Daniel Schreiber
LemonadeAbout Daniel Schreiber
Daniel Schreiber, 54, is Lemonade’s Co‑Founder, Chief Executive Officer, and Chairman (director since 2015). He previously served as President and director of Powermat (2011–2015), senior marketing roles at SanDisk/M‑Systems (2003–2011), co‑founded Alchemedia (CEO; acquired by Finjan), and practiced corporate law in Israel; he holds an LL.B. with First Class Honors from King’s College London . Under his leadership, 2024 revenue grew 22% to $526.5M (from $429.8M in 2023) while Adjusted EBITDA improved to $(150)M (from $(173)M), and in‑force premium reached $944M; post year‑end, Q3’25 in‑force premium rose to $1,158M . Since IPO (July 2020), company TSR for a $100 initial investment moved to $45 in 2024 (from $20 in 2023), reflecting volatility through growth and reinsurance transitions .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lemonade, Inc. | Co‑Founder, CEO and Chairman | 2015–present | Founded AI‑first insurer; scaled multi‑product footprint and reinsurance programs . |
| Powermat Technologies | President; Director | 2011–2015 | Drove commercialization of wireless charging . |
| SanDisk / M‑Systems | SVP Marketing; VP Marketing & BD | 2003–2011 | Led marketing during M‑Systems integration into SanDisk . |
| Alchemedia, Inc. | Co‑Founder, CEO | 1997–2002 | Built and exited internet security software company . |
| Herzog, Fox & Neeman | Corporate lawyer | Prior | Corporate/commercial legal practice in Israel . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | — | — | No current public company directorships disclosed for Schreiber. Board service is at Lemonade (Chairman) . |
Fixed Compensation
- Lemonade has no annual cash incentive plan for NEOs; pay mix is salary plus equity .
- CEO 2024 base salary was $492,887 (no salary increase in 2024 vs 2023) .
| Component (USD) | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary | $375,225 | $392,732 | $492,887 |
| Cash bonus | — | — | — |
| Stock options (grant‑date FV) | $7,541,200 | $1,209,932 | $3,175,367 |
| RSUs (grant‑date FV) | — | — | $149,698 |
| All other comp (benefits/perqs) | $119,376 | $119,189 | $140,630 |
| Total | $8,035,801 | $1,721,853 | $3,958,582 |
Notes: 2024 “All other” includes Israeli pension/severance/education funds and car allowance .
Performance Compensation
- No annual cash metrics; 2024 equity was primarily time‑based options and RSUs. A prior price‑vesting option award (2021) for co‑founders includes stock price hurdles through April 21, 2025 .
| Instrument | Metric / Hurdle | Weighting | Target | Actual/Payout | Vesting / Term |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 CEO option grant (part of co‑founder program) | Stock price hurdles for exercisability: 25% at $126; +25% at $162; +25% at $198; +25% at $234 (30‑day average by 4/21/2025) | N/A | Price hurdles as specified | Not disclosed (exercisability contingent; unachieved portions forfeited after 4/21/2025) | Vests over 4 years; exercisability tied to price hurdles; forfeiture for unmet hurdles at 4/21/2025 . |
| 2024 CEO options (6/23/24; 8/12/24) | Service time | N/A | N/A | N/A | 6/23/24: 111,310 unexercisable at $15.90; 8/12/24: 153,203 unexercisable at $15.02; vest in equal quarterly installments (per plan footnotes) . |
| 2024 CEO RSU (2/2/24) | Service time | N/A | N/A | N/A | 6,996 unvested at 12/31/24; vests in 16 equal quarterly installments over 4 years . |
Grant detail (2024): RSUs 9,327 (2/2/24; $16.05); options 133,572 (6/23/24; $15.90) and 167,130 (8/12/24; $15.02); grant‑date FV $149,698; $1,457,271; $1,718,096 respectively .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Anti‑hedging and anti‑pledging policy applies to all directors/officers; pledging and hedging prohibited, mitigating misalignment risks .
- Beneficial ownership (as of 4/10/2025): CEO owns 2,773,856 shares (3.8% of outstanding) including 50,000 direct, 1,650,159 via Dan and Dan Ltd., 583 RSUs vesting within 60 days, and 1,073,114 options exercisable within 60 days .
| Ownership (4/10/2025) | Shares | % Outstanding |
|---|---|---|
| Daniel Schreiber total beneficial | 2,773,856 | 3.8% |
| Of which: Direct + Dan and Dan Ltd. | 1,700,159 (50,000 direct; 1,650,159 entity) | — |
| RSUs vesting ≤60 days | 583 | — |
| Options exercisable ≤60 days | 1,073,114 | — |
Outstanding at FY‑end 2024 (selected awards):
- Options: 13,927 exercisable/153,203 unexercisable (8/12/24, $15.02; exp. 8/12/2034); 22,262 exercisable/111,310 unexercisable (6/23/24, $15.90; exp. 6/23/2034); 36,635 exercisable/80,575 unexercisable (8/11/23, $15.13; exp. 8/11/2033); 281,250 exercisable/218,750 unexercisable (8/15/22, $30.89; exp. 8/15/2032) .
- RSUs: 6,996 unvested (2/1/24 grant) .
Potential equity acceleration values (12/31/2024 price $36.68): six months’ acceleration $69,497; full acceleration upon CIC termination $389,077 .
Insider trading/10b5‑1 plans: In Q3’25 disclosure, certain officers’ plans were listed; Schreiber was not among officers with adoptions/terminations that quarter (disclosure limited to that period) .
Employment Terms
| Term | Key provisions |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement | At‑will (amended and restated 7/7/2020) . |
| Base salary history (ILS base) | Monthly salary increased over time to NIS 152,000 effective Sept 2023 . |
| Severance (non‑CIC) | If terminated without Cause: 6 months’ base salary, 50% of target annual bonus, and acceleration of 6 months of equity vesting (subject to release) . |
| Change‑in‑control (double‑trigger; window: 3 months prior–12 months post) | 12 months’ base salary, 100% of target annual bonus, and full acceleration of all outstanding equity (subject to release) . |
| Cause definition | Includes material breach, fiduciary breach, felony involving moral turpitude, or willful failure to perform duties (with short cure periods) . |
| Clawback | Dodd‑Frank Rule 10D‑1 compliant policy adopted; mandatory recovery of erroneously awarded incentive pay . |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited (short sales, derivatives, hedging, and pledging banned) . |
| Tax gross‑ups | No excise tax gross‑ups under §4999 (“golden parachute”); §162(m) deductibility not prioritized . |
Board Governance (role, independence, committees)
- Dual role: CEO and Chairman. Board justifies combined role for unified leadership; Lead Independent Director (Michael Eisenberg) presides over independent sessions and provides counterbalance .
- Independence: Four of six directors independent; Schreiber and Wininger are not independent .
- Committees (all independent):
- Audit: Chair Dr. Samer Haj‑Yehia; members Debra Schwartz, Maria Angelidis‑Smith; both Haj‑Yehia and Schwartz are “financial experts” .
- Compensation: Chair Michael Eisenberg; members Dr. Haj‑Yehia, Maria Angelidis‑Smith .
- Nominating & Governance: Chair Debra Schwartz; member Michael Eisenberg .
- Board attendance: Directors attended ≥75% of meetings in 2024; independent directors meet in executive session regularly .
Director Compensation (for Schreiber as a director)
- As an executive director (CEO), his pay is covered under executive compensation; non‑employee director retainers/equity not applicable to him. Non‑employee structure for context: annual cash fees plus RSUs (e.g., $150,000 annual RSU post‑meeting) .
Compensation & Incentives – Multi‑Year View (CEO)
| Year | Mix and design | Notes/implications |
|---|---|---|
| 2022 | Large option grant; no cash bonus | Equity‑heavy, high at‑risk exposure to stock performance . |
| 2023 | Options only; no cash bonus | Continued equity orientation; no annual cash plan . |
| 2024 | Options + modest RSUs; no cash bonus | Time‑based equity refresh with strike near mid‑teens; adds retention RSUs . |
Compensation governance: independent comp consultant (Aon HCS) and market‑based peer group (fintech/insurtech/payments) used for 2024 decisions .
Say‑on‑pay: 2024 support ~87.5% “For,” an improvement vs 2023 indicating shareholder acceptance of equity‑heavy design .
Performance & Track Record
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total revenue ($M) | 256.7 | 429.8 | 526.5 |
| Net income (loss) ($M) | (297.8) | (236.9) | (202.2) |
| IFP ($M, YE) | 625 | 747 | 944 |
| Adjusted EBITDA ($M) | (225) | (173) | (150) |
| TSR (value of $100 at IPO) | $17 | $20 | $45 |
Recent run‑rate (Q3’25): customers 2.87M, IFP $1,157.9M; gross loss ratio improved YoY (62% vs 73%); Adjusted gross profit margin 42% .
Equity Ownership & Alignment Details
- Prohibitions on hedging/pledging reduce leverage‑related risk and support alignment .
- Price‑vesting hurdles (2021 options) tied exercisability to ambitious multi‑year stock price targets—clear shareholder value linkage (forfeiture if unmet by 4/21/2025) .
- Beneficial ownership at 3.8% provides meaningful exposure to equity value creation .
Employment & Contracts (Retention/transition analysis)
- Severance provides modest 6‑month salary and partial bonus proxy; CIC provides 12 months salary and full bonus plus full vesting—market‑typical double‑trigger design aimed at retention during strategic events .
- No disclosed non‑compete in filing excerpts; standard Israeli benefits included (pension, severance, education fund) .
- Clawback in place covering incentive‑based compensation for restatements .
Related Party / Other Governance
- Lemonade Foundation: Company contributed 500,000 shares in 2020; both CEO and President sit on the foundation’s board; 400,000 shares held as of 9/30/2025 (related‑party disclosure) .
- Compensation Committee fully independent; no interlocks disclosed .
Compensation Peer Group (2024)
Selected peers included fintech/insurtech/software names such as Affirm, Hippo, Root, Oscar, SoFi, Trupanion, LendingClub, Q2, PagerDuty, Fiverr, EverQuote, Upstart, etc.; peers chosen for business model and size comparability .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 Say‑on‑Pay approved with ~87.5% “For,” which the committee cites as support for program design adjustments and alignment .
- Frequency: annual (per 2022 vote and company policy) .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: High equity orientation (no annual cash bonus) and price‑vesting legacy options tightly link upside to TSR; anti‑pledging removes leverage overhang—positive for alignment .
- Retention risk: Quarterly‑vesting RSUs and refreshed options provide ongoing retention, but equity‑only design concentrates compensation risk in stock performance; CIC terms are moderate and shareholder‑friendly double trigger .
- Selling pressure: CEO holds a significant option overhang with staggered quarterly vesting; RSUs vest quarterly. No Schreiber 10b5‑1 plan changes listed in Q3’25 disclosures (limited to that quarter), but monitoring Form 4s remains prudent for tax or liquidity‑driven sales .
- Pay for performance: Revenue and IFP growth with improving loss ratios and Adjusted EBITDA trend demonstrate operational traction; equity awards at mid‑teens strikes could be accretive if margin trajectory sustains .
- Governance: Combined CEO/Chair role offset by Lead Independent Director and fully independent key committees; strong insider trading policy (hedging/pledging bans) and adopted clawback policy .
Data limitations: Recent Form 4 transaction details for Schreiber were not retrieved here; this analysis relies on proxy, 10‑Q Item 5 trading arrangement disclosures, and ownership tables. For trade‑level color, review current Form 4 filings on EDGAR.