Michael J. Pitta
About Michael J. Pitta
Kinder Morgan’s Vice President and Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) since February 2024; previously Vice President, Human Resources (Jan 2023–Feb 2024), with a 20-year tenure spanning operations, project management, and EHS leadership. Age 51; MBA from UC Irvine and B.S. in Engineering Geology from UCLA . Company performance context during his recent tenure: 2024 DCF/share achieved $2.19 versus a $2.26 target and leverage at 4.0x vs 3.9x target, influencing annual incentive funding and RSU performance hurdles . Long-term TSR improved substantially from 2020–2024, framing value creation expectations for admin/HR/EHS governance.
Company performance context
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues ($USD) | $19,042,000,000* | $15,157,000,000* | $14,873,000,000* |
| EBITDA ($USD) | $6,201,000,000* | $6,455,000,000* | $6,630,000,000* |
| Net Income ($USD) | $2,548,000,000 | $2,391,000,000 | $2,613,000,000 |
Values retrieved from S&P Global.*
| Value of $100 Initial Investment (TSR proxy) | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KMI | $69.23 | $85.67 | $103.86 | $108.12 | $177.77 |
| Peer Group | $76.64 | $106.08 | $128.92 | $147.00 | $212.45 |
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kinder Morgan | Vice President & Chief Administrative Officer | Feb 2024–present | Oversees enterprise administrative and HR programs that underpin compensation governance, ownership policy compliance, and retention frameworks . |
| Kinder Morgan | Vice President, Human Resources | Jan 2023–Feb 2024 | Led executive performance input and peer benchmarking support to Compensation Committee; HR systems alignment across segments . |
| Kinder Morgan – Products Pipelines | Vice President, Operations | Jan 2019–Nov 2020 | Operations leadership across pipeline assets; execution for reliability and safety . |
| Kinder Morgan – Corporate/Groups | Vice President, EHS (Terminals) | Jun 2012–Jan 2019 | EHS oversight for terminals portfolio; sustainability reporting inputs and safety targets . |
| Kinder Morgan | Vice President, EHS | Nov 2020–Jan 2023 | Enterprise EHS leadership, incident rate improvement focus, integration with compensation metrics . |
External Roles
No public company board or external roles disclosed for Pitta in the proxy .
Fixed Compensation
| Item | Policy / Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Executive base salary cap | $500,000 (2018–2024); increased to $600,000 in Jan 2025 | Reflects below-median base philosophy; emphasis on incentives. |
| Highest base salary (KMI executives) | 2024: $500,000; 2025: $525,000 | Cap constrained; individual CAO salary not separately disclosed. |
| Employment agreements | None for executive officers | Reduces guaranteed pay and lock-in risk. |
| Executive perquisites | None (no cars, aircraft, first-class, financial planning) | Governance-friendly cost discipline. |
| Severance plan | Capped at 6 months of base salary; available for job elimination or termination other than cause | Applies uniformly to executives. |
Performance Compensation
| Component | Metric | Weighting | 2024 Target | 2024 Actual | Payout Mechanics | Vesting / Terms |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Incentive (cash) | DCF per share | Not disclosed | $2.26/share | $2.19/share | Executive pool baseline funded at 98%; individual up/down adjustments by performance, EHS/ops, backlog growth | Paid annually; CEO waived program; executives eligible . |
| Annual Incentive (cash) | Net Debt / Adjusted EBITDA | Not disclosed | 3.9x | 4.0x | Committee discretion to adjust funding; segment EBDA informs segment presidents | — |
| Annual Incentive (cash) | EHS performance | Not disclosed | Beat industry incident rates; improve vs 3-year average; no significant incidents | Qualitative evaluation | Influences final pool | — |
| Long-term incentive (RSUs) | DCF per share (any 4 quarters during 3-year period) | Not disclosed | Set consistent with budget; published post-vesting for prior cycles | Ongoing | 3-year cliff; dividend equivalents on unvested RSUs; performance confirmation by Committee | Grants typically July; vest July 31, Year+3; double-trigger CoC acceleration only upon qualifying termination . |
Key design features:
- No “stretch”/TSR stock-price gating; awards are sized to vest with achievable performance to avoid underpaying relative to peers and discourage excessive risk-taking .
- Dividend equivalents paid on unvested RSUs align executives with shareholders .
- Committee confirms performance goal attainment before vesting .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Stock ownership guidelines: CEO 6x base salary; all other executive officers (incl. CAO) 2x base salary; expected compliance within 5 years; until compliant, retain 50% of net shares from vesting .
- Hedging prohibited; standing/limit orders prohibited except intra-day or under pre-approved 10b5-1; insider trading policy described and filed with 2024 10-K .
- Pledging/margin: Prohibits margin accounts/pledging for amounts at/under guideline; allows pledging of shares in excess of guideline or with no pecuniary interest. As of Jan 2025, all directors and executive officers are in compliance or are within the five-year transition period .
- Individual beneficial ownership for Pitta not itemized in the proxy’s management table (directors/NEOs reported; executives as a group hold 12.73%) .
Employment Terms
| Term | Provision | Implication |
|---|---|---|
| Severance | 6 months base salary if role eliminated or termination other than cause (uniform for execs) | Limits windfall; provides baseline retention cushion. |
| RSU change-in-control | Double-trigger (requires CoC plus involuntary termination without cause or resignation for good reason within 24 months) for acceleration; Committee may assume/substitute awards or cash-out if not assumed | Moderates automatic acceleration; reduces M&A gaming. |
| Annual Incentive CoC | If Mr. Kinder no longer Chair upon CoC, executives deemed to earn 100% of bonus opportunity unless Committee set a different %; paid within 30 days if employed at CoC | Codified payout floors in specific governance scenario. |
| Clawback | NYSE/SEC-compliant clawback effective Dec 1, 2023; equity under 2021 plan subject to clawback | Enhances pay-for-performance integrity. |
| No employment agreements/perqs | None for executive officers; no special severance beyond plan; governance-friendly cost design | Flexibility; lowers guaranteed comp risk. |
Track Record, Value Creation, Execution Risk
- Backlog growth considered in 2024 bonuses: project backlog rose from $3B YE2023 to $8.1B YE2024 (Committee considered in funding) .
- Sustainability oversight: Board EHS Committee reviews EHS performance; 2023 report highlighted 8% methane reduction since 2021; EHS goals inform annual bonus .
- Meeting attendance/governance cadence robust; Compensation and EHS Committees met multiple times in 2024 .
Say-on-Pay & Peer Benchmarking (Program Context)
- 2024 say-on-pay approved at >94% .
- Peer benchmarking via Equilar; peers include major North American midstream/integrated energy companies (e.g., EOG, Enbridge, Williams, Phillips 66, TC Energy) .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Ownership guidelines, dividend-equivalent RSUs, and hedging bans promote long-term alignment; pledging is restricted below guideline thresholds, reducing collateralization risk for core holdings .
- Retention risk: No employment agreements and capped severance limit guaranteed pay, but achievable RSU hurdles and consistent annual awards support retention; double-trigger CoC terms curb automatic acceleration while preserving protection in a sale .
- Insider selling pressure: Executives must retain 50% of net shares until guideline met; no Form 4 data for Pitta was found in our SEC filings search, suggesting limited recent disclosed transactions, but ongoing monitoring is warranted .
- Performance sensitivity: Incentive design tied to DCF/share, leverage, and EHS/ops keeps payouts linked to execution under controllable metrics; 2024 under-target DCF/share led to modest bonus pool funding (~98% baseline), indicating disciplined pay-for-performance .
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