Bonita I. Lee
About Bonita I. Lee
Bonita I. Lee is President & CEO of Hanmi Financial Corporation and Hanmi Bank, and a director of HAFC; she has served as CEO since May 2019 after roles as President (since June 2018) and SEVP/COO (since 2013) . She is 62 years old, holds a B.S. in Business Administration from the University of Illinois at Chicago, and completed an executive program in corporate strategy at Chicago Booth . Under her leadership, 2024 GAAP net income was $62.2M, ROAA was 0.83%, and Hanmi’s five‑year cumulative TSR translated a $100 investment to $147 versus $124 for the S&P U.S. Small Cap Banks Index, indicating positive relative value creation despite a tougher operating environment . 2024 execution highlights include 16% C&I loan growth driven by the Corporate Korea initiative, deposits up 2.5% with 32.6% noninterest-bearing, efficiency ratio of 60.31%, and nonperforming assets reduced to 0.19% of total assets .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hanmi Financial/Bank | SEVP & Chief Operating Officer | 2013–2018 | Led operations during growth and transformation; prepared the platform for CEO transition . |
| Hanmi Financial/Bank | President | Jun 2018–May 2019 | Elevated leadership scope ahead of CEO appointment . |
| BBCN Bank & BBCN Bancorp | SEVP & COO; Acting President & COO | Feb–Apr 2013 | Led Executive Council during CEO transition; ensured operational continuity . |
| Shinhan Bank America | Director & Regional President (Western Region) | Sep 2008–Mar 2009 | Expanded regional footprint and client coverage . |
| Nara Bank | EVP & Chief Credit Officer; member of Office of the President | Apr 2005–Sep 2008 | Strengthened credit administration and enterprise leadership . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role/Recognition | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| American Banker | Most Powerful Women to Watch honoree | 2024 | External validation of leadership and strategic execution in banking . |
Board Governance
- Board service: Director since 2019; committee member of the Risk, Compliance and Planning (RCP) Committee .
- Independence and leadership structure: All directors are independent except Ms. Lee; roles of Chairman and CEO are separated (Chairman: John J. Ahn; Vice Chairman: David L. Rosenblum), mitigating dual-role concerns .
- Attendance: In 2024 the Board held nine joint meetings with the Bank; all directors attended >75% of Board and committee meetings; all directors attended the 2024 Annual Meeting .
- Director compensation policy (for non-employee directors): Cash retainer $42,500; committee member retainers (Audit $6,000; RCP $5,000; CHR $4,000; NCG $2,500; ALCO $3,000); chair premiums; and an annual restricted stock grant valued at $65,000; directors must reach 3x annual retainer ownership within 5 years .
- Pay oversight: CHR Committee comprised entirely of independent directors; 2024 members included Christie K. Chu (Chair), Harry H. Chung, Gloria J. Lee, James A. Marasco, David L. Rosenblum, Michael M. Yang; Aon served as independent consultant .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 703,750 | 762,500 | 780,000 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 81,755 | 80,517 | 81,000 |
Perquisites and benefits:
- Monthly automobile allowance $3,000; membership club dues up to $20,000 annually; welfare benefits (medical, dental, vision, life); 25 days paid vacation; term life insurance up to $1,000,000 or amount purchasable with $25,000 annual premium cap .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – 2024 CEO Scorecard
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Achievement/Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROAA | 20% | 0.66% | 0.83% | 0.91% | 0.83% | 20.0% |
| NPA/Assets | 15% | 0.42% | 0.35% | 0.28% | 0.19% | 22.5% |
| Efficiency Ratio | 20% | 63.62% | 57.84% | 54.95% | 60.31% | 15.8% |
| Risk Management | 15% | Exam results | Exam results | Exam results | Satisfactory | 15.0% |
| Strategic Plan/Projects | 20% | Divisional goals | Divisional goals | Divisional goals | Corporate Korea +23%; C&I +16%; systems; Seoul office; branch consolidation; DDA growth; talent; buyback | 20.0% |
| Discretionary | 10% | Personal factors | Personal factors | Personal factors | Strategic achievements | 10.0% |
| Eligible Salary ($) | 780,000 | |||||
| Target % of Salary | 75% | |||||
| Total Achieved vs Target | 103% | |||||
| Payout % of Base Salary | 77.42% | |||||
| Actual Payout ($) | 603,893 |
AIP design notes: Threshold payout 50% of target, target 100%, maximum 150% with straight-line interpolation; corporate metrics for all NEOs: ROAA at target, NPA/Assets at maximum, efficiency ratio above threshold .
Long-Term Incentives and Vesting
- 2024 grants: Time-based RS 24,171 shares; PSUs 30,000 units (target), both under the 2021 Plan; RS vest in three equal annual installments from grant date; PSUs vest based on 3‑yr relative TSR vs KBW Regional Banking Index, with 35th/50th/75th percentile thresholds earning 50%/100%/150%; negative absolute TSR caps payout at target .
- 2021 PSUs: 3‑yr performance period ended Mar 23, 2024; company TSR -10.77% ranking at 48th percentile; payout certified at 92.06%; Ms. Lee earned 14,447 units, which vested in March 2024 .
- 2024 vesting activity: Ms. Lee had 27,451 shares vest (RS + PSUs) with value realized $420,527; no options exercised .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Ownership Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership | 180,810 shares; <1% of shares outstanding; shares outstanding 30,217,915 (Apr 2, 2025) . |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | CEO required to hold 5× base salary worth of shares; CFO 1.5×; both in compliance; 50% retention of granted shares until guidelines met; hedging and pledging prohibited . |
| Outstanding Unvested RS | 3,922 (Mar 23, 2022 grant); 10,050 (Mar 10, 2023); 24,171 (Apr 1, 2024) . |
| Outstanding PSUs (unearned) | 14,244 (2022 grant at target); 18,550 (2023 grant at target); 45,000 (unearned units noted) . |
| 2024 Shares Vested | 27,451; value realized $420,527 . |
Alignment and safeguards:
- Clawback policy adopted in 2023 per SEC/Nasdaq rules; recovery of erroneously awarded incentive compensation over prior 3 fiscal years; no indemnification or insurance reimbursement allowed; Sarbanes‑Oxley 304 clawback also in place .
- No excise tax gross-ups; no dividends on unvested performance awards; executive and director pledging/hedging prohibited .
Employment Terms
- Agreement term: Amended and restated employment agreement (Feb 28, 2022–Feb 28, 2025) auto-renew; First Amendment (Mar 2025) extended to April 28, 2028 with annual auto-renewals unless non-renewal notice is given; target cash bonus 75% of salary .
- Compensation terms: Initial base salary $715,000, increased to $780,000 in 2024; eligible for annual bonus; perquisites as noted .
- Non-solicit/confidentiality: Agreements reconfirmed restrictions on recruiting/soliciting employees and disclosing confidential information/business practices .
Severance and Change-in-Control (CoC) Economics:
- Termination without cause/for good reason (outside CoC 18 months window): 12 months base salary; pro‑rated prior year’s bonus; accelerated vesting of time-based awards for one year of additional service; pro‑rated PSUs based on actual performance; up to 18 months COBRA reimbursement .
- CoC termination (within 18 months post-CoC): Lump sum 2.5× the sum of annual base salary and the greater of average last three annual bonuses or target bonus; up to 18 months COBRA; time‑based equity fully vests and PSUs vest per plan terms .
Quantitative potential payments (assuming Dec 31, 2024 event):
| Scenario | Cash Severance ($) | Accelerated Stock Awards ($) | Health/Welfare ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination without cause/for good reason | 1,401,653 | 1,174,647 | 45,737 | 2,622,037 |
| Qualifying termination in connection with CoC | 3,683,728 | 2,640,395 | 45,737 | 6,369,861 |
| Death or Disability | 621,653 | — | — | 621,653 |
| CoC only (no termination) | — | 900,938 | — | 900,938 |
Compensation & Incentives (Multi‑Year Summary)
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Awards ($) | 650,041 | 715,010 | 803,409 |
| Non-Equity Incentive ($) | 777,563 | 515,738 | 603,893 |
| Total Compensation ($) | 2,213,109 | 2,073,765 | 2,268,302 |
2024 LTI target awards (% of salary; shares granted):
| Item | CEO |
|---|---|
| Total Target Equity Award Opportunity (% of Salary) | 100% |
| Time-Based Restricted Stock (#) | 24,171 |
| Performance-Based RSUs (# Target) | 30,000 |
Pay Versus Performance (PVP) – CEO and Company Metrics
| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CEO SCT Total ($) | 1,463,615 | 1,869,786 | 2,213,109 | 2,073,765 | 2,268,302 |
| CEO Compensation Actually Paid ($) | 1,193,723 | 2,927,802 | 2,543,027 | 1,383,605 | 3,084,111 |
| Value of $100 Investment – Hanmi TSR ($) | 59 | 127 | 138 | 114 | 147 |
| Value of $100 Investment – Peer Group TSR ($) | 89 | 120 | 108 | 108 | 124 |
| Net Income ($ Millions) | 42.2 | 98.7 | 101.4 | 80.0 | 62.2 |
| ROAA (%) | 0.72% | 1.64% | 1.44% | 1.08% | 0.83% |
Say‑on‑pay & shareholder engagement:
- 2024 Say‑on‑Pay approval: 94.6% in favor .
- Ongoing investor outreach with invitations to holders of ~60% of outstanding shares; management and Board maintain engagement channels .
Compensation peer group (2024):
- Constructed with Aon; banks ~$4–$16B in assets; includes Brookline Bancorp, Kearny Financial, CVB Financial, TriCo Bancshares, Westamerica Bancorporation, among others; committee does not target a specific percentile .
Performance & Track Record
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Efficiency Ratio (AIP metric actual) | — | — | 60.31% |
| NPA/Assets (AIP metric actual) | — | — | 0.19% |
| C&I Loan Portfolio Growth | — | — | 16% |
| Deposits | — | — | $6.44B; up 2.5%; NIBD 32.6% |
Company operating commentary:
- CEO emphasized net interest margin expansion and robust preprovision net revenue; credit quality improved with reductions in criticized and nonperforming assets; deposit and loan growth aligned to strategic initiatives (USKC/Corporate Korea) .
HAFC Financials – Pay-for-Performance Alignment View
| Metric | FY 2021 | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues ($) | 40,171,000 | 34,200,000* | 32,236,000* | 31,585,000 |
| EBITDA ($) | N/A* | N/A* | N/A* | N/A* |
Values retrieved from S&P Global. * indicates values without document citations.
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Hedging and pledging of company stock prohibited for executives and directors (alignment positive) .
- No excise tax gross-ups; no dividends on unvested performance awards (shareholder-friendly) .
- Clawback coverage for material restatements and misconduct per SEC/SOX (risk mitigation) .
- 2021 PSUs paid at 92.06% due to below-median TSR, signaling balanced performance calibration; not a repricing or modification event .
Equity Vesting & Potential Insider Selling Pressure
- 2024 vesting volume: 27,451 shares vested for Ms. Lee with $420,527 value realized; future scheduled RS tranches from 2022/2023/2024 grants may create regular liquidity windows .
- Retention requirements: CEO must retain ≥50% of granted shares until 5× salary guideline met; hedging/pledging prohibited, which dampens near-term selling pressure relative to typical executives .
Employment Terms – Additional Details
- Change‑in‑control equity treatment: Time-based awards fully vest upon CoC for Ms. Lee per her employment agreement; PSUs vest based on actual performance through termination date under double-trigger conditions .
- Voluntary termination/for cause: Forfeiture of unvested equity; no termination-related compensation beyond accrued items .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: AIP ties payouts to ROAA, efficiency, and asset quality, and LTI is majority performance‑based via relative TSR PSUs with downside caps; Ms. Lee’s 2024 CAP increased alongside stronger fourth-quarter momentum but full-year net income declined, suggesting careful scrutiny of forward targets amid margin dynamics .
- Retention risk appears low: CEO agreement extended to 2028 with automatic renewals and competitive CoC protections; high say‑on‑pay support (94.6%) and ownership guideline compliance support stability .
- Insider selling pressure: Recurring RS/PSU vesting creates periodic supply, but 50% retention requirement and no hedging/pledging materially mitigate short‑term selling risk; monitor Form 4 filings around vest dates for transactional signals .
- Governance quality: Separation of Chair/CEO roles, independent CHR with external consultant, clawback adoption, and strong director ownership practices reduce governance risk; dual CEO/director role is counterbalanced by the independent board structure and committee oversight .