Say-on-pay support remained high (92.6% approval in 2024), indicating shareholder backing for the compensation program design .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- High at-risk mix and PSU-centric LTI: 50% PSU weighting with EPS/Organic revenue targets plus TSR modifier increases pay-for-performance linkage and can amplify dispersion of outcomes vs pure RSU programs .
- Governance guardrails: robust clawback, ownership/retention requirements, and strict prohibitions on hedging/pledging reduce misalignment and short-termism risk .
- CIC economics: double-trigger standard; cash severance caps and ratification policy (2.99× threshold) constrain excessive payouts; no gross‑ups .
- Metric evolution: replacing 3‑yr Cumulative Adjusted EBIT with Cumulative Adjusted EPS in 2024 PSU design heightens sensitivity to bottom-line execution and capital allocation efficiency .
Equity Ownership & Alignment (Skin-in-the-game) – Additional Notes
- Individual ownership level, vest vs. unvested breakdown, and option moneyness for Mr. Westrick are not disclosed in the proxy tables (he is not an NEO). An August 7, 2024 Form 4 shows a sale of 2,750 shares (~$222K), a modest disposition relative to typical executive equity overhang; post-transaction holdings reported at 17,509 shares (third-party Form 4 aggregators). Insider transactions can have multiple motivations; single small sales generally imply limited selling pressure. Sources: https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/thomas-westrick-takes-money-table-sells-222k-ge-healthcare-techs-stock https://marketchameleon.com/Overview/GEHC/InsiderTrades/
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Strong governance architecture (3× ownership, 75% hold‑through, no hedging/pledging, clawback) plus PSU-heavy LTI and double-trigger CIC terms support alignment and reduce agency risk .
- Retention risk: Standard Leadership Team severance (1× cash; 2× on CIC) and multi-year vesting (18/30/42 months; 3-year PSU cliff) create meaningful unvested equity and delayed monetization—supportive for retention. No gross‑ups and a ratification policy cap severance inflation .
- Execution focus: 2024 PCS revenue −1% and EBIT −9% underscore near-term execution risk in Monitoring Solutions; the move to EPS in PSUs elevates bottom-line accountability. Company TSR since spin remains above $100 baseline and slightly higher YoY, while peer TSR advanced more strongly in 2024, keeping relative performance in view .
- Trading signals: The identified 2024 open‑market sale (~$222K) is small versus typical executive equity exposure; absent a pattern of sustained selling, implied near-term insider selling pressure appears limited. Source: https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/thomas-westrick-takes-money-table-sells-222k-ge-healthcare-techs-stock
Appendix – References to Company Programs That Apply to Executives (including segment CEOs)
- Stock ownership policy and retention rules
- Prohibitions on hedging/pledging
- Clawback policy
- Executive Severance Plan (severance/CIC terms)
- Pay-versus-performance, TSR figures
- Annual bonus design and 2024 certified results
- LTI design, vesting, and PSU metric change