Gary Pilnick
About Gary Pilnick
Gary Pilnick, age 60, is Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of WK Kellogg Co (KLG), appointed effective upon the October 2023 spin-off from Kellanova; he has served on KLG’s Board since November 2022 and previously held senior roles at Kellogg/Kellanova including Vice Chairman, Corporate Development & Chief Legal Officer (since 2016) and earlier General Counsel roles; prior experience includes senior legal and corporate development roles at Sara Lee/Sara Lee Branded Apparel . Under his leadership, KLG delivered adjusted EBITDA of $275 million in 2024 with adjusted EBITDA margin of 10.1% (up 70 bps YoY) on adjusted net sales of $2.708 billion; 2023 standalone adjusted net sales grew 2.8% with standalone adjusted EBITDA margin of 9.4% . Pay-versus-performance disclosures show the value of a $100 investment in KLG rose to $140.87 in 2024 vs $99.83 in 2023, with net income of $72 million and adjusted EBITDA of $275 million in 2024 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| WK Kellogg Co | Chairman & CEO | Oct 2023–present | Led first full year post-spin; margin expansion and supply chain modernization program up to $500M . |
| Kellanova/Kellogg Company | Vice Chairman, Corporate Development & Chief Legal Officer | Jan 2016–Oct 2023 | Executive committee leadership; global corporate development responsibility . |
| Kellanova/Kellogg Company | SVP, General Counsel & Secretary | Aug 2003–Jan 2016 | Legal leadership across global operations . |
| Kellanova/Kellogg Company | VP, Deputy General Counsel & Assistant Secretary | Sep 2000–Aug 2003 | Senior legal management . |
| Sara Lee Branded Apparel | Vice President & Chief Counsel | Pre-2000 | Senior legal leadership in consumer apparel . |
| Sara Lee Corporation | VP & Chief Counsel, Corporate Development & Finance | Pre-2000 | Corporate development and finance legal leadership . |
External Roles
No external public-company directorships disclosed for Pilnick in KLG’s proxy; Board biography lists only roles at KLG and prior corporate experience .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $793,000 | $844,750 | $1,000,000 |
| Target Annual Bonus (%) | N/A | Aggregate 99% of salary (pre/post-spin prorated) | 110% of salary |
| Target Annual Bonus ($) | N/A | $987,397 | $1,100,000 |
| Perquisites & Other ($) | $161,775 | $192,167 | $246,307 |
Summary Compensation (cash and equity):
| Component | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Awards ($) | $1,900,173 | $6,456,792 | $3,322,668 |
| AIP Paid ($) | $1,167,693 | $1,526,611 | $1,507,000 |
| Total Compensation ($) | $4,022,641 | $9,020,320 | $6,075,975 |
Notes:
- 2023 includes one-time RSU retention grant ($3,960,096) vesting in 2026 .
- 2024 equity grants split between PSUs and RSUs ($1,650,008 each) .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) design (FY 2024):
- Metrics equally weighted: adjusted Net Sales, adjusted EBITDA, and Free Cash Flow; payout range 0–200%, with qualitative safety/quality factors only allowing downward adjustments (none applied) .
- Individual Performance Adjustment (IPA) was used in 2024 (to be eliminated for NEOs starting FY 2025) .
AIP 2024 metrics and outcome:
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Max | Actual | Factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Net Sales | 1/3 | $2.63B | $2.74B | $2.84B | $2.708B | 85% |
| Adjusted EBITDA | 1/3 | $228M | $268M | $285M | $275M | 124% |
| Free Cash Flow | 1/3 | ($82)M | ($17)M | $33M | $5M (AIP basis) | 128% |
| Total BPF | — | — | — | — | — | 112% |
Pilnick’s AIP 2024 payout calculation:
| Component | Value |
|---|---|
| Business Performance Factor (BPF) | 112% |
| Individual Performance Adjustment (IPA) | +25% |
| Total % of Target | 137% |
| Payout ($) | $1,507,000 |
Long-Term Incentives (LTI):
- 2024 PSUs (50% of grant): performance-based units measured over FY2024–FY2026 on Organic Three-Year Net Sales Growth and Aggregate Free Cash Flow; payout 0–200%; grant-date fair value $1,650,008; earned based on results at FY2026 end and continued employment .
- 2024 RSUs (50% of grant): time-based cliff vest on third anniversary (Feb 15, 2027); grant-date fair value $1,650,008 .
- 2023 one-time retention RSUs (spin-related): cliff vest Nov 13, 2026; $3,960,096 grant intended for retention and alignment, forfeitable upon voluntary resignation before vest .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Ownership, guidelines, and restrictions:
- Beneficial ownership: 762,842 KLG shares for Pilnick (less than 1% of outstanding) as of Feb 28, 2025; no shares pledged as collateral .
- Executive stock ownership guideline: CEO must hold at least 6x annual base salary; required holding of net shares from awards until guideline met; all NEOs on track .
- Insider trading policy prohibits short sales, options/derivatives, and hedging; pledging or margin accounts are prohibited absent specific authorization .
Outstanding awards and vesting (as of Dec 28, 2024):
| Award Type | Grant Date | Units Unvested | Vesting/Performance Condition | Market Value at 12/27/24 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs | Feb 17, 2023 | 146,630 | Vest Feb 17, 2026 (service) | $2,621,744 |
| RSUs (Retention) | Nov 13, 2023 | 389,991 | Vest Nov 13, 2026 (service; retention terms) | $6,973,039 |
| RSUs | Feb 15, 2024 | 113,671 | Vest Feb 15, 2027 (service) | $2,032,437 |
| PSUs (target) | Feb 15, 2024 | 113,671 | FY2024–FY2026 performance; 0–200% payout | $2,032,437 |
Implications for selling pressure:
- Large RSU cliffs in 2026 and 2027 (retention and annual grants) may create concentrated vest-related liquidity events; holding requirements mitigate immediate sales until guideline compliance .
Employment Terms
Key agreements and severance/change-of-control economics:
- No individual employment contracts for NEOs; compensation governed by plans and policies .
- Severance Benefit Plan (no CoC): CEO receives 2x base salary + target bonus paid over two years; COBRA premium reimbursement; continued RSU vesting during severance period; PSUs forfeited (unless eligible for retirement treatment); outplacement; continuation of financial/tax planning thru year-end .
- Change-of-Control Policy (double trigger): upon qualifying termination within two years of CoC, CEO receives 3x base salary + target bonus, prorated current-year target bonus, retirement benefit continuation (three years for CEO), continued health/welfare benefits (three years for CEO), outplacement; equity fully vests (RSUs) and PSUs earned at target if assumed/substituted; or full vesting at greater of target or assessed performance if awards not assumed .
- Clawback: mandatory recoupment of excess incentive compensation upon restatement; equity awards subject to forfeiture/recoupment for detrimental conduct or restrictive covenant breaches .
Scenario values (as of Dec 28, 2024):
| Scenario | Cash Severance | AIP (2024 Earned) | RSUs Acceleration/Continuation | PSUs Treatment | Health/Welfare | Other |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Qualifying termination (no CoC) | $4,200,000 | $1,507,000 | $10,100,109 continuation | Forfeited (unless retirement eligible) | $48,621 | Outplacement $11,138 |
| CoC with qualifying termination (double trigger) | $6,300,000 | $1,507,000 | $11,627,219 acceleration | PSUs at target $2,032,432 | $72,932 | Retirement benefit continuation $341,550; other $229,182 |
Say-on-Pay, Peer Group, Governance
- Say-on-Pay approval: 94% support at 2024 Annual Meeting; say-on-frequency set to annual .
- Compensation peer group: food and consumer peers (e.g., Lamb Weston, Post Holdings, Reynolds Consumer Products, TreeHouse Foods, Utz, Edgewell, Energizer, Flowers Foods, Hain Celestial, Simply Good Foods, Spectrum Brands, Central Garden & Pet, BellRing, Lancaster Colony, J&J Snack Foods, B&G Foods); Hostess Brands removed in 2024 due to acquisition .
- “What we do not do”: no guaranteed bonuses, no employment contracts for NEOs, no single-trigger CoC vesting, no excessive perquisites, no tax gross-ups, no hedging/pledging transactions .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- High at-risk pay: ~81% of CEO’s 2024 annual target compensation at-risk; other NEOs ~66% .
- Shift to PSUs/RSUs: 2024 LTI split 50% PSUs / 50% RSUs; reinforces long-term performance alignment while retaining talent via time-based cliffs .
- Strong pay-for-performance link: AIP tied to adjusted Net Sales, adjusted EBITDA, Free Cash Flow; PSU metrics tied to multi-year Net Sales growth and Free Cash Flow .
- Governance protections: double-trigger equity vesting on CoC, clawbacks, stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Pledging/hedging prohibited; no shares pledged by executives (reduces alignment risk) .
- Large retention RSU grant (2023) cliffing in 2026 could concentrate vest-related selling; mitigated by holding policy until guideline met .
- CoC severance multiple at 3x for CEO raises payout sensitivity in M&A scenarios (balanced by double-trigger and performance-based PSU treatment) .
- No tax gross-ups; clawback policy in place (positive governance signals) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Shares owned (Feb 28, 2025) | 762,842; <1% of outstanding |
| Ownership guideline | 6x base salary for CEO; five years to comply; holding net shares until guideline met |
| Pledging/margin | Prohibited absent specific authorization; none pledged |
Investment Implications
- Alignment: High proportion of at-risk pay, multi-year PSU metrics (Net Sales growth and Free Cash Flow), and stringent ownership/holding requirements indicate strong pay-for-performance alignment and skin-in-the-game .
- Retention and execution: Significant time-based RSU cliffs in 2026–2027 and converted Kellanova awards create retention hooks during the supply chain modernization program; expect potential vest-driven liquidity events but mitigated by holding policy .
- Governance quality: Double-trigger CoC protections, robust clawback, no tax gross-ups, and prohibition of hedging/pledging reduce shareholder risk; however, 3x CoC multiple for CEO implies higher potential transaction costs .
- Performance track: Margin expansion and EBITDA growth in first full year post-spin support confidence in operational execution under Pilnick’s leadership; TSR improvement in 2024 provides early market validation, though small-cap food peers’ TSR lag suggests relative benchmarking caution .
Citations embedded per section and table cells:
About **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:14]** **[1959348_0001628280-24-012571_klg-20240321.htm:11]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:1]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:81]** **[1959348_0001628280-24-012571_klg-20240321.htm:43]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:62]**;
Past Roles **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:14]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:1]**;
External Roles **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:14]**;
Fixed Compensation **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:44]** **[1959348_0001628280-24-012571_klg-20240321.htm:55]** **[1959348_0001628280-24-012571_klg-20240321.htm:48]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:37]** **[1959348_0001628280-24-012571_klg-20240321.htm:57]**;
Summary Compensation **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:44]** **[1959348_0001628280-24-012571_klg-20240321.htm:55]**;
Performance Compensation **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:37]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:38]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:40]**;
LTI **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:40]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:49]** **[1959348_0001628280-24-012571_klg-20240321.htm:51]**;
Ownership & Alignment **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:69]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:42]**;
Outstanding Awards **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:50]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:49]** **[1959348_0001628280-24-012571_klg-20240321.htm:51]**;
Employment Terms **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:34]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:54]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:56]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:57]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:42]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:49]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:58]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:60]**;
Say-on-Pay & Peer Group **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:30]** **[1959348_0001628280-24-012571_klg-20240321.htm:5]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:36]**;
Comp Structure **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:29]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:37]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:40]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:34]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:42]**;
Risk Indicators **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:42]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:69]** **[1959348_0001628280-24-012571_klg-20240321.htm:51]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:57]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:34]**;
Equity Ownership **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:69]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:42]**;
Investment Implications **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:29]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:40]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:42]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:50]** **[1959348_0001628280-24-012571_klg-20240321.htm:51]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:34]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:57]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:1]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:62]** **[1959348_0001628280-25-012381_klg-20250312.htm:81]**.