Ronald Bruehlman
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer at IQV
Executive
About Ronald Bruehlman
Ronald E. Bruehlman, age 64, is Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of IQVIA. He originally served as CFO of IMS Health beginning in 2011, played key roles in the IMS IPO (2014) and the 2016 Quintiles–IMS merger, returned from retirement in 2020 to serve as IQVIA CFO, and will transition to Senior Advisor to the CEO on February 28, 2026, as part of a planned succession (Michael Fedock named CFO effective that date) . Under his finance leadership in 2024, IQVIA delivered revenue of $15.4B, Adjusted EBITDA of $3.7B, Adjusted Diluted EPS of $11.13, and Free Cash Flow of $2.1B (up 40.9% YoY), while reducing net leverage to 3.33x and repurchasing $1.35B of stock . For the 2022–2024 PSU cycle, payout was 53.5% (EPS growth 7.8% vs target 10%; Relative TSR 17th percentile), evidencing pay-for-performance rigor .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| IQVIA | EVP & CFO | 2020–2026e | Navigated COVID, strengthened cash flow (FCF $2.1B in 2024), delevered to 3.33x, executed $1.35B buybacks |
| IMS Health | CFO | 2011–2016 | Led 2014 IPO and 2016 Quintiles–IMS merger integration |
| IQVIA | Senior Advisor to CEO | From 2026‑02‑28 | Planned CFO transition; continuity role post-handover to Michael Fedock |
External Roles
- None disclosed for Mr. Bruehlman in the 2025 Proxy Statement NEO biographies; filings emphasize internal leadership roles and transition plan .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 895,400 | 905,000 | 905,000 |
| Target Bonus (% of Salary) | — | — | 100% (current setting) |
| Actual Annual Incentive Payout ($) | 1,402,009 | 1,160,193 | 1,239,221 |
Notes:
- Target bonus for Messrs. Bruehlman, Staub, and Sherbet is “currently set at 100%” of base salary per their agreements; the proxy discloses current settings rather than historical targets by year .
Performance Compensation
Short‑Term Incentive (Annual Plan) – Structure and 2024 Outcomes (CFO)
- Weightings (CFO): Revenue/Profit 50%; Cash Flow 30%; Operational/Strategic 10%; Leadership/Sustainability 10% .
- CFO calculated formula-based payout factor for 2024: 136.9%; final award paid with no individual adjustment .
Corporate financial metric outcomes used in STI (company-wide):
| Metric | Threshold | Target | Maximum | 2024 Actual | Unweighted Payout | Weight (within Rev/Profit) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue ($mm) | 13,175 | 15,500 | 17,825 | 15,405 | 99.0% | 30% |
| Adjusted EBITDA ($mm) | 3,145 | 3,700 | 4,255 | 3,684 | 99.3% | 30% |
| Adjusted Diluted EPS ($) | 9.31 | 10.95 | 12.59 | 11.13 | 111.0% | 40% |
CFO-specific 2024 performance scoring:
| Performance measure | CFO weighting | 2024 payout |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue/Profit | 50% | 103.9% |
| Cash Flow | 30% | 200% (Free Cash Flow %, DSO, Capital Intensity all scored 5/5) |
| Operational/Strategic | 10% | 125% (score 12/20) |
| Leadership/Sustainability | 10% | 125% (score 12/20) |
Result: 0.50×103.9% + 0.30×200% + 0.10×125% + 0.10×125% = 136.9% → payout $1,239,221 on $905k base, 100% target .
Key CFO accomplishments tied to payout (selected): record $31.1B backlog; Adjusted EBITDA margin +10 bps; Adjusted tax rate −160 bps; $1.35B buybacks; extended $550mm receivables facility; reduced finance costs/reported net interest .
Long‑Term Incentive (2024 grants)
- Mix: 75% Performance Shares (PSUs); 25% Stock Appreciation Rights (SARs) .
- 2024 LTI grant values (fair value):
- PSUs: $4,499,854
- SARs: $1,499,993 (20,719 SARs @ $214.34, vest 1/3 annually over 3 years) .
- PSU metrics and goals (2024–2026 cycle):
- 3‑Year Adjusted Diluted EPS Growth (75% weight): Threshold 6.2%, Target 10.0%, Max 13.6%
- 3‑Year Relative TSR vs S&P 500 (25% weight): Threshold 25th pctile, Target 55th, Max 75th; payout 50%–200%; negative absolute TSR cap applies to the TSR tranche .
2022–2024 PSU vesting outcome (applies to all NEOs):
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Max | Actual | Payout Factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3‑Year Adjusted Diluted EPS Growth | 75% | 6.2% | 10.0% | 13.6% | 7.8% | 53.5% (after UK tax-rate adjustment) |
| 3‑Year Relative TSR (percentile) | 25% | 25 | 50 | 75 | 17 | — (below threshold) |
| Final payout | 53.5% |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial ownership and guidelines
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Shares beneficially owned (1/31/2025) | 116,558 shares; includes 69,189 SARs exercisable/vesting within 60 days and 1,957 RSUs vesting within 60 days; 11,893 shares held in Revocable Trust |
| % of outstanding | <1% (company table notation) |
| Ownership guidelines | NEOs must hold IQVIA stock valued between 3×–6× base salary; must retain 50% of net shares until guidelines met |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited without exception under Securities Trading Policy |
| Clawbacks | Dodd‑Frank restatement policy + supplemental misconduct clawback; broader coverage than required |
2024 equity vesting/exercises and net shares retained
| 2024 | Options/SARs exercised (#) | Value realized ($) | Stock vested (#) | Value realized ($) | Net shares retained (#) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ronald E. Bruehlman | — | — | 10,471 | 2,149,057 | 6,330 |
Vesting schedule and potential flow (CFO)
| Award | Quantity | Vest/Settlement date | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSU (2022 grant) | 1,957 | 2025‑02‑10 | Time‑based |
| SAR (2024 grant) | 6,906 | 2025‑02‑07 | 1/3 of 20,719 @ $214.34; remaining 1/3 on 2026‑02‑07 and 1/3 on 2027‑02‑07 |
| PSU (2023 target) | 20,193 | 2025‑12‑31 | Vests per performance |
| PSU (2024 target) | 20,994 | 2026‑12‑31 | Vests per performance |
Note: Equity values in the “Outstanding Equity Awards” table use $196.51 (12/31/2024 close) for valuation .
Employment Terms
Current pay design and agreements
- Base salary: $905,000; target annual bonus: 100% of base salary .
- Non-compete/non-solicit: 12 months post-termination (CFO) .
- No excise tax gross‑ups; anti‑hedge/anti‑pledge policies in force .
Severance and change‑in‑control (CFO)
| Scenario | Cash severance | Health & welfare | Outplacement | Total example (12/31/2024) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Involuntary termination (no CIC) | $452,500 | $6,712 | $3,109 | $462,321 |
| Involuntary termination following CIC (double‑trigger) | $452,500 | $6,712 | $3,109 | $462,321 |
- CFO participates in the Employee Protection Plan (EPP): salary continuation (26 weeks for CFO), benefits continuation, and outplacement; benefits conditional on release/covenants; CIC benefits are generally provided upon qualifying termination (no single-trigger vesting) .
- Transition plan: CFO to retire as CFO and become Senior Advisor to CEO effective 2026‑02‑28; Michael Fedock appointed CFO effective the same date (mitigates near‑term retention risk) .
Retirement, pension, deferred comp, perquisites
| Item | 2024 Detail |
|---|---|
| Pension (present value @12/31/2024) | IMS Health Retirement Plan: $206,514; Retirement Excess Plan: $675,867 |
| Deferred compensation | No reported contributions/balance for CFO; plan eligibility disclosed |
| All other compensation | $63,185 total; includes 401(k) match $10,350 and Savings Equalization Plan contribution $52,835; life insurance $0 shown for CFO |
Compensation Structure Analysis (Signals)
- Cash vs. equity mix: Majority at‑risk; 2024 LTI delivered 75% PSUs, 25% SARs—tilting toward performance‑contingent equity and away from time‑based RSUs (NEOs no longer receive annual RSUs) .
- STI simplification: 2024 plan reduced measures from five to four; Cash Flow now integrates capital intensity; 65%–80% of payout formula tied to annual financials—reducing discretionary risk (discretion capped at 1/6th, unused for CFO in 2024) .
- Performance hurdles: Company disclosed objective targets for Revenue, Adjusted EBITDA, EPS; PSU targets increased RTSR target to 55th percentile; negative absolute TSR cap on RTSR tranche—tightened pay/performance alignment .
- Realization discipline: 2022–2024 PSU payout at 53.5% due to below‑target EPS growth and sub‑threshold RTSR (17th percentile), showing downward variability when underperforming .
Say‑on‑Pay, Peer Group, and Governance
- Say‑on‑Pay approval 2024: 84% “For” (up 4 pts YoY) .
- Compensation peer group (unchanged in 2024) spans biotech, healthcare services, IT consulting/services, life science tools, and large pharma (e.g., Accenture, Danaher, Eli Lilly, Abbott peers listed in proxy) .
- Governance safeguards: Two clawbacks; robust ownership guidelines; anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging; majority‑independent board and committees .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and payout sensitivity: A heavy tilt to PSUs (EPS growth and Relative TSR) and formulaic STI (Revenue/EBITDA/EPS/FCF) ties CFO compensation tightly to value creation; the 53.5% PSU outcome evidences meaningful downside when growth/TSR lag, aligning with shareholder interests .
- Selling pressure/flow: 2024 showed no option exercises for the CFO, and a net retention of 6,330 shares on vestings; upcoming scheduled events include 2/7/25 SAR vest (6,906), 2/10/25 RSU vest (1,957), and PSU settlements on 12/31/25 and 12/31/26—expect routine tax‑withholdings, but anti‑pledging reduces leverage‑driven selling risk .
- Retention/transition risk: CFO succession plan (effective 2026‑02‑28) reduces key‑man risk and supports continuity; near‑term incentive design remains cash‑flow focused (200% payout on Cash Flow measure in 2024), which may continue to support deleveraging and repurchase capacity if operating trends hold .
- Policy guardrails: Dual clawbacks, anti‑hedge/anti‑pledge, and no excise tax gross‑ups reflect shareholder‑friendly posture and lower governance risk .
Monitoring list: (i) Quarterly Form 4 filings for any incremental sales, (ii) PSU cohort performance versus EPS growth and S&P 500 TSR percentiles, (iii) continued FCF conversion vs. Adjusted Net Income (2024: 104%) and leverage trajectory (3.33x) for capital allocation flexibility .
Appendix – Key 2024 CFO Data Snapshots
2024 Grants of Plan‑Based Awards (CFO)
| Type | Grant date | Quantity / Terms | Grant‑date fair value |
|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs (target) | 2024‑02‑07 | 20,994 target units; EPS growth and RTSR; 50%–200% payout | $4,499,854 |
| SARs | 2024‑02‑07 | 20,719 @ $214.34; vest 1/3 per year over 3 years | $1,499,993 |
Outstanding Equity at FY‑End 2024 (CFO)
| Award | Quantity | Exercise/Strike | Vesting or expiration | FY‑end valuation notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SARs (exercisable) | 26,701 (2021) | $183.82 | Exp. 2023–2031 cadence | |
| SARs (unexercisable) | 7,283 (2022); 13,734 (2023); 20,719 (2024) | $250.43; $232.11; $214.34 | 2025–2027 pro rata vest | |
| RSUs (time‑based) | 1,957 | — | 2025‑02‑10 | Valued using $196.51 at 12/31/24 |
| PSUs (target unearned) | 20,193 (2023); 20,994 (2024) | — | 2025‑12‑31; 2026‑12‑31 | Valued at target using $196.51 |
Sources: 2025 DEF 14A sections on CD&A, Grants, Outstanding Equity, Security Ownership; 8‑K (9/2/2025) CFO transition; 10‑Q certifications and exhibits .