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Adina Eckstein

Chief Operating Officer at LemonadeLemonade
Executive

About Adina Eckstein

Adina Eckstein is Chief Operating Officer at Lemonade (LMND), age 40, serving as COO since July 2021 after joining Lemonade in 2019 and previously serving as VP of Operations. She holds a BA in Economics from Hebrew University and an MBA from Tel Aviv University . During her tenure, company results improved in 2024: Gross Written Premium (GWP) +26% YoY to $929.0M, Total Revenue +22% YoY to $526.5M, net loss improved 15% to $(202.2)M, and the gross loss ratio fell from 85% (2023) to 73% (2024) . Lemonade’s cumulative TSR since the 2020 IPO corresponded to a $45 value for a $100 initial investment as of 2024 vs $20 as of 2023; IFP rose to $944M and Adjusted EBITDA to $(150)M in 2024 from $(173)M in 2023 .

Company performance (selected metrics):

Metric20232024
Gross Written Premium ($M)$738.4 $929.0
Total Revenue ($M)$429.8 $526.5
Net Loss ($M)$(236.9) $(202.2)
Gross Loss Ratio (%)85% 73%
In Force Premium ($M)$747 $944
Adjusted EBITDA ($M)$(173) $(150)
TSR – value of $100 investment$20 $45

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
LemonadeVP of OperationsNov 2020–Jul 2021 Scaled operations prior to COO role
HSBCChief Operating OfficerPre‑2019 (dates not disclosed) Led digitization at a global financial institution
BBC WorldwideVP Programme & Portfolio2014–2016 Led development/operations for consumer digital tech

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
No external directorships disclosed for Eckstein

Fixed Compensation

Component202220232024
Base Salary ($)$375,225 $360,186 $395,607

2024 perquisites (selected; all company‑paid): pension $25,714; recuperation pay $678; car allowance $1,851; severance fund $32,954; disability fund $11,094; education fund $3,821; health benefits $363 .

Performance Compensation

Lemonade does not provide annual cash incentive compensation to NEOs; pay is heavily equity‑based and time‑vested .

Incentive TypeMetricWeightingTargetActualPayout BasisVesting
Annual cash bonusNone0%N/AN/ANoneN/A
RSUs (2024 grants)Service (time‑based)Part of ~80% equity mix for NEOsN/AN/AShares vest over time2/2/24 RSUs vest in 16 equal quarterly installments (4 years); 6/23/24 RSUs vest in 8 equal quarterly installments (2 years)
Stock Options (2024 grant)Service (time‑based)Part of ~80% equity mix for NEOsN/AN/AValue only if stock > strikeOptions vest in 8 equal quarterly installments over 2 years (6/23/24 grant) or 16 equal quarterly installments over 4 years (other grants)

2024 equity grants to Eckstein:

Grant DateTypeSharesExercise PriceVesting
02/02/2024RSUs7,486 16 equal quarterly installments/4 years
06/23/2024RSUs53,667 8 equal quarterly installments/2 years
06/23/2024Options71,556 $15.90 8 equal quarterly installments/2 years

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial ownership (as of April 10, 2025):

ItemAmount
Shares owned directly100,971
RSUs vesting within 60 days14,582
Options exercisable within 60 days162,870
Total beneficial ownership278,423 shares; under 1% of outstanding
Shares outstanding (for % calc)73,266,170

Unvested awards outstanding (as of Dec 31, 2024):

AwardUnvested Units/SharesNotes
RSUs (6/23/24)40,249 (MV $1,476,333) Vests over 2 years
RSUs (2/2/24)5,615 (MV $205,958) Vests over 4 years
RSUs (8/11/23)16,155 (MV $592,565) Vests per 2023 grant schedule
RSUs (2/7/23)37,496 (MV $1,375,353) Vests per 2023 grant schedule
Options (6/23/24) unexercisable53,666 (strike $15.90) Vests/2 years
Options (8/11/23) unexercisable32,380 (strike $15.13) Vests/4 years

Alignment policies:

  • Hedging and pledging of company stock are prohibited under the Insider Trading Compliance Policy .
  • Clawback policy adopted per SEC Rule 10D‑1, mandating recovery of erroneously awarded incentive compensation over the prior three fiscal years .

Employment Terms

TermDetails
Employment arrangementAt‑will; Employment Agreement (9/23/2019), Severance Agreement (8/5/2021)
Base salary (local currency)NIS 122,000/month effective Sept 2023 (previously NIS 105,000 in July 2022; NIS 90,000 in June 2022; NIS 85,000 upon promotion)
Severance (no CIC)6 months base salary + 50% of target annual bonus + acceleration of 6 months’ vesting (subject to release)
Change‑in‑control (CIC)If terminated from 3 months pre‑CIC to 1 year post‑CIC: 12 months base salary + 100% target annual bonus + full acceleration of all equity (subject to release)
ClawbackSEC‑compliant clawback for restatements (three fiscal years lookback)
Hedging/pledgingProhibited (shorts, derivatives, margin/pledge)

Estimated potential payments (as of 12/31/2024):

ScenarioCashEquity AccelerationPerqs/HealthcareTotal
Termination without cause (no CIC)$197,803 $480,434 $0 $678,237
CIC termination$395,607 $1,710,388 $0 $2,105,995

Investment Implications

  • Pay mix and structure: Compensation is predominantly equity and time‑vested (~80% of NEO target direct compensation in 2024), with no annual cash bonus program. This supports retention but weakens direct pay‑for‑performance linkage to operating targets; equity realization depends on stock performance .
  • Near‑term supply and selling pressure: 14,582 RSUs vest within 60 days of April 10, 2025, adding potential near‑term share supply; options were generally underwater as of 12/31/2024 for NEOs (except Peters), limiting exercise‑driven selling unless the stock appreciates .
  • CIC economics and retention risk: Double‑trigger CIC provides 12 months salary, 100% target bonus, and full equity acceleration; estimated $2.11M as of 12/31/2024. This is competitive and could aid retention through a transaction, but also represents meaningful potential dilution/cost if triggered .
  • Governance and alignment: Prohibitions on hedging/pledging and an SEC‑compliant clawback reduce risk and enhance shareholder alignment. No related‑party transactions disclosed for Eckstein; ownership remains below 1% of outstanding shares, with continuing unvested equity aligning future value creation .
  • Execution track record: 2024 saw operational improvements (gross loss ratio down to 73%) and growth (GWP +26%, revenue +22%), with net loss improving, indicating progress under current leadership structure .
  • Shareholder sentiment: Say‑on‑pay approval reached ~87.5% in 2024, improving from 2023, suggesting investor acceptance of the equity‑heavy, time‑vested pay model .