Helen P. Johnson-Leipold
About Helen P. Johnson-Leipold
Helen P. Johnson-Leipold is Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Johnson Outdoors and has served as CEO since 1999; she has been a director since 1994. She is 68 years old and is the controlling shareholder, deemed to beneficially own over 50% of the Company’s voting power, rendering JOUT a “Controlled Company” under Nasdaq rules . Recent performance indicators: fiscal 2024 net income (loss) of $(26.53) million and pre-tax (loss) of $(29.86) million, with JOUT’s TSR value falling to 45.52 (value of $100 invested on 9/30/2020) versus 176.42 for the S&P 600 Consumer Discretionary sector . Pay-for-performance alignment tightened in 2024: no annual cash bonus paid, and the 2022–2024 PSU cycle paid 0% of target; by contrast, the 2021–2023 PSU cycle paid 119.2% .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. | Various executive positions | 15 years | Built depth in strategic planning, marketing, new product development, operations and international business . |
| Foote, Cone & Belding Advertising | Executive roles | 8 years | Developed brand, market research and corporate communications capabilities . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact / Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Johnson Bank; Johnson Financial Group, Inc. | Chairman and Director | Not disclosed | Financial services governance; potential related-party nexus . |
| S.C. Johnson | Director | Not disclosed | Consumer products industry expertise; family enterprise linkage . |
| The Johnson Foundation at Wingspread | Chairman and Chair of Board of Trustees | Not disclosed | Non-profit leadership and community engagement . |
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year CEO cash compensation and perquisites:
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 829,511 | 860,821 | 893,918 |
| Bonus – Individual Objectives ($) | 95,186 | 92,969 | — |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 105,432 | 44,483 | 37,386 |
| Total Cash (Salary + Bonus + All Other) ($) | 1,030,129 | 998,273 | 931,304 |
Perquisites and retirement contributions detail:
| Component | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 401(k) Match ($) | 7,709 | 8,578 | 8,726 |
| Qualified Plan Contributions ($) | 14,500 | 9,150 | 6,600 |
| Non-Qualified Plan Contributions ($) | 66,223 | 26,755 | 13,560 |
| Perquisites ($) | 17,000 | — | 8,500 |
| Total “All Other Compensation” ($) | 105,432 | 44,483 | 37,386 |
Notes:
- The company provides standard employee benefits and an Executive Flexible Spending Account Plan (up to $8,500 for the CEO) for financial planning, business equipment and association dues .
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive (Cash Bonus Plan)
- Structure: 85% Company financial component (pre-tax income target and working capital as % of net sales), 15% individual objectives; target bonus 90% of base salary for CEO; payout range 0–200% per component with minimum profitability hurdles .
- FY 2024 outcome: No bonuses paid to CEO; both Company financial and individual objectives components paid $0 due to minimum financial metrics not being satisfied .
| Component (FY 2024) | Weight | Target ($) | Actual Payout ($) | Key Metrics | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Company Financial | 85% | 683,847 | 0 | Pre-tax income; working capital % net sales | Minimum profitability required for any payout . |
| Individual Objectives | 15% | 120,679 | 0 | Role-specific goals | Payouts capped at 100% if pre-tax income below target . |
2025 design changes (signals for future pay/payouts): Individual objectives weight increased to 25% (from 15%); Company financial component reduced to 75%; e-commerce/digital investments excluded from pre-tax income; threshold rules adjusted; minimum pre-tax income required for payouts >100% under both components .
Long-Term Equity (PSUs; CEO-only performance-based awards)
- 2024 grants (for FY 2024–2026): Target 21,218 PSUs (grant-date value $1,150,016), measured 50% on cumulative net sales and 50% on cumulative profit before taxes; threshold 80% (50% payout), max 120% (150% payout). Downward adjustment applies if minimum average ROIC not achieved .
- 2025 grants (for FY 2025–2027): Target 34,707 PSUs ($1,150,000); same metrics, but maximum payout raised to 200% and ROIC downward adjustment eliminated .
Realized and in-flight performance cycles:
| PSU Cycle | Target Units | Metric Weights | Payout Curve | Decision/Vesting | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY 2021–2023 | 11,301 | 50% cumulative net sales; 50% cumulative operating profit | 50%–150% (legacy) | Dec 2023 | 119.2% of target; 13,471 shares earned . |
| FY 2022–2024 | 11,362 | 50% sales; 50% operating profit | 50%–150% | Dec 3, 2024 | 0% payout; no shares issued . |
| FY 2023–2025 | 20,341 | 50% sales; 50% PBT | 50%–150% | Dec 2025 | In progress (TBD) . |
| FY 2024–2026 | 21,218 | 50% sales; 50% PBT | 50%–150% | Dec 2026 | In progress (TBD) . |
| FY 2025–2027 | 34,707 | 50% sales; 50% PBT | 50%–200%; ROIC downward adjustment removed | Dec 2027 | In progress (TBD) . |
Stock awards vestings in FY 2024: CEO had 13,471 shares vest (value realized $661,426) tied to the 2021–2023 cycle result .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership and pledging:
- Sole voting/investment power over 335,381 Class A shares; shared voting/investment power over 1,255,342 Class A shares; also shared voting/investment power over 1,168,366 Class B shares via the Class B Voting Trust where she serves as voting trustee .
- Pledged as collateral: 241,731 Class A shares from sole holdings and 158,497 Class A shares from shared holdings—pledged to secure a non-JOUT business line of credit and note (RED FLAG for alignment/forced selling risk) .
- Outstanding and unvested equity at FY-end 2024:
- CEO held unvested/uneared PSUs totaling 53, (components shown below); no options outstanding .
- Detail at 9/27/2024: 11,362 PSUs (2022–2024), 20,341 PSUs (2023–2025), 21,218 PSUs (2024–2026), with market values calculated at $36.46/share .
| Item | Amount / Detail |
|---|---|
| Options outstanding | None . |
| Unvested/Unearned RSUs/PSUs (9/27/24) | 11,362; 20,341; 21,218 units; total 52,921 units . |
| Market value of unvested/uneared (9/27/24) | $414,259; $741,633; $773,608, respectively (at $36.46) . |
| Shares acquired on vesting in FY 2024 | 13,471 shares; $661,426 value . |
| Hedging/margin policy | Hedging and margin accounts prohibited; pre-clearance required for insiders . |
| Stock ownership guidelines | Adopted June 3, 2022 for executives and directors; five-year phase-in to effective date; details on multiples not disclosed here . |
Change-of-control treatment (single-trigger equity acceleration):
- Restricted stock (where applicable) vests immediately; performance-based RSUs deemed earned at 100% of target upon a change of control. For the CEO, 52,921 units would vest at target as of 9/27/2024; implied value $1,929,500 at $36.46 .
Employment Terms
- Employment agreements: None; the Company historically does not enter into employment agreements with NEOs .
- Severance policy: No contractual severance or termination pay; severance historically negotiated case-by-case if applicable .
- Change-of-control: Equity acceleration as described above; no mention of cash multiples or gross-ups .
- Clawback: Incentive Compensation Recovery Policy (effective Dec 2, 2015; amended Jun 30, 2023) covering cash and equity incentive compensation tied to financial measures for the last three completed fiscal years in the event of an accounting restatement .
- Deferred compensation: CEO executive contributions $122,717 in FY 2024; Company contribution $13,560; aggregate earnings $2,570,539; balance $11,431,184 at FY-end .
- Pension: No defined benefit pension; 401(k) matching and discretionary retirement contributions provided .
Board Governance and Service
- Board roles: Chairman and CEO; Class B Director since 1994; member of the Executive Committee (with Lead Independent Director John M. Fahey, Jr.) .
- Controlled Company: The Board has designated JOUT a “Controlled Company” because Ms. Johnson-Leipold is deemed to beneficially own >50% of the voting power, exempting JOUT from certain Nasdaq independence requirements; nonetheless, 8 of 9 director nominees are independent, and Compensation and Nominating committees are composed of independent directors .
- Committees: Executive Committee member; not listed as a member of Audit, Compensation, or Nominating & Corporate Governance Committees .
- Board process: Seven Board meetings in fiscal 2024; all directors attended at least 75% of Board and committee meetings; outside directors met in executive session at least twice .
- Director compensation program (context): Non-employee directors receive retainers and equity grants; Ms. Johnson-Leipold, as an employee, is not a recipient of non-employee director pay .
Compensation Peer Group and Say-on-Pay
- Peer group for 2024 compensation benchmarking (Pearl Meyer): G-III Apparel, Deckers Outdoor, Callaway Golf, Acushnet, YETI, Malibu Boats, American Outdoor Brands, Delta Apparel, Solo Brands, Twin Disc, Rocky Brands, Nautilus, Clarus, Marine Products, Escalade (and others listed) .
- Independent consultant: Pearl Meyer engaged directly by the Compensation Committee; no conflicts of interest .
- Say-on-Pay: ~99% approval at the 2024 Annual Meeting (voting reflects 10 votes per share for Class B when voting with Class A) .
Related Party Transactions (Governance Risk)
The Company purchases certain services primarily from S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. and other organizations controlled by Johnson family members (including Ms. Johnson-Leipold); headquarters leased from Johnson Bank; total incurred in fiscal 2024 was approximately $1,538,000. The Audit Committee reviews these transactions, asserting arm’s-length terms .
Year-over-Year Compensation Mix and Signals
| Component | FY 2022 ($) | FY 2023 ($) | FY 2024 ($) | Commentary |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Salary | 829,511 | 860,821 | 893,918 | Fixed comp trending up modestly. |
| Bonus (Indiv. Objectives) | 95,186 | 92,969 | — | 2024 paid $0 across both bonus components due to financial hurdles not met . |
| Non-Equity Incentive (Company) | 266,522 | — | — | 2022 paid; 2023–2024 paid $0 as Company metrics not met . |
| Stock Awards (Grant-date FV) | 1,150,005 | 1,149,478 | 1,150,016 | CEO equity is 100% PSUs since 2016, fully performance-based . |
| Total Compensation | 2,446,656 | 2,147,751 | 2,081,320 | Total down with zero cash bonus; equity unchanged in target value. |
Signals:
- Shift toward performance-contingent pay: no 2024 cash bonus; 2022–2024 PSUs paid 0%. 2025 PSU design increases maximum payout to 200% and removes the ROIC downward modifier (higher upside risk/reward) .
- No tax gross-ups; no guaranteed incentives; clawback in force .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Pledging: Significant pledged shares (241,731 sole + 158,497 shared) securing non-company credit lines represent potential forced-selling risk under stress (alignment concern) .
- Controlled Company & dual role: CEO also serves as Chairman; JOUT relies on independent committees and a Lead Independent Director to mitigate governance risks .
- Related-party transactions: Ongoing services with family-controlled entities (incl. S.C. Johnson and Johnson Bank) total ~$1.54 million in FY 2024; monitored by Audit Committee .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment has tightened: $0 cash bonus in 2024 and a 0% 2022–2024 PSU payout reflect discipline amid a challenging year (net loss), while 2021–2023 PSUs paid above target at 119.2% in better conditions—this cyclicality suggests upside leverage if the 2025–2027 criteria are met (max now 200%) but no cushion if targets are missed .
- Near-term supply/insider selling pressure: No options outstanding; equity overhang is primarily PSUs that vest on three-year performance cycles. Key upcoming PSU decision points: Dec 2025 (20,341 target), Dec 2026 (21,218), Dec 2027 (34,707). Actual issuance depends on achieving cumulative sales and PBT targets; failure in 2022–2024 cycle (0%) shows downside sensitivity .
- Alignment vs governance trade-offs: Strong insider ownership aligns interests, but substantial pledging and related-party transactions are notable governance risks; the Controlled Company structure with a dual CEO/Chair role increases reliance on independent committees and the Lead Independent Director for oversight .
- Retention risk: No employment agreements or severance protections; retention is primarily via multi-year PSUs and significant deferred compensation balances (CEO deferred comp balance $11.43 million), which create stickiness but also concentrate incentive outcomes on long-horizon performance .
All data sourced from Johnson Outdoors’ 2025 and 2024 DEF 14A filings and a May 23, 2023 Form 8-K:
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