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Bernard McCracken

Chief Financial Officer at LANDS' ENDLANDS' END
Executive

About Bernard McCracken

Bernard McCracken is Chief Financial Officer of Lands’ End (appointed September 14, 2023) and age 63 as disclosed in the latest 10-K. He previously served as Interim CFO (January 2023–September 2023) and, before that, as Vice President, Controller and Chief Accounting Officer since April 2014 . Company performance during his CFO tenure shows revenue down year-over-year while EBITDA increased; details below.

Company performance last two fiscal years:

MetricFY 2024FY 2025
Revenues ($USD)$1,472.5M $1,362.9M
EBITDA ($USD)$74.7M*$94.1M*

*Values retrieved from S&P Global.

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Lands’ EndChief Financial Officer; Treasurer; Principal financial and accounting officerSep 2023–present
Lands’ EndInterim Chief Financial Officer; VP, Controller & Chief Accounting OfficerJan 2023–Sep 2023 (Interim CFO); Apr 2014–Sep 2023 (VP CAO)
The Children’s PlaceVP Corporate Controller/Business Transformation Office; Sr Director Special Projects; Sr Director Accounting2004–2014
Footstar (Meldisco Division)VP Finance (divisional CFO); Assistant Controller1998–2003
Deloitte & Touche LLPConsultant/Manager, Enterprise Risk Services—Retail Internal Audit1997–1998
The Leslie Fay CompaniesDivisional Controller1994–1997
Loehmann’s Inc.Assistant Controller1987–1994

External Roles

  • No public company directorships disclosed for McCracken in Lands’ End filings reviewed (DEF 14A/10-K executive officer sections) .

Fixed Compensation

ComponentFY 2024 TermsNotes
Base Salary$525,000 Maintained in 2025 DEF 14A
Target Bonus (AIP)75% of base salary Remains 75% in 2025 DEF 14A
Target Long-Term Incentive (LTI)110% of base salary (beginning FY 2024) 110% confirmed in 2025 DEF 14A

Multi-year compensation (Summary Compensation Table):

YearSalary ($)Stock Awards ($)Non-Equity Incentive ($)All Other ($)Total ($)
2023$529,122 $169,748 $309,536 $9,088 $1,017,494
2024$525,000 $546,648 $275,625 $11,462 $1,378,735

Performance Compensation

Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) design and outcomes:

Fiscal YearMetricThresholdTargetMaximumActual OutcomePayout
2023Adjusted EBITDA (quarterly and annual)FY23 AIP EBITDA: Q1 $19.5M (9%); Q2 $15.8M; Q3 $17.3M; Q4 $31.7M (25%); Full Year $84.3M (44%); Total payout % 78% 78% of target
2024AIP EBITDA net of inventory charge$60M (50% payout) $71M (100%) $91M (200%) Achieved above threshold and below target 70% of target; McCracken paid $275,625

Long-Term Incentives (FY 2024 grants):

Award TypeMetric(s)WeightingTarget Shares (McCracken)Grant DateVesting / Performance PeriodValuation
Financial PSUsNet Debt / Adjusted EBITDA ratio (end of period); Average ROIC (FY 2024–2026)50% + 50% 20,424 shares 4/1/2024 Vests post FY 2026 upon committee certification $230,995 grant-date fair value
Stock Price PSUsAverage closing stock price achieved over any 20 consecutive trading days during grant→FY 202620% of LTI value 10,212 shares 4/1/2024 Threshold 33% payout; target 100% (max = target) $84,657 grant-date fair value
Time-based RSUsTime-based vesting40% of LTI value (company LTI split 50% PRSU, 50% RSU in 2023; FY 2024 mix per tables) 20,424 shares (All Other Stock Awards) 4/1/2024 Standard time-based vesting per plan (not individually detailed)$230,995 grant-date fair value

Vesting and realized value in FY 2024:

ExecutiveRSUs Vested (#)Value Realized ($)
Bernard McCracken4,505 $50,941

Prior performance-based award outcome:

  • 2022 LTIP PRSUs (financial goals covering FY 2022–FY 2024): No shares were earned; awards expired unvested .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial ownership (as of March 28, 2025):

HolderShares Beneficially Owned% of Outstanding
Bernard McCracken30,129 * (less than 1%)

Outstanding equity awards (as of Jan 31, 2025; closing price $12.45 per share) — McCracken:

CategoryShares/UnitsMarket Value ($)Notes
Time-based RSUs (unvested)1,864 $23,207
Time-based RSUs (unvested)6,965 $86,714
Time-based RSUs (unvested; FY 2024 grant)20,424 $254,279
Performance RSUs (unearned; 2022 LTIP)1,864 $23,207 Expired unvested
Performance RSUs (unearned; FY 2023–2025 goals)4,643 $57,805 Financial PSUs
Performance RSUs (unearned; FY 2024–2026 goals)10,212 $127,139 Financial/Stock Price PSUs
Performance RSUs (unearned; stock price PSU)3,370 $41,956 Stock price PSU

Policies on hedging/pledging:

  • LE’s Insider Trading Policy prohibits short sales, hedging (e.g., collars, swaps), holding company stock in margin accounts, or pledging company securities as loan collateral .

Employment Terms

Core employment arrangement (as CFO):

TermDetail
Base Salary$525,000
AIP Target Bonus75% of base salary
LTI Target110% of base salary (from FY 2024 onward)
Non-compete12 months
Non-solicit18 months
Non-disparagement2 years
Confidentiality2 years
Severance (no cause/good reason)12 months base + Average Bonus; health coverage; outplacement; unused vacation
Severance (change in control within 2 years)2× (base + Average Bonus) over 24 months; higher-of target or Average Bonus used; pro-rata bonus if termination in last six months of fiscal year

Potential payments upon termination (as of Jan 31, 2025, using $12.45/share for equity acceleration):

ScenarioSeverance Pay ($)Bonus Payment ($)Medical/Welfare ($)Vacation ($)Outplacement ($)Equity Acceleration ($)Total ($)
Good Reason$525,000 $14,183 $40,385 $7,725 $587,293
Without Cause$525,000 $14,183 $40,385 $7,725 $587,293
Disability$393,750 $171,399 $565,149
Death$393,750 $171,399 $565,149
Change in Control (termination)$525,000 $14,183 $40,385 $7,725 $907,642 $1,494,935

Notes:

  • “Average Bonus” generally defined as average of prior two years; for CoC cases, higher of target or Average Bonus is used for McCracken .
  • Health coverage continuation aligned with severance period; COBRA rules apply if joining other coverage .

Investment Implications

  • Pay-for-performance calibration: AIP paid 70% of target in FY 2024 (below target), and FY 2023 paid 78% of target, indicating a disciplined payout framework tied to EBITDA execution . LTI PSUs are linked to leverage (Net Debt/EBITDA) and ROIC over FY 2024–2026, and stock-price PSUs require sustained price levels—aligning equity value creation with balance sheet strength and returns .
  • Retention and selling pressure: McCracken holds meaningful unvested RSUs/PSUs across 2024–2026 windows with no stock options; FY 2022 PRSUs expired unvested, while FY 2024 grants vest post-FY 2026, suggesting staggered future vesting events rather than near-term option exercises. FY 2024 RSU vesting was 4,505 shares ($50,941), a modest flow relative to overall beneficial ownership .
  • Alignment and risk controls: Beneficial ownership is <1% of outstanding; hedging and pledging are prohibited by policy, reducing misalignment risk from derivatives or collateralization . Severance economics are moderate (12 months base + Average Bonus, or 2× under CoC) with standard restrictive covenants, limiting abrupt departure risk while avoiding outsized golden parachutes .
  • Execution track record context: Company revenue fell y/y while EBITDA increased under his CFO tenure, consistent with focus on profitability and leverage metrics prioritized in incentive design; continued monitoring of PSU performance (Net Debt/EBITDA, ROIC) through FY 2026 is key to assessing cumulative value creation .