Manoj Leelanivas
JNPRAbout Manoj Leelanivas
Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Juniper Networks. Age 55. Joined Juniper in March 2018 (EVP, Chief Product Officer), appointed COO on July 6, 2021; previously CEO of Cyphort (acquired by Juniper in 2017) and earlier senior product roles at Juniper (1999–2013). Education: B.Tech in Computer Engineering (NIT Karnataka), M.S. in Computer Science (University of Kentucky), Stanford Executive Business Program. Company performance context during his tenure includes FY24 net revenue of $5,073.6M, net income of $287.9M, and cumulative TSR value of $172.64 on a $100 initial investment (2019–2024); FY24 saw services revenue hit a record $2.1B (+6% YoY), software and related services +8% YoY, and non‑GAAP gross margin of 60.2% (up from 59.1% in FY23). Compensation programs tied FY24 incentives to Corporate Revenue, ARR, and Non‑GAAP Operating Margin; FY24 Financial PSAs paid at 79% and FY22 RTSR PSAs at 109% (52nd percentile vs S&P 500).
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Juniper Networks | EVP, Chief Operating Officer | Jul 2021–present | Leads company operations, aligning product strategy with go‑to‑market execution. |
| Juniper Networks | EVP, Chief Product Officer | Mar 2018–May 2021 | Led all aspects of product strategy and direction, aligning with marketing and GTM. |
| Cyphort | President & CEO | Jun 2013–Sep 2017 | Led scale-out security analytics company; acquired by Juniper in Sep 2017. |
| Juniper Networks | Senior product and AT sales leadership | Mar 1999–May 2013 | Held key product management roles including EVP of Advanced Technologies Sales for data center. |
External Roles
- Filings reviewed do not list current public company directorships for Mr. Leelanivas.
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | 625,000 | 650,000 | 665,000 |
| Non‑Equity Incentive Plan Compensation (AIP cash) ($) | 321,875 | 292,500 | 332,500 |
| Stock Awards ($, ASC 718 grant‑date value recognized for year) | 4,482,253 | 4,669,445 | 4,324,684 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 11,397 | 10,947 | 14,052 |
- 2024 base salary rate increased mid‑year: 2023 $650,000 to 2024 $680,000 (+4.6%), effective July 1, 2024.
Performance Compensation
FY24 Annual Incentive Plan (AIP)
| Component | Weighting | FY24 Company Results | Payout conversion |
|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate Revenue | 33⅓% | $5,074M vs $5,460M target → 65% payout | 50% cash / 50% fully vested Bonus Shares (Mar 2025) |
| Non‑GAAP Operating Margin | 33⅓% | 14.2% vs 16.4% target → 65% payout | Same as above |
| Annual Recurring Revenue (ARR) | 33⅓% | $474M vs $467M target → 107% payout | Same as above |
| Strategic goals (Build enterprise scale, Win AI opportunity, Employee experience) | 30% (10% each) | Committee determined payouts based on progress vs goals | Same as above |
| Individual FY24 AIP details | Value |
|---|---|
| Target as % of Salary | 100% |
| Target AIP Value ($) | 665,000 |
| 2024 AIP Funding ($) | 665,000 |
| AIP allocated to Bonus Shares ($) | 332,500 |
| AIP Cash Payout ($) | 332,500 |
| Bonus Shares (granted and earned) (#) | 11,634; conversion price $28.58; granted fully vested Mar 2025 |
FY24 Equity Grants (awarded Feb 20, 2024; approved Feb 14, 2024)
| Award type | Shares/Target | Range/Threshold | Grant‑date fair value ($) | Vesting schedule |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Service‑vested RSUs | 63,800 | — | 2,247,674 | 34% at 1‑yr, 33% at 2‑yr and 3‑yr anniversaries |
| Performance Share Awards (PSAs) – Financial | 63,800 target; 31,900 threshold; 127,600 max | 0–200% of target | 731,999 | Three one‑year financial tranches banked annually; cliff‑vest in Q1’27 subject to service |
PSA Performance Banking (multi‑year)
| PSA Cohort | Target (relevant year) | FY24 Performance Achievement | FY24 Banked | Vesting timing |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY24 Financial PSAs (granted 2024) | 21,267 | 79% | 16,800 | First quarter of 2027, subject to service |
| FY23 Financial PSAs (granted 2023) | 14,340 | 79% | 11,328 | To vest in 2026 (banked 2023+2024 tranches) 18,431 |
| FY22 Financial PSAs (granted 2022) | 11,740 | 79% | 9,274 | To vest in 2025 (banked 2022–2024) 29,431 |
| FY22 RTSR PSAs (granted 2022) | 23,480 | 52nd percentile RTSR → 109% payout | 25,593 | Vested Feb 18, 2025 (service condition) |
2024 Stock Vested
| Metric | FY 2024 |
|---|---|
| Shares acquired on vesting (#) | 150,376 |
| Value realized on vesting ($) | 5,550,483 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership (Apr 1, 2025): 100,636 shares; under 1% of class.
- Stock ownership guidelines: 3× base salary for NEOs; must retain at least 50% of net shares until compliant; five years to comply; all individuals subject to guidelines were in compliance as of the record date.
- Hedging/pledging: Prohibited (no hedging, borrowing in margin, pledging, or short‑sales); Rule 10b5‑1 plan restrictions include no overlapping plans and 120‑day cooling‑off period.
- Outstanding equity at FY24 year‑end (selected items; $37.45 closing price on 12/31/24 used for values):
• 55,024 unvested PSAs from FY22 (earned based on 2022–2024 performance), $2,060,656; vested Feb 18, 2025 subject to service.
• FY23 PSAs: 22,513 “Number of Shares or Units of Stock That Have Not Vested” ($843,112) and 43,020 “Unearned” (target) ($1,611,099).
• FY24 PSAs: 16,800 banked (79% of 21,267), to vest in Q1’27 subject to service. - Bonus Shares from FY24 AIP: 11,634 shares granted fully vested in March 2025 (near‑term supply).
Employment Terms
| Scenario | Cash multiple and components | Equity treatment | Benefits and terms | Estimated amounts as of 12/31/24 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination without cause / good reason (outside CIC) | 12 months base salary; pro‑rata or actual bonus per timing | No acceleration | Cash in lieu of COBRA (12× monthly premium) | Base salary $680,000; Incentive $665,000; Benefits $41,846; Total $1,386,846 |
| Change in control (CIC) “double trigger” within 12 months (involuntary termination or good reason) | 150% of base salary + target bonus (200% for CEO; N/A to COO) | Time‑based awards accelerate; performance awards: completed periods vest on actual performance; remaining portions vest at target; RTSR periods shortened to CIC date if applicable | Cash in lieu of COBRA (12× monthly premium); better‑after‑tax cutback vs full gross amount (no 280G gross‑ups) | Base $1,020,000; Incentive $997,500; Benefits $41,846; Accelerated equity $11,559,524; Total $13,618,870 |
- Agreements expire January 2027; non‑solicitation and non‑competition obligations apply to receive benefits.
- Clawback: Company must recoup incentive compensation after an accounting restatement; may recoup for misconduct; three‑year lookback for restatements; policy applies to cash and equity. Copies filed as exhibits to FY24 10‑K.
Additional Compensation & Benefits
- Deferred Compensation Plan: Contributed $99,750 in FY24; aggregate earnings $10,747; year‑end balance $110,477.
- Executive Wellness Program: Eligible; up to $10,000 per year value.
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and trend: For FY24, no change in AIP target percentage vs FY23 (COO at 100% of salary); equity remains significant with a 50/50 split between service‑vested RSUs and Financial PSAs; FY24 excluded RTSR due to HPE merger‑driven stock price dynamics.
- Performance alignment: FY24 Financial PSAs tied equally to Corporate Revenue, ARR, and Non‑GAAP Operating Margin; Company achieved 79% payout (ARR above target; revenue and margin below target).
- Governance safeguards: Double‑trigger CIC, no single‑trigger, no option repricing, no excise tax gross‑ups, robust ownership guidelines, and clawback policy.
Investment Implications
- Alignment and incentives: High proportion of at‑risk equity and multi‑year banked PSAs provide strong retention and pay‑for‑performance linkage; FY24 PSA payout at 79% underscores balanced performance discipline.
- Near‑term selling pressure: Fully vested Bonus Shares (Mar 2025) and FY22 PSA cliff‑vesting (Feb 18, 2025) added supply; subsequent vesting cliffs in Q1’26 (FY23 PSAs) and Q1’27 (FY24 PSAs) stagger supply.
- Retention risk: CIC and severance protections through Jan 2027, plus substantial unvested equity, mitigate flight risk amid M&A integration; hedging/pledging prohibitions and ownership compliance support alignment.
- Performance execution: As COO, Mr. Leelanivas’ remit spans product and operational alignment during a period of recovering orders, record services revenue, and expanding gross margins, with incentives explicitly tied to growth/ARR and profitability metrics.