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Jason Ringblom

President at LOUISIANA-PACIFICLOUISIANA-PACIFIC
Executive

About Jason Ringblom

Jason P. Ringblom is President of LP Building Solutions (LPX) as of April 7, 2025, overseeing all manufacturing and commercial operations; he previously served as EVP & GM of Siding (since Feb 2022), EVP of OSB & EWP (2017–2022), and VP of OSB Sales & Marketing (2015–2016) with more than 20 years at LP . He was age 40 as of March 1, 2023 and has progressed through sales, marketing, and operations leadership roles that underpin LP’s growth and specialization strategy . LP’s pay-for-performance framework ties his incentives to Adjusted EBITDA, Economic Profit, ROIC, and a relative TSR modifier; in 2024, corporate Adjusted EBITDA ($688M) and Economic Profit ($239M) exceeded maximum plan levels, driving above-target annual incentive payouts (Ringblom actual $849,732 for 2024 performance) .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Louisiana-Pacific (LP)President2025–presentUnifies manufacturing and commercial operations; succession planning; streamlines OSB/Siding customer engagement
Louisiana-Pacific (LP)EVP & GM, Siding (and EWP until sale in Aug 2022)2022–2025Led Siding business; continued strategic transformation post-EWP divestiture
Louisiana-Pacific (LP)EVP, OSB & EWP2017–2022Ran OSB/EWP businesses; commercial and operational leadership through commodity cycles
Louisiana-Pacific (LP)VP, OSB Sales & Marketing2015–2016Drove OSB commercial strategy and pricing
Louisiana-Pacific (LP)Sales leadership roles2004–2014Progressive sales leadership roles across LP

Fixed Compensation

Summary Compensation (NEO disclosures)

Metric202220232024
Salary ($)$513,542 $540,714 $584,925
Stock Awards ($)$852,656 $1,582,775 $1,123,394
Non-Equity Incentive Plan ($)$658,657 $364,200 $849,732
Change in Pension/Deferred Earnings ($)$1,842
All Other Compensation ($)$98,839 $73,630 $71,915
Total ($)$2,125,535 $2,561,319 $2,629,967

2023 Target Mix (as disclosed)

ComponentDollar Amount
Annual Base Salary$544,701
Annual Incentive Target Value$381,291
Long-Term Incentive Award Value$1,100,000
2023 Total Target Compensation$2,025,992

2025 Base Salary Updates

  • Approved February 13, 2025: $600,478 .
  • Effective April 7, 2025 upon promotion to President: $800,000; target annual incentive increased to 90% of salary; incremental 2025 LTI grants totaling $1.5M ($750k RSUs + $750k PSUs) on 4/7/2025, taking aggregate 2025 LTI to $2.7M .

Performance Compensation

Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – 2024 structure and payout

MetricWeightingTargetActualPayout ImpactVesting/Payment
Corporate Adjusted EBITDA20% (for Siding GM) Threshold $412M; Target $527M; Max $630M $688M 200% of target for corporate goals Cash, paid in 2025; employment condition; committee may reduce/eliminate
Corporate Economic Profit20% (for Siding GM) Threshold $33M; Target $119M; Max $197M $239M 200% of target for corporate goals Same as above
Siding BU Adjusted EBITDA30% (for Siding GM) Not disclosed200% of target attainment Drives BU component to max Cash; employment condition
Siding BU Economic Profit30% (for Siding GM) Not disclosed200% of target attainment Drives BU component to max Cash; employment condition
AIP Target Opportunity75% of base salary; $424,867 Actual 2024 AIP payout $849,732 Paid in 2025; subject to plan terms

AIP – 2023 corporate goal calibration and outcomes (context)

MetricThresholdTargetMaxActualOutcome
Adjusted EBITDA (company)$316M $437M $545M $478M Above target
Economic Profit (company)$(3)M $88M $169M $109M Above target

Long-Term Incentives (LTI)

Grant YearInstrumentGrant Value ($)Performance MetricVesting
2024PSUs$550,000 3-year ROIC (with ±20% TSR modifier vs capital market peer group) Cliff vest on 3rd anniversary (12/31/2026 performance period)
2024RSUs$550,000 Time-based3 equal annual installments from 2/8/2025
2023PSUsIncluded in 2023 LTI; value disclosed in total3-year cumulative Adjusted EBITDA (2023–2025) with TSR modifier Cliff on 3rd anniversary
2022PSUs/RSUsIncluded in 2022 LTIAdjusted EBITDA for PSUs (company/segment basis); RSUs time-based; 2022 awards may be settled in cash or stock (administrator discretion)

Capital market peer group for TSR modifier includes A. O. Smith, Armstrong World, Boise Cascade, CSW Industrials, Fortune Brands, James Hardie, Lennox, Masco, Owens Corning, Simpson Mfg, Summit Materials, Trex, UFP Industries, West Fraser Timber .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial Ownership

DateShares Beneficially Owned% of Shares Outstanding
March 1, 202386,245 <1%
March 12, 202496,479 <1%
  • Executive stock ownership guidelines: EVP multiple = 3x base salary; RSUs and certain time-based awards count; performance-conditioned PSUs and options/SSARs do not count. All NEOs met guidelines for 2023 .
  • Anti-hedging and anti-pledging: Short sales, options, collars, swaps, forwards, exchange funds prohibited unless pre-approved; pledging prohibited unless approved in writing . Insider trading policy requires pre-clearance and treats gifts/pledges as sales .
  • Deferred Compensation Plan: Executives may defer up to 90% of base and bonus; 5% employer match; balances paid per election .

Outstanding Equity and Vesting Pressure (as of 12/31/2024)

ItemAmount
Unvested RSUs (#)15,874
Market value of unvested RSUs ($)$1,643,790 (at $103.55/share)
Unearned PSUs (#, based on actual-to-date and next-higher level assumption)11,461
Market/payout value of PSUs ($, at target assumption)$1,186,807 (at $103.55/share)

RSU tranche vesting schedule:

Vest DateShares
2/8/20252,683
2/10/20254,959
2/8/20262,682
2/10/20262,869
2/8/20272,682
Total15,874

These scheduled RSU vests can create near-term selling pressure to cover taxes; value calculated using $103.55 closing price on 12/31/2024 .

Employment Terms

  • Severance and change-of-control agreements: LP maintains severance and CoC employment agreements for executive officers; post-2022 equity awards provide double-trigger vesting upon CoC if assumed; PSUs/RSUs have defined retirement and disability treatment .
  • Clawback/recoupment: Legacy policy permits recovery/cancellation upon restatement tied to fraud or intentional misconduct; company indicated updates in light of SEC clawback rules and NYSE standards .

Potential Payments (estimated if event on 12/31/2024)

Triggering EventPayments Earned but Unpaid ($)Severance Payments ($)Equity Awards ($)Other Benefits ($)Total ($)
Termination by LP for Cause or by NEO Without Good Reason$54,470 $204,553 $259,023
Termination by LP Without Cause or by NEO for Good Reason$479,337 (incl. pro‑rata AIP) $1,534,350 $2,452,758 (PSUs at target; RSUs at 12/31/24 price) $214,553 $4,680,998
Death or Disability$479,337 $3,969,331 $204,553 $4,653,220
Termination Following a Change of Control$479,337 $3,079,351 $4,017,403 $261,202 $7,837,292
Change of Control Not Resulting in Termination$4,017,403 $4,017,403
Retirement$54,470 $204,553 $259,023

Notes:

  • Equity values based on $103.55 closing price on 12/31/2024; PSUs calculated at target .
  • Other benefits include vested deferred compensation balances; paid per distribution selection .

Governance, Peer Benchmarking, and Shareholder Feedback

  • Say-on-pay approval: Over 95% “FOR” at 2024 annual meeting, indicating strong shareholder support .
  • Compensation emphasis: Variable pay remains substantial; 2024 PSU metric shifted to ROIC with TSR modifier; committee maintains caps and stock ownership guidelines to mitigate risk .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: High equity exposure with scheduled RSU vests and multi-year PSUs linked to ROIC and relative TSR indicates strong pay-for-performance alignment; compliance with 3x salary ownership guideline reinforces skin-in-the-game .
  • Near-term trading signals: RSU vest tranches on 2/8 and 2/10 each year through 2027 may trigger tax-related sell-to-cover activity; unvested RSUs/PSUs totaling ~27,335 units at 12/31/2024 represent material forthcoming issuance potential .
  • Retention risk: Promotion to President with higher base ($800k), 90% AIP target, and incremental $1.5M LTI grants materially improves retention incentives and succession continuity; formal severance/CoC protections further reduce voluntary departure risk .
  • Execution risk: Consolidation of operations under Ringblom increases scope and decision velocity; successful delivery against ROIC/TSR PSU metrics and AIP goals will be key levers for value creation; committee’s discretion to reduce AIP payouts adds downside governance discipline .