Dan Skovronsky
Chief Scientific Officer at LLY
Executive
About Dan Skovronsky
Executive Vice President, Chief Scientific Officer and President, Lilly Research Laboratories and Lilly Immunology. Age 51; 14 years of service at Eli Lilly (current role since 2024; previously Executive Vice President, Chief Scientific and Medical Officer and President, Lilly Research Laboratories since 2018) . Education: M.D. (University of Pennsylvania), Ph.D. in neuroscience (University of Pennsylvania), B.S. in molecular biophysics & biochemistry (Yale); previously founded Avid Radiopharmaceuticals and served as its CEO (founded 2004) . Under his R&D leadership in 2024, Lilly delivered $45.0B revenue and 33% TSR, with key approvals including Kisunla (Alzheimer’s), Ebglyss (atopic dermatitis), and Zepbound (OSA in adults with obesity) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eli Lilly and Company | EVP, Chief Scientific Officer and President, Lilly Research Laboratories and Lilly Immunology | 2024–present | Oversees R&D and immunology; pipeline and launch execution |
| Eli Lilly and Company | EVP, Chief Scientific & Medical Officer; President, Lilly Research Laboratories | 2018–2024 | Led R&D productivity and clinical development; advanced pipeline |
| Eli Lilly and Company | SVP, Clinical and Product Development | Prior to 2018 | Led development execution and late-stage programs |
| Eli Lilly and Company | VP, Diabetes Research | Prior to 2018 | Guided discovery/programs in diabetes |
| Avid Radiopharmaceuticals | Founder & CEO | Founded 2004 | Built neuro diagnostics innovator; CEO prior to Lilly roles |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Committees/Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Myriad Genetics (NASDAQ: MYGN) | Director | Since 2020 | Compensation & Human Capital (CHCC), Research & Product Innovation (RPIC) . Bio confirms education and Lilly roles; age 51 |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base salary rate | $1,350,000 | $1,450,000 |
| Salary paid (SCT) | $1,330,769 | $1,430,769 |
| Target annual bonus (% of salary) | 100% | 100% |
| Actual annual bonus paid | — | $3,219,230 (for 2024 performance) |
Perquisites and other items (2024):
- Personal use of corporate aircraft: $27,503
- Tax reimbursement for imputed income (Paris events): $28,089
- HSR filing fee reimbursement: $30,000 (required to participate in LTI due to ownership thresholds)
Performance Compensation
Annual Bonus (company-wide program for executives)
- 2024 metrics and weights: Product revenue 33.3%; EPS 33.3%; Pipeline progression 33.3%
- Outcomes: Pipeline multiple 250%; overall Bonus Plan multiple 2.25x; resulted in above-target payouts (Skovronsky’s bonus shown above)
Long-Term Incentives (equity)
- Structure:
- Shareholder Value Award (SVA): 3-year absolute stock-price target vs cost of capital; 0–200% payout; 1-year post-vesting holding
- Relative Value Award (RVA): 3-year TSR vs peer median; 0–200% payout; 1-year post-vesting holding
2024 Grants (targets)
| Award | Threshold (#) | Target (#) | Max (#) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024–2026 SVA | 1,819 | 3,638 | 7,276 |
| 2024–2026 RVA | 1,695 | 3,389 | 6,778 |
Recent Payouts
| Cycle | Plan | Payout multiple | Shares paid to Skovronsky |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022–2024 | SVA | 175% | 19,174.75 |
| 2022–2024 | RVA | 175% | 14,647.50 |
| 2023–2025 (first 2 years) | Performance Award (EPS growth) | 200% (two-year EPS growth 31.6%) | Earned into RSUs; 12,684 RSUs subject to 13‑month service vesting |
Vesting and holding schedule (selected)
| Award | Vest/Performance end | Shares/Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 2022–2024 Performance Award | Feb 1, 2025 | Prior-cycle RSUs vested on 2/1/2025 |
| 2023–2025 Performance Award | Feb 1, 2026 | 12,684 RSUs vest after 13‑month service period (no additional holding required) |
| 2023–2025 SVA/RVA | Dec 31, 2025 | Max shares outstanding as of 12/31/24; 1‑year post-vesting holding applies |
| 2024–2026 SVA/RVA | Dec 31, 2026 | 1‑year post-vesting holding applies |
Program design notes:
- Annual equity for executive officers is predominantly performance-based (SVA/RVA); no stock options disclosed .
- Adjustments to EPS and revenue for incentive purposes follow committee-approved non-GAAP guidelines (consistent with investor reporting), with the committee retaining downward discretion .
Multi‑Year Compensation (Summary Compensation Table)
| Metric ($) | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary | 1,201,923 | 1,330,769 | 1,430,769 |
| Stock Awards (grant-date fair value) | 5,747,500 | 7,483,400 | 7,499,895 |
| Non‑Equity Incentive Plan (annual bonus) | 1,442,308 | 2,408,692 | 3,219,230 |
| Change in Pension Value | — | 551,222 | 281,870 |
| All Other Compensation | 72,115 | 79,846 | 206,980 |
| Total Compensation | 8,463,846 | 11,853,929 | 12,638,744 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership | 212,276 shares owned directly/indirectly; 11,099 stock units not distributable within 60 days; <1% of outstanding (947,989,151 shares) |
| Pledging/hedging | None pledged; hedging and pledging prohibited for executives |
| Ownership guidelines | Requirement: 6x base salary for senior executives; Skovronsky’s holdings ≈100x base salary as of 12/31/2024 (substantially exceeds requirement) |
| Holding requirements | Must retain 50% of net shares until guideline met; 1‑year post‑vesting hold on SVA/RVA; PA awards include 13‑month service-vesting (satisfies holding) |
| Outstanding equity (selected) | 2024–2026 SVA unearned max 7,276; 2024–2026 RVA unearned max 6,778; 2023–2025 PA 12,684 RSUs outstanding (service vesting) as of 12/31/2024 |
Deferred compensation and retirement
- Nonqualified Savings Plan (2024): Executive contribution $65,146; company match $65,146; aggregate balance $1,625,773 .
- Pension (present value, 2024): Retirement Plan (post‑2009) $264,343; Nonqualified Plan (post‑2009) $2,044,188; total $2,308,531 .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement | Lilly does not enter into individual employment agreements with executive officers |
| Clawback | Comprehensive policy compliant with SEC/NYSE; applies in accounting restatements and specified misconduct; applies post‑employment |
| Non‑compete / Non‑solicit | Annual awards to executive officers typically bound by non‑compete and non‑solicit covenants effective for 1 year following termination; breach triggers forfeiture |
| Change‑in‑control (CIC) | Double‑trigger required; 2x base salary + target bonus cash severance; 18 months benefits continuation; unvested equity converts/continues, with acceleration on covered termination; no tax gross‑ups; 280G cut‑down if beneficial |
| CIC economics (individual) | If terminated without cause/for good reason within 2 years post‑CIC: cash $5,800,000; benefits PV $54,113; equity acceleration/continuation $47,195,463; total $53,049,576 (as of 12/31/2024) |
| Special non‑compete payment agreements | Company may elect to enforce Non‑Compete Payment Agreement; potential payment up to $5,000,000 (less reductions) for Skovronsky in exchange for restrictive covenants (outside CIC) |
Performance & Track Record
- 2024 R&D and pipeline execution: Directed high-performing R&D organization; FDA approvals (Kisunla for Alzheimer’s; Ebglyss in AD); strong Omvoh launch; multiple late‑stage wins and BD to enrich pipeline .
- Company results connected to incentive payouts: 2024 revenue $45.0B; GAAP EPS $11.71; non‑GAAP EPS $12.99; 2024 TSR 33% and outperformance vs S&P 500 and peer group over 1/3/5‑year periods .
- Bonus plan outcomes: Pipeline multiple at 250%; overall bonus multiple 2.25x; Skovronsky’s actual 2024 bonus $3.22M .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Strong pay‑for‑performance alignment: 2024 bonus equally weighted across product revenue, EPS, and pipeline; long‑term incentives fully performance‑based (SVA, RVA) with 0–200% payout ranges and mandatory post‑vesting holding; committee retains downward discretion and employs audited non‑GAAP frameworks for adjustments .
- Market benchmarking and governance: Peer group spans large global biopharma (e.g., AbbVie, Merck, Novo Nordisk, Pfizer, J&J, Novartis); independent consultant FW Cook advises; 2024 Say‑on‑Pay support 95% (5‑year >94%) .
- Risk controls: Robust ownership/retention requirements; prohibitions on hedging/pledging; comprehensive clawback; double‑trigger CIC with no tax gross‑ups .
Vesting Schedules and Potential Selling Pressure
- Near‑term inflows: 2023–2025 Performance Award RSUs (12,684) service‑vest on Feb 1, 2026 .
- Recently paid awards: 2022–2024 SVA and RVA paid at 175% in early 2025 and are subject to a one‑year post‑vesting holding—reducing immediate selling pressure .
- Ongoing performance cycles: 2023–2025 and 2024–2026 SVA/RVA remain unearned until performance end; executive officers must hold net shares for at least one year post‑vesting and maintain 6x salary guideline (Skovronsky ≈100x), further tempering forced selling .
Equity Ownership & Alignment (Snapshot)
| Shares owned | Stock units (not distributable <60 days) | Ownership % | Ownership multiple vs requirement | Hedging/Pledging |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 212,276 | 11,099 | <1% | Required 6x; actual ~100x base salary | Prohibited; none pledged |
Compensation Peer Group (Benchmarking)
AbbVie, Amgen, AstraZeneca, Biogen, Bristol‑Myers Squibb, Gilead, GSK, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Novartis, Novo Nordisk, Pfizer, Roche, Sanofi, Takeda .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 Say‑on‑Pay approval: 95% .
- Last five years >94% approval; ongoing investor engagement on compensation and governance .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: Very high ownership (≈100x salary), strict holding requirements, and prohibitions on hedging/pledging indicate strong alignment and mitigate near‑term selling risk despite sizable award payouts (2022–2024 SVA/RVA; 2023–2025 PA) .
- Upside tied to pipeline and TSR: Incentive mix (SVA/RVA) tightly couples realizable pay to absolute and relative TSR; recent 175–200% payouts reflect exceptional execution but embed future performance risk as awards remain fully at risk through 2026 .
- Downside protection for shareholders: Robust clawback, no tax gross‑ups, double‑trigger CIC, and committee discretion reduce adverse governance risk; change‑in‑control economics largely equity‑driven (majority of potential benefits from equity continuation/acceleration) .
- Execution signal: 2024 bonus multiple (2.25x) and pipeline 250% support management confidence in R&D productivity under Skovronsky, with approvals and late‑stage readouts providing near‑term catalysts .