Chris Raub
About Chris Raub
Chris Raub is Executive Vice President of Jackson Financial Inc. and President of Jackson National Life Insurance Company (JNLIC), appointed effective April 14, 2025; he is age 54 and has over 25 years with Jackson across investment, strategy, and risk roles, including Executive Vice President & Chief Risk Officer since April 2023 and senior managing director/head of insurance assets at PPM America . He holds a bachelor’s degree in accounting from Miami University (Ohio) and an MBA from Northwestern University, and his remit spans distribution, product development, operations, IT, and fund accounting; in October 2025 he was also named interim leader of PPM following the announced retirement of its CEO, while retaining his JNLIC presidency . His pay design aligns to Jackson’s performance framework emphasizing Pretax Adjusted Operating Earnings (annual), Controllable Costs and strategic objectives, and multi-year PSU metrics split between Net Cash Flow to JFI and Adjusted Operating ROE with an rTSR modifier versus the S&P Insurance Select Industry Index .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jackson Financial Inc. | Executive Vice President & Chief Risk Officer | Apr 2023–Apr 2025 | Enterprise risk management leadership; oversight of hedging/ALM supporting earnings stability and capital strength |
| Jackson National Life Insurance Company | President | Apr 2025–present | Go-to-market leadership across distribution, products, operations, IT; drive sustainable growth and execution |
| PPM America (subsidiary) | Senior Managing Director & Head of Insurance Assets | Not disclosed | Oversight of life insurer general account investing; capital efficiency and performance alignment |
External Roles
No public company directorships or external board roles disclosed for Raub. Prior employers include GE Capital’s Merchant Banking group, Heller Financial’s Corporate Finance group, and Arthur Andersen’s Specialty Consulting group .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Detail | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $600,000 | Effective with appointment as EVP (JFI) & President (JNLIC) |
| Target Annual Bonus | 175% of base salary | Paid under Jackson Annual Bonus Program framework |
| Target Annual LTI (Equity) | $2,000,000 | Granted under Jackson OIP (PSUs/RSUs mix consistent with program) |
| Benefits | Health/welfare, retirement and typical executive benefits | Per company plans |
Performance Compensation
| Annual Incentive Metric (2024 program) | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual Outcome (2024) | Payout % | Weighted Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pretax Adjusted Operating Earnings (non-GAAP) | 60% | $1,357m | $1,696m | $2,035m | $1,815m | 135.1% | 81.0% |
| Controllable Costs | 20% | $847m | $770m | $693m | $735m | 145.5% | 29.1% |
| Key Strategic Objectives | 20% | Qualitative | Qualitative | Qualitative | Target | 120.0% | 24.0% |
| Cumulative Payout | — | — | — | — | — | — | 134.1% |
- Notes: These results represent Jackson’s 2024 company framework used to determine NEO payouts; Raub’s appointment occurred in April 2025 and his annual incentive will follow the same metric architecture going forward .
| LTI PSUs (2024–2026 cycle) | Weighting | Threshold (50%) | Target (100%) | Maximum (200%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash Flow to JFI (non-GAAP) | 50% | $1,225m | $2,449m | $3,674m |
| Adjusted Operating ROE (non-GAAP) | 50% | 11.1% | 13.9% | 16.7% |
| rTSR Modifier vs S&P Insurance Select Industry Index | — | Top quartile: 120% | 2nd/3rd quartile: 100% | Bottom quartile: 80% (capped overall at 200%) |
- Program changes: In 2024, Net Cash Flow to JFI replaced “Generation of Net Cash Flow Available to JFI” and its weighting was reduced to 50% (from 60%), while Adjusted Operating ROE increased to 50% (from 40%) to strengthen alignment and reduce volatility; rTSR modifier unchanged .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Policy/Guideline | Requirement | Status/Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Executive Stock Ownership Guidelines | CEO: 7× base salary; Executive Committee members: 4×; SVPs: 1×; 5 years to reach compliance; RSUs count, PSUs do not | Mandatory deferral of bonus into RSUs if not compliant within 5 years; all NEOs in compliance (2024 proxy) |
| Anti-Hedging | Hedging or monetization transactions prohibited for directors and associates (including executive officers) | No directors or executive officers have hedged their shares |
| Anti-Pledging | Pledging or margin accounts prohibited for directors, executive officers, and SVPs | No directors or executive officers have pledged shares |
| Ownership Alignment | Significant portion of TDC delivered in stock-based incentives; multi-year vesting/performance periods | Reinforces long-term decision-making and shareholder alignment |
Employment Terms
| Element | Terms |
|---|---|
| Severance Plan Eligibility | All NEOs eligible; lump-sum on termination without cause or resignation for good reason, subject to release |
| Cash Severance Multiple | CEO: 2.0× severance compensation basis; Other NEOs: 1.5× |
| Severance Compensation Basis | Base salary + target annual bonus + 12 months COBRA cost; plus pro‑rated current year bonus and prior-year earned bonus if unpaid |
| RSU Termination Treatment | Death/disability: immediate vest; without cause/good reason: pro‑rata vest of next tranche; qualifying retirement: full vest on scheduled date (≥6 months from grant); release and restrictive covenants apply to specified awards |
| PSU Termination Treatment | Death: vest at target; disability/qualifying retirement: earned based on actual performance for entire cycle; without cause/good reason: pro‑rata based on elapsed time, paid on actual performance; release and restrictive covenants apply |
| Change in Control (Equity) | If awards assumed: double‑trigger acceleration upon qualifying termination within 24 months; if not assumed: all unvested awards vest at change in control; payout in cash or publicly‑traded shares per Board determination |
| Clawback Policy | Committee can recoup incentive comp for fraud, malfeasance, accounting restatement, breaches of law/conduct/misconduct; NYSE‑compliant provisions effective Dec 1, 2023 for incentive comp received on/after Oct 2, 2023 |
| Nonqualified Deferred Compensation | MDIP allows voluntary deferrals of salary/bonus; 100% vested, notional investment options, payouts at termination or specified year (lump sum or installments ≤25 years) |
Performance & Track Record
- Longevity and breadth: 25+ years at Jackson with senior roles spanning investments (PPM head of insurance assets), enterprise risk (EVP & CRO), and operating leadership (President JNLIC), with oversight of distribution, product, operations, IT, and fund accounting .
- Interim mandate: Named interim leader of PPM in October 2025 to ensure continuity and maintain investment performance while executing growth initiatives in global institutional channels .
- Pay-for-performance context: Incentives tied to Pretax Adjusted Operating Earnings, cost discipline, strategic execution (annual), and multi-year Net Cash Flow to JFI and Adjusted Operating ROE with rTSR modifier (LTI), anchoring value creation to earnings quality, capital generation, and relative shareholder returns .
Compensation Committee Analysis
- Committee composition and independence: Compensation Committee chaired by Esta E. Stecher; all members independent and non‑employee directors; oversight of executive compensation, equity and annual incentive plans, and employment/separation agreements .
- Philosophy and practices: Pay-for-performance, strong risk governance, multi‑metric incentives, robust stock ownership guidelines, clawbacks; no single-trigger CIC benefits, no excise tax gross‑ups, no option repricing without shareholder approval .
- Shareholder feedback: 2024 say‑on‑pay received ~98% support, reflecting strong investor endorsement of program design .
Investment Implications
- Alignment strengths: High proportion of at‑risk pay linked to earnings and ROE with capital generation (Net Cash Flow to JFI) and rTSR modifier; double‑trigger CIC design and strict anti‑hedging/pledging policies reduce misalignment risks .
- Retention economics: EVP/President package ($600k base; 175% bonus target; $2.0m LTI target) competitive and levered to performance; severance multiples (1.5× for non‑CEO NEOs) plus pro‑rated bonus and equity treatment mitigate abrupt departure risk while preserving performance gates .
- Selling pressure signals: RSUs vest on scheduled dates with pro‑rata vesting on certain terminations; PSUs require full-cycle performance with rTSR modifier and cap; combined design dampens near‑term forced selling and ties realized value to multi‑year outcomes .
- Execution risk: Transition into broad go‑to‑market leadership from CRO requires sustained delivery on distribution growth and product competitiveness under the same performance architecture; interim PPM leadership adds scope but maintains continuity across investment and operating functions .
Overall, Raub’s incentives are tightly tethered to earnings quality, capital generation to the holding company, and relative shareholder returns, with governance features that reduce misalignment and windfall risks—supportive for long‑term value creation if execution on growth and cost discipline continues within the defined risk framework .