Adrian Daws
About Adrian Daws
Adrian Daws is Chief Executive Officer of Hamilton Global Specialty (Hamilton International), a role he has held since 2020, with prior leadership as Active Underwriter of Syndicate 4000 and Syndicate 3334 at Hamilton; earlier roles include head of Specialty Division at CNA Hardy and underwriting positions at Trenwick and Limit . Education and age are not disclosed in the proxy. Company performance context during his tenure includes net income attributable to common shareholders of $400.4 million, ROE of 18.3%, net premiums earned of $1,734.7 million, and a combined ratio of 91.3% in FY2024 . Pay-versus-performance disclosures show Company TSR rising to 126.87 (vs S&P 500 P&C Index TSR of 138.79) for the period from IPO to FY2024 end .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hamilton Global Specialty (Hamilton International) | Chief Executive Officer | Since 2020 | Leads specialty insurance platform execution and underwriting strategy |
| Hamilton Syndicate 4000 | Active Underwriter | Not disclosed | Underwriting leadership at Lloyd’s syndicate |
| Hamilton Syndicate 3334 | Active Underwriter | Not disclosed | Underwriting leadership at Lloyd’s syndicate |
| CNA Hardy | Head, Specialty Division | Not disclosed | Led specialty lines business |
| Trenwick | Financial Institutions Underwriter | Not disclosed | Specialty underwriting (financial institutions) |
| Limit | Financial Institutions Underwriter | Not disclosed | Specialty underwriting (financial institutions) |
External Roles
No public company board memberships or external directorships disclosed for Daws in the proxy .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 383,439 | 447,768 | 491,684 |
| Base Salary progression ($) | — | 447,768 → 491,684; +6.9% | — |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 38,343 | 43,222 | 48,370 |
Notes:
- Employment agreement (effective March 18, 2021) sets base salary in GBP: £280,000 initially, £385,000 as of Dec 31, 2024 .
- No executive perquisites; company emphasizes pay-for-performance governance .
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive Plan (2024)
| Metric | Weighting | Target/Threshold/Max | Actual | Payout Mechanism | Daws Target | Daws Actual Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Combined Ratio | 60% | 95.2% / 111.5% / 88.5% | 91.3% | Linear 0–200% vs targets | 140% of base salary ($682,644) | 162% of target ($1,108,188) |
| Strategic Growth | 20% | Qualitative scale | 200% | Committee assessment | — | — |
| Technology Enablement | 10% | Qualitative scale | 75% | Committee assessment | — | — |
| Magnet for Talent | 10% | Qualitative scale | 150% | Committee assessment | — | — |
| Aggregate Funding | — | — | — | Overall bonus pool funding 160% | — | — |
Long-Term Incentives (2024 grants)
| Instrument | Allocation | Grant Calibration | Vesting | Performance Metrics | Daws 2024 Target LT Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs | 50% | FMV per share $19.03 as of Dec 31 prior year | 3-year cliff | 3-yr avg ROE and 3-yr annualized BVPS Growth (BVSG), equally weighted | $356,227; 25,245 PSUs at target |
| RSUs | 50% | FMV per share $19.03 as of Dec 31 prior year | 1/3 per year over 3 years | Time-based | $356,227; 25,245 RSUs |
2022–2024 PSU Outcome (legacy metric: Underwriting ROC): actual 6.1% resulted in 146.4% of target earned; Daws earned 23,373 PSUs .
Multi-Year Compensation Summary
| Year | Salary ($) | Bonus ($) | Stock Awards ($) | Non-Equity Incentive ($) | All Other ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 383,439 | — | 473,202 | 464,816 | 38,343 | 1,359,800 |
| 2023 | 447,768 | 102,418 | 609,292 | 1,078,820 | 43,222 | 2,281,520 |
| 2024 | 491,684 | — | 732,105 | 1,108,188 | 48,370 | 2,380,347 |
Stock vested in FY2024 (value realized): 55,237 shares; $921,784 for Daws .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership | 116,638 Class B shares; “less than 1%” of total shares outstanding |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | Executives: 3x base salary; RSUs count, PSUs do not until earned; 5-year phase-in |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited: short sales and hedging; pledging Company securities is prohibited |
| 10b5-1 Trading Plans | Permitted with cooling-off period; trades pre-cleared and executed per plan |
| Options | Company does not grant options currently; none awarded in FY2024 |
Outstanding equity awards at 12/31/2024:
- RSUs unvested (shares; market value): 5,322 ($101,278); 13,625 ($259,284); 25,245 ($480,412) .
- PSUs unearned at target (shares; payout value): 15,965 ($303,814); 20,437 ($388,916); 25,245 ($480,412) .
- VAP units related to IPO/change-in-control triggers: 33,681 ($640,949) .
- Vesting schedules:
- 02/23/2022 RSUs: 1/3 on Jan 1 of 2023, 2024, 2025 .
- 03/10/2023 RSUs: 1/3 on Mar 1 of 2024, 2025, 2026 .
- 03/05/2024 RSUs: 1/3 on Mar 1 of 2025, 2026, 2027 .
- 03/05/2024 PSUs: performance period 2024–2026; earned on 3-yr ROE and BVSG .
Insider reporting note: A Form 4 for RSU vesting on Jan 1, 2024 was filed late on March 5, 2024 (including Daws among others) .
Employment Terms
| Term | Details |
|---|---|
| Employment Agreement | Effective March 18, 2021; CEO Hamilton Global Specialty |
| Base & Targets | Base £280,000 initially; £385,000 at 12/31/2024; target annual cash bonus 140% (was 100%); target equity 160% (was 100%) of base |
| Annual Incentive Targets | Daws 2024 target cash incentive 140% of base |
| LT Incentive Targets | 2024 LT target 160% of base; split 50/50 PSUs/RSUs |
| Termination Notice | 180-day notice by either party; employer may pay lump sum in lieu and continue benefits until day 180 |
| Non-Compete/Non-Solicit | During employment plus 6 months post-termination; 12 months if termination in connection with change-in-control |
| Severance (no CIC) | Company may pay 6 months of base in lieu of notice; benefits for 6 months |
| Severance (double-trigger CIC) | Lump sum = 12 months base + target bonus; benefits up to 12 months; unvested equity vests (assumes target for PSUs) |
| Clawback | Dodd-Frank/NYSE-compliant; 3-year lookback for accounting restatements; enforced unless recovery impracticable |
Estimated potential payments (as of 12/31/2024):
| Scenario | Cash Payment ($) | LTI Acceleration ($) | Benefits ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CIC + qualifying termination | 1,181,242 | 2,655,066 | 2,171 | 3,838,479 |
| Involuntary termination w/o cause or for good reason | 246,092 | — | 1,086 | 247,178 |
| Death/Disability | 689,058 (pro-rated target bonus) | — | — | 689,058 |
Compensation Committee Analysis
- Independent Compensation & Personnel Committee; engaged independent consultant for FY2024 review .
- “What we do/What we don’t do” governance: pay-for-performance, double-trigger CIC, clawback, ownership guidelines; no perqs, no excise tax gross-ups, no hedging/pledging, no guaranteed bonuses .
Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- First say-on-pay (2024 AGM) approval 82% in favor; committee considered feedback for 2025 decisions .
Investment Implications
- Compensation alignment: Daws’ 2024 pay is majority variable (cash incentive and equity); annual bonus funding tied to combined ratio and strategic objectives; PSUs now linked to ROE and BVPS growth — stronger alignment to shareholder value drivers .
- Retention and selling pressure: Significant unvested RSUs from March 2024 grant vest annually on March 1 through 2027; RSUs from March 2023 vest March 1, 2025 and 2026; PSUs cliff in 2026. Expect elevated insider activity around vest dates, typically via pre-cleared 10b5-1 plans; hedging/pledging is prohibited, mitigating leverage-driven selling risk .
- Ownership: Beneficial holdings are <1% of total shares, but meaningful unvested RSUs/PSUs (44,192 RSUs unvested; 61,647 PSUs at target unearned; VAP 33,681) support continued alignment into 2025–2027 .
- Change-in-control economics: Double-trigger severance equals one year base plus target bonus, and equity acceleration at target in CIC; cash amounts are modest vs CEO, indicating retention but limited windfall risk .
- Governance quality: Strong pay governance (clawback, independent committee/consultant, no perqs/gross-ups) and 82% say-on-pay approval reduce headline risk; isolated late Form 4 in 2024 appears administrative rather than strategic .