Tammi Gaskins
IRONWOOD PHARMACEUTICALSAbout Tammi Gaskins
Tammi Gaskins is Senior Vice President and Chief Commercial Officer (CCO) at Ironwood Pharmaceuticals (IRWD). She was appointed CCO in January 2025 after joining Ironwood in 2020; she is 52, with 20 years at AstraZeneca culminating as Executive Director of the U.S. diabetes franchise, and previously served as Commercial Director for the Middle East. She holds a B.A. in International Studies (Trinity College) and an MPA (University of Delaware) . Company performance context relevant to incentive alignment: LINZESS U.S. net sales were $916.3M in 2024 and adjusted EBITDA (company definition) was $99.5M, contributing to a below-target corporate achievement multiplier of 70% used in executive bonus decisions .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| AstraZeneca | Executive Director, U.S. Diabetes Franchise; prior roles across specialty and primary care; Commercial Director, Middle East | 20 years (prior to 2020) | Led commercial strategy in U.S. diabetes; regional leadership in Middle East; progressive senior roles across brands |
External Roles
- No external board or public directorships disclosed .
Fixed Compensation
- Base salary and target/actual bonus amounts for Tammi Gaskins have not been individually disclosed in filings reviewed. Executives’ annual cash incentive program ties payouts to company and individual goals; 2024 corporate performance achievement multiplier was set to 70% .
Performance Compensation
| Metric | Weight | Target | Actual | Payout Basis | Vesting/Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LINZESS U.S. Net Sales | 30% | $1,087M (target); >$1,100M (overachieve) | $916.3M | 0% for this metric as below threshold | Company performance goal within ACIP |
| Build Innovative Pipeline (composite of partner rights, NDA modules, portfolio decisions) | 35% | Specific goals not disclosed | Mix of Target and Below Target across sub-goals | 30% effective for this bucket | Competitive sensitivity; components summarized in proxy |
| Adjusted EBITDA (ex certain items) | 30% | $162M (target); >$170M (overachieve) | $99.5M | 0% for this metric as below threshold | Company Selected Measure in Pay vs Performance; ACIP metric |
| Culture/Workforce (“Great Place to Work”) | 5% | Deliver three initiatives (target) | Target achieved | 5% | ACIP qualitative metric |
| Adjusted Company Performance Achievement Multiplier | — | — | 70% | Applied to executive bonus calculations | Board exercised discretion considering external headwinds |
Equity plan design (executive-wide, not individual to Gaskins): RSUs typically vest 25% per year over four years (CEO vesting differs), and PSUs measure aTSR (absolute TSR price hurdles) and rTSR (peer percentile) over three years ending Feb 28, 2027; aTSR max 400% at $21.36 30-day avg price, rTSR max 200% at 75th percentile, with cap at 100% if company TSR is negative .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership for Tammi Gaskins was not listed in the 2025 proxy’s security ownership table (named executives and directors shown; Gaskins not included) .
- Executive stock ownership guidelines: CEO must hold ≥4x base salary in stock; other executive officers must hold ≥1x base salary; compliance measured annually; unvested RSUs net of taxes count; vested in-the-money options and unearned performance awards do not count .
- Hedging and pledging: Executives are prohibited from hedging, monetization, holding securities in margin accounts, or pledging company stock as collateral .
Employment Terms
- Ironwood maintains executive severance agreements; benefits require compliance with non-disclosure, noncompetition and non-solicitation obligations. Agreements include double-trigger requirements for equity acceleration and other benefits upon change of control and do not provide tax gross-ups .
- Clawback policy adopted per Dodd-Frank/SEC/Nasdaq since Oct 2023; requires recovery of erroneously awarded incentive-based compensation for three fiscal years preceding an accounting restatement; no misconduct requirement; company will not indemnify recovery .
Performance & Track Record
- Role in commercialization: CEO highlighted Gaskins as newly appointed CCO leading commercialization planning for apraglutide (rare disease SBS). Strategy targets centers of excellence with a robust patient support service model from prescription through authorization and ongoing utilization; preparations underway for potential launch .
- Organizational restructuring to focus on apraglutide: In January 2025, Ironwood streamlined focus (workforce reduced ~50%, primarily field force), expecting $20–$25M restructuring charges (1H25) and $55–$60M annual opex savings, yielding a $40–$45M annual profit benefit net of collaboration impacts—context for commercial model changes under the CCO’s remit .
- LINZESS demand remains strong with 11–12% prescription demand growth YoY in Q4 and FY2024; 2024 net sales delivered $916M despite Medicare headwinds, informing compensation discretion and commercial priorities .
Compensation Committee Analysis (Context)
- Pay-for-performance orientation: Long-term equity (RSUs/PSUs) comprised ~73% of other current NEOs’ 2024 compensation (CEO ~78%), emphasizing stockholder value creation over cash .
- Peer groups: 2024 compensation peer group (17 companies) used by Alpine; updated in Sep 2024 to an 18-company set with lower median market cap (~$1.4B) for late-2024 decisions .
- Say-on-pay support: 94% approval at 2024 annual meeting, with advisory vote held annually .
Equity and Performance References (Company-Level)
| Item | FY2024 | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| LINZESS U.S. Net Sales ($M) | $916.3 | Reported by AbbVie; below ACIP threshold; 84% of target |
| Adjusted EBITDA ($M, company definition) | $99.5 | Company Selected Measure in pay-vs-performance; below ACIP threshold |
| Corporate Achievement Multiplier | 70% | Board discretion applying external headwinds; used in bonus payouts |
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Executive policies prohibit hedging and pledging, and require ownership multiples—positive alignment signals for the CCO role as launch risk increases with apraglutide’s targeted market approach .
- Retention and incentive risk: Equity-heavy compensation and three-year PSU metrics (aTSR/rTSR) tie outcomes to share performance and relative peers; restructuring reduces field force cash burden and shifts commercialization to specialty centers, aligning cost savings with focus but increasing execution dependence on patient services and center engagement under the CCO .
- Trading signals: Company-level underperformance vs ACIP targets (LINZESS net sales, Adjusted EBITDA) prompted below-target bonus multipliers, but strong demand growth and NDA progress for apraglutide may catalyze future value; investor support for pay (94% say-on-pay) suggests acceptance of equity-linked incentives during transition .