Matthew Rucker
About Matthew Rucker
Matthew Rucker (age 39) is Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer (COO) of Gulfport Energy, promoted on February 24, 2025 after serving as Senior Vice President of Operations since March 2023 . He holds a BS in Petroleum Engineering from Marietta College and an MBA from Texas Christian University; his background spans operations, reservoir, and planning roles at Chesapeake, Blue Ridge Mountain Resources, Montage Resources, and Javelin Energy Partners . Company performance during his tenure included strong shareholder returns: GPOR stock appreciated over 80% in 2023 and ~38% in 2024, with adjusted free cash flow of $199 million (2023) and $257 million (2024) and reported net income of $1,471 million (2023) and $(261) million (2024) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gulfport Energy | Senior Vice President, Operations | Mar 2023–Feb 2025 | Led operations efficiency, cost reductions, and execution; promoted to COO . |
| Javelin Energy Partners | Vice President, Production Operations; earlier VP, Business Development | Jul/Aug 2022–Feb 2023 | Led production operations; business development leadership . |
| Montage Resources Corporation | Executive Vice President, Chief Operating Officer | Jun 2020–2022 | Operational leadership post-business combination with Blue Ridge . |
| Blue Ridge Mountain Resources | Vice President, Resource Planning & Development | 2016–2020 | Strategic planning and resource development . |
| Chesapeake Energy | Leadership and engineering roles in field ops, reservoir, planning | 2007–2016 | Optimization of Utica/Marcellus operations; led operating team . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ohio Oil and Gas Association | Board Member | Not disclosed | Industry advocacy and network . |
| Petroleum Alliance of Oklahoma | Board Member | Not disclosed | Industry advocacy and network . |
Fixed Compensation
- Current role terms: Base salary $500,000; STI target 100% of base; LTI target 400% of base (established upon COO promotion on Feb 24, 2025) .
- 2024 base salary increased to $440,000 from $390,000 in March 2024 (12.8% increase) .
- 2024 actual STI payout: $561,000 at 150% of target (target $374,000) .
- Perquisites are limited (group term life, LTD imputed income, de minimis benefits); 2024 “All Other Compensation” was $22,828 .
| Year | Base Salary ($) | Target Bonus ($) | Actual Bonus Paid ($) | Stock Awards ($) | All Other Comp ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | 309,938 | 292,500 | 482,625 | 1,170,045 | 3,746 | 1,966,354 |
| 2024 | 429,425 | 374,000 | 561,000 | 1,701,140 | 22,828 | 2,714,393 |
Performance Compensation
- Equity mix emphasizes performance-based RSUs tied to absolute and relative TSR over 3 years; 60% PSUs and 40% time-based RSUs in 2024 awards .
- No stock options are outstanding or planned; no option repricing .
- Clawback policy (SOX/Dodd-Frank compliant) and forfeiture provisions adopted July 31, 2023 .
| Metric (2024 STI) | Weight | Threshold | Target | Max | Actual | Payout (% of target) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Production (MMcfe/d) | 20% | 1,035 | 1,057 | 1,090 | 1,060 | 22% |
| Capex ($MM) | 20% | 435 | 408 | 375 | 385 | 34% |
| LOE per Mcfe ($/Mcfe) | 15% | 0.20 | 0.19 | 0.17 | 0.18 | 22% |
| Adjusted FCF ($MM) | 15% | 190 | 231 | 295 | 261 | 22% |
| TRIR | 10% | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 20% |
| Spills | 10% | 6 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 20% |
| Strategic Initiatives | 10% | Qualitative | Qualitative | Qualitative | Qualitative | 10% |
| Total Achievement | 100% | — | — | — | — | 150% |
PSU structure (3-year performance):
- Payout grid tied to annualized absolute TSR buckets and relative TSR percentiles against peer group; maximum 200% of target for highest TSR/relative TSR outcomes .
2024 Equity Grants (awarded Mar 1, 2024):
- RSUs: 4,226 units; grant value $600,092 .
- PSUs (target): 7,058 units; grant value $1,101,048 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Policies and Guidelines:
- Ownership guidelines: 3× base salary for NEOs within 5 years; once met, declines in share price do not affect compliance if shares are retained (amended Feb 20, 2025). Rucker is on track given tenure; hedging/pledging prohibited .
- No options outstanding; equity plan emphasizes RSUs and PSUs to promote “skin in the game” and long-term alignment .
Current Ownership and Unvested Awards:
| Category | Shares/Units | Market/Value Basis | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (common) | 3,174 | — | <1% of shares outstanding (17,883,113 as of Mar 7, 2025) . |
| Unvested RSUs (12/31/2024) | 8,605 | $1,585,041 @ $184.20/share | Vests in equal annual installments over 3 years . |
| Unvested PSUs (target, 12/31/2024) | 17,946 | $3,305,653 @ $184.20/share | Vests based on TSR performance over 3 years . |
| Options (exercisable/unexercisable) | 0 | — | Company does not currently grant options . |
| Pledged/Hedged shares | 0 allowed | — | Hedging/pledging prohibited for executives/directors . |
Insider transactions and potential selling pressure:
- Recent Form 4 reference exists for Matthew Rucker (2023 filing) .
- Third-party feeds indicate stock award grants recorded in late Feb 2025 (typical RSU/PSU grants at $0.00 price imply non-cash awards) .
- No pledging or hedging allowed; equity awards vesting schedules may create periodic liquidity windows, but lack of options reduces near-term exercise-driven selling risk .
Employment Terms
Contract and Renewal:
- Employment agreement effective March 1, 2023; initial term through Dec 31, 2026 with automatic one-year renewals unless either party provides 90 days’ notice. Change of control extends term to 24 months post-CoC date .
- One-year post-employment non-solicitation; confidentiality/trade secret and cooperation provisions (no explicit non-compete disclosed) .
Severance and Change-of-Control:
- Non-CoC qualifying termination (without cause/by executive for good reason): cash severance equal to 100% of base salary + target annual bonus; pro-rata target bonus; pro-rata vesting of equity (performance awards based on actual performance to termination); 12 months COBRA reimbursement .
- CoC qualifying termination (double-trigger within 24 months post-CoC): cash severance equal to 200% of (base + target bonus) for NEOs; immediate vesting of unvested equity (performance awards based on actual performance); 18 months COBRA reimbursement (CEO is 300%) .
Illustrative 12/31/2024 payouts (estimates per proxy’s termination table):
| Scenario | Cash Severance ($) | RSUs Accelerated ($) | PSUs Accelerated ($) | COBRA ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Death/Disability | — | 1,585,041 | 1,337,656 | — | 2,922,697 |
| Qualifying Termination (non-CoC) | 1,188,000 | 1,585,041 | 1,337,656 | 22,686 | 4,133,384 |
| CoC + Qualifying Termination | 2,002,000 | 1,585,041 | 3,305,653 | 34,030 | 6,926,724 |
| CoC only (no termination) | — | 1,585,041 | 3,305,653 | — | 4,890,694 |
Award Acceleration Mechanics:
- If not assumed in CoC: RSUs fully vest; PSUs vest at 100% of target or actual if higher as of CoC date .
- If assumed in CoC: PSUs convert to time-based RSUs measured at target or actual if higher; 100% vests at end of original performance period; RSUs accelerate upon qualifying termination within 24 months of CoC .
- Special CoC Event (board independence change >30 days or >75% beneficial ownership by a stockholder): RSUs fully vest; PSUs vest at target or actual if higher as of event date .
Clawback:
- Company may recover incentive compensation in the event of a required accounting restatement; forfeiture for serious misconduct; awards are subject to clawback under Dodd-Frank/SOX .
Company Performance Context (for alignment assessment)
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Total Shareholder Return (value of $100 initial investment) | $196 (company) | $271 (company) |
| Peer Group TSR (S&P Oil & Gas E&P Index) | $160 | $155 |
| Net Income ($mm) | $1,471 | $(261) |
| Adjusted Free Cash Flow ($mm) | $199 | $257 |
| GPOR stock appreciation (calendar year) | >80% | >38% |
Governance and Policies affecting alignment
- Ownership guidelines: CEO 5× salary; other executives 3× salary; directors 5× retainer .
- Anti-hedging/pledging/margin prohibitions; insider trading policies enforced .
- Say-on-Pay approval strongly supportive: 99.8% (2023); 97.8% (2024) .
- Compensation peer group refined annually with WTW; energy-weighted peer list for 2024 includes CNX, Matador, Range, SM, Magnolia, Comstock, Murphy, Vital Energy, Civitas, SilverBow, Talos, Callon, Berry .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: High proportion of at-risk pay (STI/PSU) tied to operational KPIs and multi-year TSR, strong shareholder alignment; no hedging/pledging; ownership guidelines promote long-term alignment .
- Retention/Pressure: Material unvested PSUs/RSUs (target value ~$4.89 million in CoC; ~$2.92–$6.93 million across termination scenarios) plus 2× cash severance in CoC enhance retention but could create event-linked payouts; absence of options reduces forced selling risk .
- Performance Signals: Exceeding STI targets (150% payout in 2024) and strong TSR relative to peers indicate execution strength; however, 2024 reported net loss and continued capex/LOE discipline remain key operational levers to watch .
- Trading Signals: Anticipate periodic vesting from RSUs (annual over 3 years) and PSUs (end of performance cycle), which can create scheduled liquidity events; monitor Form 4s around vest dates and annual grant timing (late Feb/Mar) .
- Governance Quality: Strong shareholder support for pay practices (97.8% approval 2024), formal clawback, prohibition of pledging/hedging, and independent compensation oversight by WTW reduce governance risk .
Overall, Rucker’s pay design is highly performance-linked (60% PSUs, TSR focus), with robust retention features (severance and equity vesting protections) and policies that curb misalignment (no hedging/pledging; ownership guidelines), supporting favorable alignment signals while calling for monitoring of vesting calendars and operational KPI execution .