Thomas P. Stenger
About Thomas P. Stenger
Senior Executive Vice President and Chief Risk Officer of Bank of Hope since October 1, 2022; previously Executive Vice President and CRO since February 2019. Age 66 as of the 2025 proxy record date. Education: B.S. in Finance (Michigan State University) and M.B.A. in Finance and Financial Management Services (Wayne State University). 2024 incentive pay reflects an 80% corporate/20% individual scorecard; his total STIP cash payout was $90,000 (40% of target), signaling below-target corporate performance and a discretionary individual component aligned to risk and regulatory execution, including Territorial acquisition application support .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bank of Hope | Senior EVP & Chief Risk Officer | Oct 1, 2022 – present | Leads enterprise risk management across third party risk, procurement, information security, compliance, model risk, ERM, and independent credit review . |
| Bank of Hope | Executive VP & Chief Risk Officer | Feb 2019 – Sep 2022 | Built and maintained balanced risk management program; supported regulatory application process for Territorial acquisition . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| PricewaterhouseCoopers | Managing Director | 2011 – 2019 | Led strategic risk advisory for financial services clients, enhancing regulatory responsiveness and enterprise risk frameworks across market, credit, and operational risk . |
| Mirror Lake Partners | Founding Partner | 2008 – 2011 | Led risk advisory, treasury/liquidity, and investment portfolio practices for FIs, PE, mortgage banking firms, and regulators . |
| GMAC Residential Mortgage Corp. | SVP & Chief Risk Officer | 2001 – 2007 | Senior enterprise and market/credit risk leadership in mortgage banking . |
| FleetBoston Financial (after BankBoston acquisition) | Senior Risk Manager, Market Risk | 1999 – 2001 | Market risk management post-acquisition integration . |
| BankBoston | Managing Director, Global Asset Liability Strategy | 1997 – 1999 | Asset/liability strategy leadership . |
| Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. | Senior Vice President | 1996 | Consumer mortgage risk leadership . |
| Chemical Bank | First Vice President, Consumer Asset Management | 1993 | Consumer asset management leadership . |
| Michigan National Bank | Vice President, Portfolio Management | 1985 | Portfolio management in financial institutions . |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base salary ($) | $442,276 | $475,991 | $494,714 |
| Year-over-year base salary change (%) | — | — | 4.1% (2023→2024) |
| Other compensation ($) | $127,986 | $155,513 | $139,408 |
| 401(k) match ($, 2024) | — | — | $14,223 |
| Auto allowance ($, 2024) | — | — | $13,800 |
| Perquisites ($, 2024) | — | — | $111,385 (relocation and travel) |
Performance Compensation
Short-Term Incentive Plan (STIP) – Design and 2024 Outcome
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EPS excluding notable items | Part of 80% corporate | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Contributed to corporate payout | Cash, annual (no vesting) |
| PPNR ROAA (ex notable items) | Part of 80% corporate | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Contributed to corporate payout | Cash, annual (no vesting) |
| Criticized loan ratio (4Q avg) | Part of 80% corporate | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Contributed to corporate payout | Cash, annual (no vesting) |
| Total loan growth | Part of 80% corporate | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Contributed to corporate payout | Cash, annual (no vesting) |
| Average deposit growth (ex brokered) | Part of 80% corporate | Not disclosed | Not disclosed | Contributed to corporate payout | Cash, annual (no vesting) |
| Individual objectives | 20% | Discretionary | Discretionary | 40% payout for Stenger’s individual component aligned to risk/reg oversight | Cash, annual (no vesting) |
| Total STIP (Thomas P. Stenger) | 100% | Target $225,000 (45% of salary) | — | Earned $90,000 total cash; 40% of target | Cash, annual |
Payout components (2024):
- Corporate performance payout: $71,910
- Individual performance payout (bonus): $18,090
- Total STIP cash earned: $90,000 (40% of target)
Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) – 2024 Grants and 2022–2024 Payout
| Grant date | Award type | Metric | Target shares | Grant-date fair value ($) | Vesting terms |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7/19/2024 | RSUs | Time-based | 8,865 | $112,497 | Ratable on each of first three anniversaries of grant date (i.e., 7/19/2025, 7/19/2026, 7/19/2027) |
| 7/19/2024 | PSUs | ROTCE | 4,432 | $56,242 | Vests in full no later than 3/14/2027 if performance criteria met |
| 7/19/2024 | PSUs | TSR (KBW Nasdaq Regional Banking Index peer set for LTIP relative metrics) | 4,433 | $50,004 | Vests in full no later than 3/14/2027 if performance criteria met |
| 2022 LTIP cycle | Target shares | Metrics | % payout | Shares vested (date) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022–2024 cycle (Thomas P. Stenger) | 4,808 | EPS, ROTCE, TSR | 70% | 3,385 shares vested on 3/7/2025 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership | 5,967 shares; <1% of outstanding |
| Shares outstanding basis | 121,074,988 shares outstanding as of 3/24/2025 |
| Options exercisable within 60 days | None |
| RSUs to vest within 60 days | None |
| Ownership guidelines | CEO required to hold 5x base salary; no stock ownership guideline for other NEOs (including Stenger) |
| Hedging/pledging | Company prohibits hedging and pledging; exceptions to pledging only with Legal approval and demonstrable capacity to repay without resort to pledged shares |
Employment Terms
| Termination scenario | Cash severance | Equity acceleration | Value (as of 12/31/2024) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Voluntary termination/retirement | None | None | — | — |
| Involuntary termination (other than for cause) | None | None | — | — |
| Involuntary termination (for cause) | None | None | — | — |
| Change in control | None | Accelerated vesting of unvested stock options, restricted stock, and performance units (assumes PSUs at target) | $486,829 | Awards under 2016/2019/2024 Plans allow acceleration upon Change in Control; calculated at $12.29 share price on 12/31/2024 . |
| Death | None | Accelerated vesting | $486,829 | Based on 12/31/2024 price assumptions . |
| Disability | None | Accelerated vesting | $486,829 | Based on 12/31/2024 price assumptions . |
| Clawback | — | — | — | Adopted Oct 2023; three-year lookback for erroneously awarded incentive comp; covers cash and equity incentives . |
| Insider trading policy | — | — | — | Hedging/pledging prohibited per policy . |
Note: The proxy states best practice “no automatic single-trigger vesting upon a change of control,” while the termination table assumes equity acceleration upon Change in Control for awards under existing plans; investors should rely on specific plan definitions of Change in Control and acceleration conditions .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: STIP redesigned to 80% financial metrics and 20% individual objectives; Stenger’s 2024 payout at 40% of target indicates below-plan corporate performance and targeted recognition for risk/regulatory execution support .
- Long-term alignment: 2024 LTIP split 50% RSUs (time-based) and 50% PSUs (ROTCE, TSR), three-year horizon; 2022–2024 PSU payout at 70% suggests calibrated goals and measured achievement versus absolute and relative metrics (TSR peer group: KBW Nasdaq Regional Banking Index) .
- Ownership signal: Low personal beneficial ownership (5,967 shares, <1%) and absence of near-term RSU vesting may modestly limit “skin in the game,” partially offset by company-wide hedging/pledging prohibitions; only the CEO has a formal ownership guideline .
- Downside protection profile: No cash severance for Stenger and equity acceleration only upon Change in Control reduces parachute risk; equity acceleration value estimated at $486,829, implying limited event-driven windfall potential vs. peers with richer severance .
- Governance quality: Strong say-on-pay support (~97% in 2024) and independent Compensation Committee using Pearl Meyer, with a defined compensation peer group and LTIP measured against regional banking index—supportive of disciplined program design .