Helen B. Bautista
About Helen B. Bautista
Helen B. Bautista, age 58, is Senior Vice President, Marketing and Digital at Haverty Furniture Companies, Inc. (HVT). She joined Havertys in 2019 as Vice President, Marketing, was promoted to Senior Vice President, Marketing in 2021, and her role expanded to Marketing and Digital in 2023 . Prior to Havertys, Bautista held senior client leadership roles at Fitzco (McCann Worldgroup) from 2013–2019, bringing deep expertise in marketing integration, brand management, digital marketing, and analytics . Her compensation is explicitly tied to pre‑tax income (MIP‑I), individual goals (MIP‑II), adjusted EBITDA and net sales via PRSUs, and is impacted by TSR under pay‑versus‑performance disclosures; notably, 2024 EBITDA PRSUs paid at 52% while sales PRSUs paid 0% (missed threshold), and Q3 2025 saw 10.6% sales growth and 7.1% comp-store growth amid increased marketing investments .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Havertys | Vice President, Marketing | 2019–Mar 1, 2021 | Led marketing integration, brand management, digital marketing, analytics focus inside Havertys |
| Havertys | Senior Vice President, Marketing | 2021–2022 | Continued leadership across integrated marketing and digital analytics |
| Havertys | Senior Vice President, Marketing and Digital | 2023–present | Expanded scope to digital, supporting traffic and conversion initiatives |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fitzco (McCann Worldgroup) | Senior Vice President, Group Account Director | 2018–2019 | Led client marketing and advertising programs |
| Fitzco (McCann Worldgroup) | Vice President, Group Account Director | 2016–2018 | Oversight of multi-channel marketing campaigns |
| Fitzco (McCann Worldgroup) | Group Account Director | 2013–2016 | Account leadership and strategy execution |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2024 |
|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $380,000 |
| Target Bonus (% of Salary) | 55% (combined MIP‑I and MIP‑II) |
| Actual Non‑Equity Incentive Paid ($) | $73,334 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $26,918 |
| Total Compensation ($) | $716,482 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentives (MIP‑I company financials and MIP‑II individual goals)
| Metric | Q1 2024 | Q2 2024 | Q3 2024 | Q4 2024 | Annual 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MIP‑I Pre‑Tax Earnings Goal ($mm) | 12.9 | 7.1 | 9.3 | 10.7 | 40.0 |
| Actual Pre‑Tax Earnings ($mm) | 3.2 | 6.5 | 6.9 | 9.6 | 26.2 |
| % of Goal Achieved (%) | 25% | 91% | 74% | 90% | 65% |
| Target % Achieved (%) | 0% | 82% | 48% | 78% | 0% |
| % of MIP‑I Earned (%) | 0% | 6% | 4% | 9% | 0% |
| MIP‑II (Individual Goals) | — | — | — | — | 100% payout of target for NEOs |
2024 combined outcome: average MIP payout of 35.1% of target (MIP‑I earned ~19% of target; MIP‑II 100%) .
Long‑Term Equity Incentives (PRSUs) – EBITDA and Sales
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA Target ($mm) | $93.3 | $54.9 |
| Adjusted EBITDA Actual ($mm) | $85.8 | $41.7 |
| EBITDA PRSU Payout (% of target) | 83.9% | 52.0% |
| Net Sales Target ($mm) | $950.0 | $847.3 |
| Net Sales Actual ($mm) | $862.1 | $722.9 |
| Sales PRSU Payout (% of target) | 44.5% | 0% (below threshold) |
| PRSU Vesting | Feb 2026 (cliff) | Feb 2027 (cliff) |
Equity Grants (2024)
| Award Type | Grant Date | Threshold (#) | Target (#) | Max (#) | Grant Date Fair Value ($) | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PRSU – EBITDA | 1/25/2024 | 1,251 | 3,127 | 5,472 | $108,601 | Cliff ~Feb 2027 |
| PRSU – Sales | 1/25/2024 | 312 | 781 | 976 | $27,124 | Cliff ~Feb 2027 |
| RSU (time-based) | 1/25/2024 | — | — | — | $90,506 (2,606 units @ $34.73) | 33.3% annually beginning May 2025 |
| RSU (supplemental) | 11/12/2024 | — | — | — | $9,999 (445 units @ $22.47) | 100% on May 8, 2026 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total Beneficial Ownership (Common) | 13,056 shares; <1% of class |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines (SVP) | Minimum holdings: 2.0x salary or 25,000 shares; 5 years to comply for new officers |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for senior executives and directors |
| Clawback/Recoupment | Company may recover incentive compensation for restatements, fraud, or misconduct |
Outstanding unvested awards and vesting schedule:
| Award | Grant Date | Units Unvested (#) | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSU (time-based) | 1/26/2022 | 847 | 33.3% per year on May 8; continued vesting at retirement; full vest at death/disability |
| PRSU – 2022 EBITDA | 1/26/2022 | 3,212 (earned 104.3% of target) | Cliff vest ~Feb 28, 2025 |
| PRSU – 2022 Sales | 1/26/2022 | 783 (earned 101.7% of target) | Cliff vest ~Feb 28, 2025 |
| RSU (time-based) | 1/26/2023 | 1,709 | 33.3% per year on May 8 |
| PRSU – 2023 EBITDA | 1/26/2023 | 2,606 (earned 83.9%) | Cliff vest ~Feb 28, 2026 |
| PRSU – 2023 Sales | 1/26/2023 | 345 (earned 44.5%) | Cliff vest ~Feb 28, 2026 |
| RSU (time-based) | 1/25/2024 | 2,606 | 33.3% per year beginning May 2025 |
| RSU (supplemental) | 11/12/2024 | 445 | 100% on May 8, 2026 |
Note: Insider Form 4 transactions (e.g., open-market sales or tax-withholding dispositions) could not be retrieved due to data access constraints; proxies disclose that shares are routinely withheld at vest for taxes, e.g., Bautista had 6,870 shares vest with net shares received of 4,269 in 2024 .
Employment Terms
- No employment agreements; executive protections via change‑in‑control agreements that auto‑renew annually .
- Double‑trigger CIC: benefits payable only upon qualifying termination within 24 months following a change in control .
- CIC severance: 2× the sum of (i) base salary (higher of current or 3‑yr average) and (ii) annual non‑equity incentive (higher of current or 3‑yr average); plus pro‑rated final year bonus; plus 24 months reimbursement for medical and life insurance premiums; plus equity vesting acceleration per plan terms .
- No tax gross‑ups on change‑in‑control benefits .
Potential payments for Bautista (as of Dec 31, 2024):
| Scenario | Severance ($) | Healthcare ($) | Long‑Term Incentive ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| CIC – Involuntary Not for Cause / Good Reason | 780,365 | 60,183 | 315,625 |
Performance & Company Context
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Net Sales ($mm) | $862.1 | $722.9 |
| Adjusted EBITDA ($mm) | $85.8 | $41.7 |
| TSR (5‑yr cumulative, company) | See 2018–2023 performance graph (HVT and HVT.A outperformed sector indices over multiple years; values tabled) |
Q3 2025 highlights: sales +10.6% y/y to $194.5mm, comp‑store +7.1%, gross margin 60.3%, with management citing strategic marketing investments driving traffic and higher average tickets .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix: For 2024 NEOs, variable compensation averaged ~60% of targeted pay; equity comprised 28–36% for non‑CEO NEOs, reinforcing at‑risk pay tied to EBITDA/sales outcomes .
- Metric rigor: 2024 PRSUs paid 52% on EBITDA but 0% on sales due to underperformance vs target—evidence of payout sensitivity to operating results; MIP‑I paid ~19% of target given pre‑tax earnings shortfall .
- Governance safeguards: Clawback/recoupment policies, prohibition of hedging/pledging, and double‑trigger CIC vesting under 2021 LTIP mitigate misalignment and windfalls .
Investment Implications
- Pay‑for‑performance alignment: Bautista’s incentives are directly levered to pre‑tax income, EBITDA, and sales; 2024 outcomes (EBITDA partial payout, sales forfeiture) indicate disciplined payout calibration to fundamentals .
- Vesting calendar and potential supply: Multiple PRSU cliffs (Feb 2025/2026/2027) and RSU tranches (each May) can create predictable vesting events and routine tax‑withholding share surrenders; recent net shares received at vest suggest internal withholding rather than open‑market sales .
- Retention and CIC economics: Double‑trigger CIC agreements with 2× salary+bonus and 24 months benefits provide market‑standard protection without tax gross‑ups; no employment contract and clawbacks reduce agency risk .
- Ownership alignment: Beneficial ownership is modest (<1%); alignment relies on unvested/earned equity and stock ownership guidelines (SVP: 2× salary or 25,000 shares) alongside strict anti‑hedging/pledging policies .