Christopher Ryan
About Christopher Ryan
Christopher D. Ryan, age 62, is Senior Vice President, Human Resources at The GEO Group and joined the company in 2011 after leadership roles at American Airlines, Florida Power & Light, and Southern Wine & Spirits of America . He holds a Bachelor of Science in Community Health Services from SUNY Plattsburgh and leads GEO’s diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives . Company performance context: FY2024 revenues were $2.42 billion and Adjusted EBITDA $463.5 million, and GEO’s stock rose from $10.76 to $27.98 in 2024; the 2022–2024 TSR was 272.8% (100th percentile in S&P 600 Commercial & Professional Services), which underpins the pay-for-performance framework that applies to senior management incentives including Ryan .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| The GEO Group | Director, Employee & Labor Relations; VP, Employee & Labor Relations; EVP, Human Resources; promoted to SVP, Human Resources | 2011–present | Leads enterprise HR; expanded scope in 2023; oversees DEI strategy |
| American Airlines | HR leadership roles | Not disclosed | Large-scale HR operations exposure |
| Florida Power & Light | HR leadership roles | Not disclosed | Regulated-utility HR experience |
| Southern Wine & Spirits of America | HR leadership roles | Not disclosed | Consumer distribution HR practices |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Several 501(c)(3) non-profits in Palm Beach County | Board Member | Not disclosed | Community engagement and youth support |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Detail | 2024/2025 Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | Not disclosed for Ryan | Not disclosed | Ryan is not an NEO; base salaries are set by executive agreements/Committee |
| Target Annual Bonus (%) | Senior Vice Presidents: 75% of base salary | Applies (class-wide) | Ryan’s role falls under SVP tier |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan Structure and 2024 Outcomes
| Metric | Weight | Threshold (Performance/Payout) | Target (Performance/Payout) | Max (Performance/Payout) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA | 65% | 90% / 50% of target | 100% / 100% of target | 110% / 200% of target |
| Adjusted Revenue | 35% | 90% / 50% of target | 100% / 100% of target | 110% / 200% of target |
| 2024 Performance | Weight | Target ($mm) | Actual ($mm) | Actual vs Target | Payout Factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA | 65% | 483.9 | 463.5 | 95.8% | 91.6% |
| Adjusted Revenue | 35% | 2,425.0 | 2,426.3 | 100.1% | 100.3% |
| Weighted Payout | — | — | — | — | 94.7% |
Notes:
- The same corporate multiplier applies across NEOs and senior management; Senior Vice Presidents have 75% targets (Ryan’s tier), but individual payouts for Ryan are not disclosed .
Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) Metrics and Vesting
| Grant Cycle | Award Type | Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Max | Payout Curve | Vesting / Measurement |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 grants | Performance-based RS | Relative TSR | 50% | P30 | P50 | P90 | 30% / 100% / 200% | 3-year; vests by Mar 15, 2027 |
| 2024 grants | Performance-based RS | ROCE | 50% | WACC+1% | 9% | 12% | 30% / 100% / 200% | 3-year; vests by Mar 15, 2027 |
| 2022–2024 | Performance-based RS | Relative TSR | 50% | — | — | — | TSR payout 200% (100th percentile) | Cycle ended Dec 31, 2024 |
| 2022–2024 | Performance-based RS | ROCE | 50% | — | — | — | ROCE payout 200% (14.0%) | Cycle ended Dec 31, 2024 |
2025 LTIP modifications (plan-level): awards now 50% time-based RS (3-year vest) and 50% performance-based RS (TSR/ROCE), with max payout capped at 180% (down from 200%) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Policy / Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Executive stock ownership guidelines | CEO: 6x salary; other executive officers: 3x salary; directors: 3x cash retainer; compliance within 5 years of appointment |
| Counting rules | Counts actual shares, options, restricted shares (vested/unvested), and unvested performance shares at threshold; target/max PSUs only counted after vesting |
| Hedging & pledging | Hedging prohibited; pledging/margin accounts prohibited absent waiver by CEO or Compensation Committee Chair; a waiver was granted to Mr. Evans (not Ryan) |
| Beneficial ownership | Ryan is not a director or NEO; his specific beneficial holdings are not disclosed in the proxy ownership table |
| Red flags (pledging) | Proxy notes 303,011 shares held by Mr. Evans were pledged; no pledging disclosed for Ryan |
Employment Terms
| Aspect | Disclosure for Ryan | Company Framework (for context) |
|---|---|---|
| Employment agreement | Not disclosed | Senior officer agreements historically provide 2x salary severance, 2 years benefits, immediate vesting of equity (performance awards vest upon certification); non-compete 2 years post-termination (examples: Evans/Black) |
| Change-in-control | Not disclosed | Company indicates double-trigger change-in-control arrangements; no single-trigger equity acceleration |
| Non-compete / confidentiality | Not disclosed | Executive agreements typically include 2–3 year non-compete and confidentiality; e.g., Donahue’s agreement sets 3-year non-compete and immediate equity vesting upon certain separations |
| Clawback policy | Applies to covered executives (current/former) for restatements; recovery of excess incentive comp over prior 3 fiscal years | |
| Perquisites | Not disclosed for Ryan | Perquisites categories include auto allowance, club dues, excess group life insurance, and limited personal aircraft usage (allocated to certain NEOs in 2024) |
Additional governance note: Christopher Ryan executed the CEO separation agreement on behalf of GEO, indicating his senior HR/compensatory role in officer transitions .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Senior VP cash incentives (Ryan’s tier) are tightly linked to revenue and Adjusted EBITDA with a clear payout curve; the 2024 corporate multiplier was 94.7%, reflecting a balanced outcome versus targets . This supports alignment and limits discretionary drift.
- Equity incentives: The LTIP’s TSR/ROCE metrics paid out at maximum for the 2022–2024 cycle (200% for both metrics), consistent with exceptional company TSR and ROCE performance, reinforcing long-term alignment. The 2025 shift to a 50% time-based component reduces performance sensitivity and may modestly increase retention value versus performance leverage .
- Ownership alignment: Executive ownership guidelines (3x salary for non-CEO officers) and strict anti-hedging/anti-pledging policies are positive for alignment; lack of disclosed individual holdings for Ryan limits skin-in-the-game analysis specificity .
- Retention and severance: While Ryan’s specific agreement is not disclosed, the company’s pattern of multi-year severance, continued benefits, and non-compete protections for senior officers suggests moderate retention support and potential separation costs if turnover occurs . Double-trigger CIC terms reduce windfall risk .
- Trading signals: No Form 4 data is disclosed in proxy for Ryan and no pledging is noted; absence of insider selling disclosures for Ryan implies limited near-term selling pressure evidence, but this remains a data gap. The 2025 LTIP change to include time-based RS could temper future PSU-driven selling spikes versus prior cycles .