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Gregory Gumbs

President, Utility Solutions Segment at HUBBELLHUBBELL
Executive

About Gregory Gumbs

President, Utility Solutions Segment at Hubbell since July 1, 2023, following leadership roles as President & CEO, Bosch Rexroth North America (2020–2023) and senior positions at Eaton Electrical and Rockwell Automation . As an NEO in 2024, his pay tied to Hubbell’s enterprise performance (net sales $5.6B, adjusted EPS $16.57, FCF $811M) and Utility Solutions segment results that drove his STI payout, aligning compensation with growth, margins, cash generation, and relative TSR in LTI grants . Hubbell’s say‑on‑pay support was 95.1% in 2024, indicating shareholder endorsement of the pay-for-performance framework .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Bosch Rexroth North AmericaPresident & CEO2020–2023Utility automation background viewed as well‑suited to grid modernization; expected to drive outperformance leveraging components, communications, and controls .
Eaton ElectricalSenior leadership rolesPrior to 2020Deep electrical/automation experience; foundation for segment leadership at HUS .
Rockwell AutomationSenior leadership rolesPrior to 2020Automation expertise aligned with HUS strategy and operational performance .

External Roles

No public company directorships or committee roles disclosed for Mr. Gumbs .

Fixed Compensation

MetricFY 2023FY 2024
Base Salary ($)298,077 632,608
Target Bonus (% of Salary)75% 75%
Actual STI Award ($)430,100 471,500
Perquisites ($)39,895 10,000
Retirement Plan Contributions ($)74,389
Total Compensation ($)2,093,131 2,239,107

Performance Compensation

Short‑Term Incentive (STI) Design and Results

  • Design: 80% financial metrics; 20% strategic objectives .
  • Enterprise metrics achieved: Adjusted EPS target $16.35, performance 102% → 115% payout; FCF target $793M, performance 101% → 107% payout; blended enterprise payout 112% .
  • Utility Solutions segment (Gumbs’ segment): OP target 118% vs PY, actual 94% → 80% payout; OCF target 104% of OP, actual 92% → 80% payout; blended segment payout 80% .
  • Strategic objectives payout: 110% based on four pillars (Serve Customers, Grow, Operate with Discipline, Develop People) .
ComponentWeightTarget/Payout InputsPayout Factor
Enterprise Adjusted EPS80% of financial (enterprise portion)Target $16.35; actual 102% of target115%
Enterprise FCF80% of financial (enterprise portion)Target $793M; actual 101% of target107%
Segment OP (Utility Solutions)Segment portionTarget +18% vs PY; actual 94%80%
Segment OCF (Utility Solutions)Segment portionTarget 104% of OP; actual 92%80%
Strategic Objectives20%Four-pillar assessment110%
Composite (Gumbs)Enterprise 112%, Segment 80%, Strategic 110%99%

STI outcome: Target $476,250; Award $471,500 (99% composite) .

Long‑Term Incentive (LTI) Structure and Grants

  • Mix: 50% performance shares (PS), 25% stock appreciation rights (SARs), 25% time‑based restricted stock (RS) .
  • PS metrics (equal‑weighted): Relative Sales Growth (34%), Adjusted Operating Profit Margin (33%), Relative TSR (33%) .
  • PS payout scales: Relative metrics—75th percentile=200%, 50th=100%, 25th=50%; OPM target levels by cycle (e.g., 2024–2026 target 21.00% for 100%) .
  • 2022–2024 PS results (companywide): Projected payouts at 200% for all three metrics (RSG 76th percentile; OPM 21.9%; Relative TSR 124.5%), subject to final peer reporting .
InstrumentGrant DateAward DetailVesting
RS2/6/2024709 shares (grant date fair value $249,958) 3‑year cliff (vests on 3‑year anniversary)
SAR2/6/20242,840 SARs at $352.55; 10‑year term to 2/6/2034 Vests in 3 equal annual tranches
PS (RSG)2/6/2024Target 468–482 shares (table shows 468/482 across NEOs; Gumbs target counts: RSG target 468; threshold 234; max 936) Earned over 2024–2026 vs index/targets
PS (OPM)2/6/2024Target 468–468; threshold 234; max 936 (Gumbs: 468/234/936) Earned over 2024–2026 against OPM targets
PS (TSR)2/6/2024Target 468; threshold 234; max 936 Earned over 2024–2026 vs S&P Capital Goods 900

Note: SAR grant pricing methodology uses mean of prior‑day high/low; ratable vesting over three years .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

  • Beneficial ownership: 2,623 shares obtainable via vested SARs; no direct common shares reported as of March 7, 2025 .
  • Outstanding equity (12/31/2024):
    • SARs: 7/6/2023 (1,677 exercisable; 3,356 unexercisable at $328.73); 2/6/2024 (2,840 unexercisable at $352.55) .
    • RS: 1,331 (7/6/2023; market value $557,543) and 709 (2/6/2024; market value $296,993) unvested, valued at $418.89 closing price .
    • PS (unearned): 1,418 shares (2/6/2024) with market/payout value $593,986 at $418.89 .
Ownership ItemQuantity/Value
Common shares owned
SARs exercisable1,677 (7/6/2023 grant)
SARs unexercisable3,356 (7/6/2023) + 2,840 (2/6/2024)
RS unvested1,331 ($557,543) + 709 ($296,993)
PS unearned1,418 ($593,986)
Total beneficial ownership (incl. SARs)2,623

Stock ownership policy: All NEOs in compliance; counts include restricted stock and in‑the‑money vested SARs; unearned PS not counted . Hedging/pledging is prohibited for officers and designated employees .

Employment Terms

  • Appointment: President, Utility Solutions Segment effective July 1, 2023 .
  • Severance (Senior Severance Policy): Involuntary termination—cash severance $793,762, welfare benefits $53,640; total $847,402 .
  • Change‑in‑Control (CIC) Agreement: Double trigger required; 2.0x base salary and 2.0x target bonus; continued benefits for 2 years; pro‑rated target bonus; outplacement up to lesser of 15% of salary or $50k; no excise tax gross‑ups (safe harbor cutback applies) . CIC + termination value example (12/31/2024): severance $1,846,564; accelerated equity $1,939,505; welfare benefits $67,526; total $3,853,595 .
  • Clawback: Three‑year recovery of erroneously awarded incentive compensation upon restatement under SEC/NYSE rules .
  • Deferred compensation: EDCP executive contributions $44,283 in 2024; DC Restoration Plan registrant contributions $16,723; aggregate balances $63,315 as of 12/31/2024 .
  • Retirement plans: Participates in defined contribution plan (4% non‑elective plus match), with DC Restoration Plan for comp above qualified limits; DB plan applies only to certain NEOs (not Gumbs) .

Investment Implications

  • Pay‑for‑performance alignment: Gumbs’ STI linked to enterprise EPS/FCF and segment OP/OCF yielded a below‑enterprise composite payout (99%), reflecting Utility Solutions underperformance versus ambitious targets—supportive of disciplined incentives but highlights execution sensitivity in his segment .
  • Equity exposure and retention: Material unvested RS/PS and multi‑tranche SARs create staggered vesting through 2026–2027 (7/6 and 2/6 anniversaries), reducing near‑term voluntary turnover risk and potentially concentrating insider selling windows around vest dates .
  • Governance/Red flags: No pledging allowed; clawback in place; no tax gross‑ups on CIC; strong say‑on‑pay support (95.1%), mitigating compensation‑related governance risk .
  • Change‑in‑control economics: Double trigger with 2.0x salary and bonus plus accelerated equity produces ~$3.85M illustrative payout, balanced by benefit cutback provisions—limited shareholder‑unfriendly features compared to peers .
  • Strategic track record: Background in utility/electrical automation (Bosch Rexroth, Eaton, Rockwell) aligns with grid modernization priorities; however, 2024 segment metrics underperformed targets, warranting monitoring of margin/cash execution in HUS under his leadership .