Jorn Lambert
MastercardAbout Jorn Lambert
Jorn Lambert is Mastercard’s Chief Product Officer (CPO) since May 2024 and a member of the company’s Management Committee; he previously served as Chief Digital Officer (2020–2024), EVP Digital Solutions (2018–2020), EVP Digital Channels (2013–2018), and Group Head, Emerging Payments, Europe (2002–2013). He is 53, with prior business experience at Clearstream . Company performance context during his recent tenure: in 2024, GAAP net revenue was $28.2B (+12%), GAAP net income $12.9B (+15%), GAAP diluted EPS $13.89 (+17%); adjusted (currency-neutral) metrics also rose, and say‑on‑pay support was 95%; Mastercard’s stock price increased from $86.16 (Dec 31, 2014) to $526.57 (Dec 31, 2024), a 6× gain .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mastercard | Chief Product Officer | May 2024–present | Senior executive on the Management Committee, which ensures alignment and implementation of key business decisions across the enterprise |
| Mastercard | Chief Digital Officer | 2020–2024 | Led digital strategy and execution across products/channels |
| Mastercard | EVP, Digital Solutions | 2018–2020 | Senior leadership over digital product solutions |
| Mastercard | EVP, Digital Channels | 2013–2018 | Senior leadership over digital channels |
| Mastercard | Group Head, Emerging Payments (Europe) | 2002–2013 | Built/managed emerging payments initiatives across Europe |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Clearstream | Various roles | Not disclosed | Prior business experience; foundation for digital/payments leadership |
Fixed Compensation
- Program architecture: Base salary reviewed annually; executives participate in annual and long-term incentive plans (SEAICP and LTIP) determined by the HRCC; majority of TDC is variable and equity‑based, with strong pay‑for‑performance design .
- Governance practices: No hedging/pledging of Mastercard stock; robust clawback and forfeiture policies; use of independent consultant; appropriate peer group benchmarking; no option repricing .
- Individual cash compensation (salary/bonus) for Jorn Lambert is not disclosed (he is not a Named Executive Officer in recent proxies) .
Performance Compensation
| Incentive element | FY 2024 design | FY 2025 changes | Vesting/settlement |
|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Incentive (SEAICP) | Corporate score funded vs metrics: Adjusted net income (67%), Adjusted net revenue (33%); capped payouts; ESG/strategic modifiers historically used | ESG modifier removed in 2025; priorities remain evaluated in strategy | Cash payout per plan; not an equity award |
| PSUs (60% of LTI) | Three 1‑year adjusted net revenue (50%) and adjusted EPS growth (50%) averaged over 3‑year period; TSR modifier vs S&P 500 up to ±50%; payout 0–200%; mandatory one‑year post‑vest holding; no dividends pre‑vest | TSR modifier target raised to 55th percentile; negative TSR cap set at 100%; financial score range increased to 0–200%; max payout unchanged (200%) | Vests at end of 3‑year performance; settlement deferred for 1 year (post‑vest hold) |
| Stock Options (20% of LTI) | 10‑year term; strike at grant date close; vest in three equal annual installments; performance‑based via stock appreciation; no dividends | No structural change noted; annual grant continues with same vesting/exercise price policy | 33⅓% per year over 3 years |
| RSUs (20% of LTI) | Vest in three equal annual installments; designed for retention and ownership alignment | No structural change noted; annual grant continues with same vesting policy | 33⅓% per year over 3 years |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Policy | Requirement | Details |
|---|---|---|
| Stock ownership requirement | Management Committee members: 2× base salary | Executives must retain at least 50% of net shares from RSU/PSU vestings until compliant |
| Executive Leadership Team ownership | 4× base salary | Higher requirement applies to ELT roles; NEO levels are higher (e.g., CEO 6×) |
| PSU post‑vest holding | Mandatory one‑year hold | PSUs accrue dividend equivalents during deferred settlement period; no pre‑vest dividends |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited | Explicitly banned for Mastercard stock |
| Individual ownership disclosure | Not disclosed for Jorn Lambert | Beneficial ownership tables list directors/NEOs; all directors and executive officers as a group held 773,062 shares as of April 7, 2025 |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Term | Applicability/Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Mandatory retirement | Required at end of calendar year when executive turns 65 | Applies to executives broadly |
| Restrictive covenants | Non‑disclosure, non‑compete, non‑solicit | Standard for executive employees; additional non‑compete agreements apply to receive LTI and severance/CoC benefits |
| Non‑compete / non‑solicit (LTI) | 12‑month non‑compete; 18‑month non‑solicit | Violation can require repayment of specified gains/vested equity from prior 2 years |
| Severance plan covenants | Longer of 18 months or severance length | Agreement executed within 60 days post‑termination |
| Change‑in‑control plan covenants | Two‑year non‑compete/non‑solicit | “Double‑trigger” required for payments |
| Change‑in‑control mechanics | Awards continue to vest; if PSUs can’t be measured post‑CoC, they vest on schedule at target; if terminated within 6 months before/2 years after CoC without cause, immediate vesting at target for PSUs | Company‑wide plan language; NEO tables quantify payouts; individual terms for non‑NEOs not separately disclosed |
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Ownership requirements (2× base for Management Committee), mandatory PSU holding, and anti‑hedging/pledging reduce misalignment and near‑term selling pressure, supporting longer‑term value focus .
- Pay‑for‑performance: Lambert’s equity mix will be heavily PSU/RSU/options with PSU metrics tied to adjusted revenue/EPS and TSR modifiers, embedding top‑/bottom‑line discipline and market‑relative returns; changes in 2025 strengthen the TSR hurdle and cap payouts in negative TSR scenarios .
- Retention risk: Three‑year vesting across equity, one‑year PSU post‑vest holding, and restrictive covenants/non‑compete obligations raise switching costs; mandatory retirement at 65 defines horizon for senior executives .
- Change‑of‑control economics: Company uses “double‑trigger” across plans, limiting windfalls; PSU target treatment if goals become unmeasurable post‑CoC balances participant certainty with shareholder discipline .
- Disclosure gap: As a non‑NEO, Lambert’s individual salary/bonus/equity grant values and personal shareholdings are not itemized in proxies, constraining granular pay‑for‑performance analysis; monitor Form 4 filings for trading/ownership changes and SEAICP/LTIP communications for role‑specific targets when available .
Company context underpinning execution: 2024 delivered double‑digit revenue/EPS growth, strong cash generation, and robust shareholder support for pay practices, indicative of a compensation framework aligned with performance and governance norms .