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Jason Reiman

Senior Vice President, Chief Supply Chain Officer at HSY
Executive

About Jason Reiman

Jason R. Reiman is Senior Vice President and Chief Supply Chain Officer at The Hershey Company, an executive officer since June 2019 and age 53 as of February 10, 2025 . He previously served as Vice President, Supply Chain Operations in 2018–2019 . Company performance metrics relevant to incentive pay: 2024 net sales grew 0.4%, adjusted EPS declined 2.3%, and EBIT margin was 23.17%, resulting in a 47% OHIP payout; the market share modifier reduced the score by 6% . For the 2022–2024 PSU cycle, Hershey’s TSR ranked 42nd percentile vs. its peer set, EPS CAGR was 9.2%, and cumulative FCF was $5,073M, producing a 123.34% vest .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
The Hershey CompanySenior Vice President, Chief Supply Chain OfficerJun 2019–presentExecutive officer overseeing supply chain; signs Company filings (Form SD)
The Hershey CompanyVice President, Supply Chain OperationsAug 2018–Jun 2019Senior leadership in supply chain operations

External Roles

No public company directorships or external board roles disclosed for Reiman in Company filings .

Fixed Compensation

MetricFY 2022FY 2023FY 2024
Base Salary (set/approved) ($)$600,000 — (not a NEO in 2023) $765,000 (effective Apr 1, 2024; +9.3%)
Salary Earned ($)$600,000 $748,750
Target Bonus % (OHIP)100% (NEO in 2022) 85%
Actual Bonus Paid (OHIP) ($)$960,000 $299,126 (Company score 47%)

Performance Compensation

Annual OHIP (2024) design and outcomes

MetricWeightingTargetActualPayout Score
Net Sales (constant currency)50% $11.512B / 3.1% growth $11.215B / 0.4% growth — (contributes to 50% base score)
Adjusted EPS – Diluted25% $9.59 $9.37 / (2.3%) growth — (contributes to 25% base score)
EBIT Margin %25% 22.80% (−137 bps) 23.17% (−100 bps) 50.00%
Base OHIP Company Score100% 50.00%
Market Share Modifier±10% (6%) impact (6%)
Total OHIP Company Score47.00%

PSU cycles: metrics, weights, results, payout

PSU CycleMetricWeightTargetActualPayout
2022–2024Relative TSR vs. Financial Peer Group34% 50th percentile 42nd percentile 24.93%
2022–2024EPS CAGR (Adjusted)33% 8.1% 9.2% 75.22%
2022–2024Cumulative Free Cash Flow33% $5,273M $5,073M 23.19%
2022–2024Total100% 123.34%
2023–2025TSR / EPS CAGR / FCF (same as 2022–2024)34% / 33% / 33% In progressIn progress
2024–2026TSR / EPS CAGR / FCF % of Net Sales34% / 33% / 33% In progressIn progress

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemAmountNotes
Beneficial Common Shares13,679 Direct/indirect beneficial ownership
% of Common Shares Outstanding~0.009% (13,679 ÷ 147,949,462) Computed from disclosed counts
Exercisable Stock Options3,485 (at $99.90; exp. 2/19/2028) All options vested as of 12/31/2024
Unvested RSUs5,177 (value $912,510) Valued at $169.35 close on 12/31/2024
Unvested PSUs (threshold counts)1,889 (2023–2025), 2,702 (2024–2026) Values $319,902 and $457,499 respectively
RSUs vesting within 60 days of 3/7/2025970 Footnote (1) vesting within 60 days
Deferred Common Stock Units7,926 Vested/deferred shares
Ownership Guidelines3× base salary for Senior Vice Presidents 5-year window to comply; retain ≥50% of shares until in compliance
Hedging/PledgingProhibited for all insiders Anti-hedging & anti-pledging policies

Vesting and selling pressure indicators:

  • Special retention RSU grant of 15,254 RSUs on February 19, 2025, cliff vesting on March 19, 2027 (earlier vesting if terminated by Company without cause or by executive with good reason) . This creates a defined vest date that may concentrate future sellable shares.
  • RSUs vesting within 60 days of March 7, 2025 (970 shares) add near‑term supply into personal liquidity windows .

Recent insider filings (last 24 months):

  • Form 4 filed February 21, 2025 (details reflected in Company’s EDGAR/gcs-web archive) .
  • MarketBeat shows a Reiman Form 4 entry on February 25, 2025 (time-stamped) .
  • Nasdaq insider page reflects Disposition (Non-Open Market) and Acquisition (Non-Open Market) entries for Reiman .

Employment Terms

ProvisionTerms
Severance PlanExecutive Benefits Protection Plan (Group 3A), double-trigger for change-in-control
Severance Multiple1.5× base salary; OHIP continuation up to 18 months; health/welfare benefits 18 months; financial planning/tax preparation up to 18 months; outplacement up to $35,000
Example payout (no CIC; termination without cause or good reason at 12/31/2024)Salary: $1,123,125; OHIP at target: $954,656; RSU vesting: $608,471; benefits: $34,832; financial planning/outplacement: $59,750; total incremental: $2,780,834
CIC benefits (incremental at 12/31/2024)OHIP: $337,312; PSU payments: $1,181,656; RSU vesting: $912,510; retirement/DC SERP/401(k): $188,365; total: $2,619,843
CIC + qualifying termination (incremental at 12/31/2024)Cash severance: $1,339,718; PSU payments: $1,181,656; RSU vesting: $304,039; benefits continuation: $12,041; financial planning/outplacement: $8,250; enhanced DC SERP/401(k): $692,115; total: $3,537,819
Non-compete / ECRCA12‑month non-compete, non‑solicit, confidentiality; violation can trigger cancellation or clawback of awards
ClawbackCompensation Recovery Policy (effective Oct 2, 2023): 3‑year mandatory recovery for incentive-based compensation after any accounting restatement; supplemental clawback for misconduct causing material financial or reputational harm

Retirement and deferred benefits:

  • Pension Plan PV: $500,292; CLRP PV: $195,422 (eligible participants only) .
  • DC SERP: Annual allocation equal to 12.5% of base salary and OHIP; Reiman 80% vested; 2024 registrant contributions $236,465; aggregate balance $269,247 .

Perquisites (2024):

  • Personal aircraft use $3,000; other standard executive benefits (financial counseling, executive physical, 401(k) match; supplemental match $51,178; DC SERP contribution $185,287) .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Cash vs. equity mix: 2024 stock awards for Reiman totaled $1,650,861, with target LTI award $1,600,000; PSUs comprise ~65% and RSUs ~35% of LTI . Shift to RSUs is limited within mix; Company removed stock options from annual LTI since 2019 .
  • Annual incentive rigor: Added ±10% market share modifier in 2024, contributing a negative (6%) adjustment to payouts (strengthens pay-for-performance) .
  • Long-term metrics amendment: 2024–2026 changed FCF metric to FCF % of Net Sales to deepen capital efficiency accountability .
  • Clawback breadth: 2023 policy now requires recovery after any restatement regardless of misconduct and supplements prior clawbacks (shareholder-friendly) .

Compensation Peer Group and Say‑on‑Pay

  • Peer group used for 2024 benchmarking includes Church & Dwight, Colgate-Palmolive, Conagra Brands, General Mills, Hormel, Kellanova, Keurig Dr Pepper, Kimberly‑Clark, Lamb Weston, McCormick, Mondelez, Campbell, Clorox, Kraft Heinz, J.M. Smucker; Hershey targets aggregate pay near median .
  • Say‑on‑pay support: Last year >88% of Common Stock votes and >98% combined votes supported NEO pay; Company reports >90% stockholder approval every year historically .

Performance & Track Record

PeriodMetricOutcome
2024Net Sales (constant currency)0.4% growth (vs. 3.1% target)
2024Adjusted EPS – Diluted$9.37; (2.3%) growth (vs. target $9.59)
2024EBIT Margin %23.17% (100 bps decline vs. target assumption)
2022–2024 PSURelative TSR42nd percentile; contributes to 123.34% vest
2022–2024 PSUEPS CAGR9.2%
2022–2024 PSUCumulative FCF$5,073M

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Significant portion of Reiman’s compensation is equity-based (PSUs/RSUs), with rigorous multi-year performance metrics and enhanced clawbacks, plus strong anti-hedging/pledging rules—favorable for shareholder alignment .
  • Retention risk and supply dynamics: The 15,254‑RSU retention award cliff vesting in March 2027 may anchor Reiman’s retention through that date but could introduce selling pressure near vest; near‑term RSU vestings (970 within 60 days of Mar 7, 2025) incrementally add to potential disposals within trading windows .
  • Change‑in‑control protections: EBPP 3A provides predictable severance and accelerated vesting under specified conditions; examples indicate mid‑seven‑figure increments at CIC+qualifying termination, which can be value protective but modestly increase downside protection costs .
  • Performance sensitivity: 2024 OHIP payout at 47% underscores real pay variability with commodity (cocoa) and market-share pressures; future PSU outcomes depend on TSR vs. updated peer set and FCF efficiency (new metric), which tie Reiman’s long-term realizable pay to execution on supply chain resiliency and cash generation .

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Best AI for Equity Research

Performance on expert-authored financial analysis tasks

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