Evan Regan-Levine
About Evan Regan-Levine
Evan Regan‑Levine is Chief Strategy Officer at JBG SMITH (appointed January 2024), age 36, responsible for firmwide strategy after leading Research & Strategic Innovation since 2019; he joined JBG (predecessor) in March 2013 and previously worked at Monday Properties and Jones Lang LaSalle. He holds a B.A. from Georgetown University . Company execution in 2024 was strong against key operating goals underlying incentive compensation: Operating Portfolio NOI of $287.2M vs $265.0M target (max payout), $373.7M of asset sales/recaps vs $300.0M target, 324K SF new office leases vs 240K target, and 552 units leased at The Grace & Reva vs 425 target (max payout) . Governance signals include a 2024 say‑on‑pay support of ~67% (down YoY), prompting 2025 plan changes to increase performance weighting and add a 3‑year NOI‑based LTIP for management .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| JBG SMITH | Chief Strategy Officer | 2024–present | Leads corporate strategy and major cross‑functional initiatives |
| JBG SMITH | EVP, Research & Strategic Innovation (Investments) | 2019–2023 | Drove data/analytics‑led investment strategy and large‑scale initiatives |
| JBG / JBG SMITH | Investments group | 2013–2019 | Investment strategy and execution following March 2013 join date |
| Monday Properties | Investment/real estate roles | Pre‑2013 | Prior real estate investment/operations experience |
| Jones Lang LaSalle | Investment/real estate roles | Pre‑2013 | Prior real estate/investment experience |
External Roles
No public company directorships or external committee roles disclosed for Regan‑Levine in the proxy .
Fixed Compensation
Not individually disclosed for Regan‑Levine (not a 2024 Named Executive Officer). Company framework for executive officers includes market‑competitive base salary; 2024 NEO base salaries ranged from $400k–$750k (context, not specific to Regan‑Levine) .
Performance Compensation
- Short‑Term Incentive Plan (STIP) for executives: company‑scorecard only (no individual modifier for executive officers) with threshold/target/maximum rigor; 2024 funded at 133% based on results then reduced to 123% via −10% Committee discretion for share price performance .
- Metrics and 2024 outcomes (drive selling pressure timing and payout visibility):
| Metric (weight) | Threshold | Target | Max | 2024 Result | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Portfolio NOI (30%) | $255.0M | $265.0M | $275.0M | $287.2M | Maximum |
| Sell/Recapitalize Assets (20%) | $200.0M | $300.0M | $500.0M | $373.7M | Target+ |
| Execute New Office Leases (15%) | 140K SF | 240K SF | 340K SF | 324K SF | Target+ |
| Lease‑up The Grace & Reva (5%) | 375 | 425 | 475 | 552 | Maximum |
| Development objectives (20%) | 2 objs | 3 objs | 4 objs | 3 objs | Target |
| Sustainability scorecard (10%) | 15 pts | 19 pts | 23 pts | 24 pts | Maximum |
- Long‑Term Incentives (LTIs): mix of Time‑Based LTIP Units (4‑year ratable vesting) and AO LTIP Units (profits‑interest, 10‑yr term) with 3‑year performance period; AO LTIPs earn based on price appreciation over a 110% participation threshold ($18.93 for 2024 grants) and a ±25% relative TSR modifier vs FTSE Nareit Equity Office peers >$400M market cap (ex‑ARE); earned AO LTIPs vest 50% at measurement and 50% at year 4 . In May 2024, the company implemented a one‑time “book‑up” modification (broadly applied to employees and trustees) setting an income‑tax book‑up price of $13.84 on certain 2020–2023 LTIP Units, adding a two‑year holding requirement; this did not reprice units or change economic value/dilution .
- 2025 program changes raising performance sensitivity: performance‑based LTIP weight increased to 60% (time‑based 40%, AO LTIP 10%) and added a 3‑year NOI‑based performance LTIP with annual targets measured and average vesting in 2027 (0–100% earn with threshold/target/maximum) .
Note: Individual award values/payouts for Regan‑Levine were not disclosed. Structures above apply to executive officers generally .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership: The proxy reports combined holdings for “all trustees and current executive officers as a group” (14 people, including Regan‑Levine), totaling 4,074,191 common shares and OP units (4.7% of common shares; 4.4% of common shares and OP units) as of Feb 25, 2025; individual Regan‑Levine holdings were not separately enumerated .
- Stock ownership guidelines: CEO 6x base salary; other executive officers 3x base salary; 5‑year compliance window (applies to Regan‑Levine as an executive officer) .
- Hedging/pledging: Policy prohibits hedging and pledging by executive officers; the ownership section states no pledging by any executive officer or trustee except Independent Chair Robert Stewart (who pledged certain OP units) .
- Vested vs unvested: No individual breakdown disclosed for Regan‑Levine; for NEOs/time‑based awards, standard 4‑year vesting; for AO LTIPs, 3‑year performance measurement then 50% immediate vest/50% at year 4 .
Employment Terms
- Evan Regan‑Levine’s specific employment agreement, severance and change‑of‑control (CIC) terms are not disclosed.
- For context, NEO agreements (double‑trigger CIC) provide: outside CIC, severance = 1x salary + target bonus, pro‑rata current‑year bonus based on actual performance, 18 months healthcare, and vesting of time‑based equity plus pro‑rata next‑tranche performance equity if earned; following CIC, severance = 3x salary + target bonus, pro‑rata target bonus, 2 years healthcare, and full vesting of all unvested equity .
- Clawback policy updated in 2023 to mandate recovery of erroneously awarded incentive compensation for three years preceding a restatement (applies to current and former executives) .
Investment Implications
- Pay‑for‑performance tightening: 2025 shift to 60% performance‑based LTIP and addition of a 3‑year NOI LTIP should heighten sensitivity of executive equity to fundamental value creation, potentially improving alignment and reducing optics of discretionary cash outcomes (a response to 67% 2024 say‑on‑pay) .
- Selling pressure windows: Time‑based LTIPs vest annually (next tranche each January 2 for 2024 grants); AO LTIPs only have realizable value above $18.93 participation threshold and after 3‑year performance certification, meaning selling pressure likely clusters post‑measurement and at year‑4 vesting, conditioned by share price performance and the relative TSR modifier .
- Retention risk: Absence of disclosed Evan‑specific severance terms increases uncertainty; however, executive‑officer policies (ownership multiples, anti‑hedging/pledging, clawback) support alignment, while multi‑year LTIP structures and the 2024 book‑up holding requirement enhance retention through extended vest/holding periods .
- Execution risk/track record: 2024 overachievement on NOI, asset recycling, leasing, and multifamily lease‑up (all core scorecard items) underpins management credibility in Regan‑Levine’s strategy remit; continued delivery against NOI and capital recycling will be key to 2025–2027 performance LTIP outcomes and sentiment .
Data gaps: The proxy does not disclose Evan Regan‑Levine’s individual base salary, bonus, equity grant sizes, or personal beneficial ownership breakdown; he is not a 2024 NEO and is included only in the group ownership line. All structures/policies cited are company‑wide or for executive officers and should be interpreted accordingly .