Tony Hamill
LOUISIANA-PACIFICAbout Tony Hamill
LP’s 2025 proxy and 2024 proxy list the named executive officers (NEOs) and do not include Tony Hamill; the 2024 Form 10-K “Information About Our Executive Officers” likewise does not list a Tony/Anthony Hamill among LP’s executive officers. As a result, LP has not disclosed any background, age, tenure, biography, compensation, or ownership information for Tony Hamill in its SEC filings for 2024–2025. The NEOs disclosed for 2024 are W. Bradley Southern (CEO), Alan J.M. Haughie (CFO), Jason P. Ringblom (EVP, Siding), Jimmy E. Mason (EVP, OSB), and Nicole C. Daniel (SVP, General Counsel) . Company context: LP’s 2024 performance was strong—net sales $2.9B (+14% YoY), net income $420M, adjusted EBITDA $688M, adjusted diluted EPS $5.88, and operating cash flow $605M—providing backdrop for incentive payouts to disclosed NEOs .
No LP filings identify Tony Hamill as an LP executive officer or NEO; therefore, Tony-specific compensation, employment, ownership, and performance disclosures are not available in SEC documents reviewed .
Past Roles
Not disclosed in LP filings. Executive officers identified in 2024–2025 filings do not include Tony Hamill .
External Roles
Not disclosed in LP filings for Tony Hamill. Executive officers identified do not include Tony Hamill .
Fixed Compensation
LP’s executive pay framework (applies to disclosed NEO roles; Tony Hamill is not disclosed):
| Role | Target Bonus % of Base Salary | Corporate Financial Weighting | Business Unit Weighting | 2024 Attainment – Corporate (% of Target) | 2024 Attainment – BU (% of Target) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CEO | 120% | 70% (Adj. EBITDA 35%, Economic Profit 35%) | 30% (BU Economic Profit components) | 200% | 172% |
| EVP, CFO | 80% | 70% (Adj. EBITDA 35%, Economic Profit 35%) | 30% (BU Economic Profit components) | 200% | 172% |
| EVP, GM Siding | 75% | 40% (Adj. EBITDA 20%, Economic Profit 20%) | 60% (Adj. EBITDA 30%, Economic Profit 30%) | 200% | 200% |
| EVP, GM OSB | 75% | 40% (Adj. EBITDA 20%, Economic Profit 20%) | 60% (Adj. EBITDA 30%, Economic Profit 30%) | 200% | 200% |
| SVP, General Counsel | 70% | 70% (Adj. EBITDA 35%, Economic Profit 35%) | 30% (BU Economic Profit components) | 200% | 172% |
Compensation philosophy targets median market positioning across base salary, cash incentive, and long-term equity; the Compensation Committee uses FW Cook and peer benchmarks to set pay .
Performance Compensation
Long-term incentive design (company-wide program terms):
| Award Type | Metric | Period | Target/Modifier | Vesting/Settlement | Change-of-Control Treatment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs | ROIC (three-year), with TSR modifier ±20% (cap at 200% of target; no adjustment if TSR between 25th–75th percentile) | 2024–2026 | Target at grant; TSR modifies achieved payout within bounds | Vests on 3rd anniversary; settled in LP common stock | Double-trigger vesting if awards assumed; if not assumed, immediate vesting per adjusted/actual rules |
| RSUs | Time-based | 3 annual tranches beginning first anniversary | N/A | Settled in LP common stock | Double-trigger vesting if awards assumed; immediate vest if not assumed |
Annual incentive metrics are objective financial goals—Adjusted EBITDA and Economic Profit—weighted by role (see Fixed Compensation table). The Compensation Committee emphasizes variable compensation with payouts linked to pre-set financial metrics .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Policy/Guideline | Detail |
|---|---|
| Anti-hedging/Anti-pledging | Prohibits short sales, options (puts/calls), prepaid variable forwards, swaps, collars, exchange funds; discourages standing/limit orders; pledging prohibited . |
| Insider Trading Policy | Filed as Exhibit 19 to LP’s 2024 Form 10-K; governs director/officer/employee trading . |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | CEO: 5× base salary; EVP: 3×; SVP: 2×. Restricted stock and time-based RSUs count; PSUs and options do not. All NEOs met guidelines in 2024 . |
| Deferred Compensation Plan | Executives may defer up to 90% of base and bonus; 5% employer match; designed to complement qualified plans . |
| Beneficial Ownership Table | Discloses shares held by directors/NEOs; Tony Hamill not listed among directors/NEOs as of March 10, 2025 . |
Employment Terms
Key severance and change-of-control economics for NEOs (company program terms):
| Scenario | Cash Severance Multiple | Bonus Treatment | RSU Treatment | PSU Treatment | Benefits/Other | Restrictive Covenants |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination without cause / Good reason | CEO: 2×; other NEOs: 1.5× of base + target bonus | Pro-rata target AIP for year of termination | Immediate vesting in full | Pro-rata based on days employed and actual performance at period end | COBRA reimbursement (CEO 24 months; others 18), outplacement (CEO up to 24 months; others up to 18, to $10k), plus plan benefits | Non-compete and non-solicit: 24 months for CEO; 18 months for other NEOs; release required |
| Change of control termination (double-trigger) | 3× sum of base + target bonus | Pro-rata target AIP for year of CoC | Immediate vest (if assumed, upon termination; if not assumed, prior to CoC) | Immediate vest per adjusted award or actual (depending on timing and assumption) | 36 months cash value of welfare benefits; 12 months outplacement up to 10% of base; standard benefits | CoC agreements supersede severance; restrictive covenants cease under CoC agreements |
| Change of control (no termination) | Maintain comp/benefits at least as favorable; base ≥ 12× highest recent monthly base; bonus ≥ target for year | Target-level access | If assumed: follow original schedule; if not assumed: immediate vest pre-CoC | If assumed: vest per adjusted award; if not assumed: immediate vest (greater of target or adjusted award, subject to performance timing) | Continued participation in plans and benefits; reimbursement per policy | N/A |
| Death/Disability | Pro-rata target AIP | 2023/2024 RSUs vest in full; 2022 RSUs pro-rata | 2022 PSUs pro-rata target; 2023/2024 PSUs target or actual if period ended | Long-term disability/life insurance benefits | N/A | |
| Retirement | Detailed RSU/PSU vesting rules based on grant year and service beyond first anniversary; PSUs vest on original schedule reflecting earned performance if service conditions met | Pro-rata target AIP | See year-specific rules | See year-specific rules | Plan balances per elections | N/A |
Governance safeguards: NYSE-compliant clawback policy referenced in 10-K exhibits and a broader compensation recoupment policy for misconduct linked to restatements .
Investment Implications
- No Tony Hamill disclosure: LP filings do not identify Tony Hamill as an executive officer or NEO; thus, there is no investor-grade, person-specific compensation, ownership, or employment-term data to analyze. Any trading or retention conclusions specific to Tony Hamill cannot be supported by LP’s SEC disclosures .
- Program levers for LP executives are investor-friendly: heavy variable pay tied to Adjusted EBITDA/Economic Profit and ROIC PSUs with a TSR modifier, strict anti-hedging/anti-pledging, rigorous ownership guidelines (all NEOs met), robust clawback/recoupment policies—signals of alignment that generally reduce misalignment and hedging/pledging risk .
- Retention economics: Double-trigger 3× CIC cash multiple and broad equity acceleration can mitigate turnover risk in a transaction but imply cost and potential supply overhang when RSUs/PSUs vest. Non-compete/non-solicit terms (24/18 months) and severance (2×/1.5×) inform baseline retention dynamics for actual NEOs; Tony-specific terms are unavailable .
- Shareholder sentiment: Say-on-pay support exceeded 95% in 2024, indicating broad approval of current pay structure and metrics—a positive governance signal for LP’s executive compensation framework .