Robert DelPriore
About Robert DelPriore
Robert J. DelPriore is EVP, Chief Administrative Officer and General Counsel at MAA; age 57, he joined MAA in August 2013 as EVP & General Counsel, developed the internal Legal Department, and later added oversight of the Commercial Division and Enterprise Risk Management before being promoted to EVP & CAO in early 2022 . 2024 company performance tied to his incentives: Core FFO per Share was $8.88 (at target), SS NOI Growth was -1.4% (between threshold and target), and FAD was $745.48 million (between target and maximum); 1-year TSR was 19.9% vs 20.5% for the Dow Jones U.S. Real Estate Apartments Index and 25.0% for the S&P 500, and the 2022 LTIP 3‑yr relative TSR paid 0% (below threshold) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| MAA | EVP & General Counsel | 2013–early 2022 | Built internal Legal Department; added Enterprise Risk Management and Commercial Division responsibilities |
| MAA | EVP, Chief Administrative Officer & General Counsel | Early 2022–present | Corporate administration and legal oversight; risk management; commercial operations governance |
| Private practice of law (counsel to MAA) | Counsel | Prior to 2013 | Provided legal counsel to MAA prior to joining |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| None disclosed | — | — | No public company directorships disclosed for DelPriore in the proxy |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 Amount | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary (set by Committee) | $583,018 | Target base salary approved for 2024 |
| Salary Received (cash paid) | $582,259 | Actual salary paid in 2024 |
| Summary Compensation Table – Salary | $582,259 | 2024 SCT salary |
| Summary Compensation Table – Stock Awards (ASC 718) | $1,496,421 | 2024 LTIP grant-date fair value |
| Summary Compensation Table – Non‑Equity Incentive Plan (AIP cash) | $729,498 | 2024 AIP payout |
| Summary Compensation Table – All Other Compensation | $118,326 | Deferred comp and 401(k) matches/dividends on unvested RSUs |
| Summary Compensation Table – Total | $2,927,004 | 2024 SCT total compensation |
Performance Compensation
| Plan | Metric | Weighting/Target Structure | Target | Actual | Payout vs Target | Vesting / Form |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 AIP (cash) | Core FFO per Share | 50% of salary for NEOs (threshold/target/max: 12.5%/50%/100%) | $8.88 | $8.88 | 100% | Cash paid in early 2025; DelPriore earned $378,961 |
| 2024 AIP (cash) | SS NOI Growth | 25% of salary (6.25%/25%/50%); threshold -2.80%, target -1.30% | -1.30% | -1.40% | 95% | Cash; DelPriore earned $180,004 |
| 2024 AIP (cash) | Individual Functional Goals | 25% of salary (22.5%/22.5%/28.13%) | N/A | Goals assessed | 90% | Cash; DelPriore earned $170,533; goals included risk, smart-lock oversight, commercial leasing, privacy compliance, sustainability |
| 2024 LTIP (equity) | Service-based RSUs | 55% of salary (target) | $320,660 | Stock price uplift applied | 117% | RSUs vest 33.33% annually over 3 years; 2,426 service RSUs granted 1/4/2024 |
| 2024 LTIP (equity) | FAD performance RSUs | 20.63%/82.50%/123.75% of salary (thr/target/max) | $741.09m | $745.48m | 132% | Earned PSUs issued 4/1/2025; vest 50%/50% over 2 years; 4,119 shares for DelPriore |
| 2022 LTIP (equity) | 3‑yr relative TSR vs Dow Jones Apt Index | 34.37%/137.50%/275% of salary (thr -400bps / target index / max +400bps) | Index benchmark | Below threshold | 0% | No award earned for any NEO for 2022 LTIP TSR |
Additional 2024 target and maximum structures:
- 2024 AIP target for DelPriore: Core FFO $378,961; SS NOI $189,481; Functional $189,481; total $757,923 .
- 2024 LTIP target for DelPriore: Service $320,660; FAD $480,990; 3‑yr TSR $801,650; total $1,603,300 .
- 2024 AIP maximums for DelPriore: Core FFO $757,923; SS NOI $378,961; Functional $236,880; total $1,373,764 .
- 2024 LTIP maximums for DelPriore: Service $320,660; FAD $721,485; 3‑yr TSR $1,603,299; total $2,645,444 .
- Grants of plan‑based awards (approved 12/12/2023 AIP; 1/4/2024 LTIP): AIP threshold/target/max $331,620/$757,923/$1,373,764; LTIP shares threshold/target/max 4,852/12,130/20,016; fair value $1,496,421 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership | 53,969 shares beneficially owned; percent of class less than 1% |
| Shares acquired on vesting (2024) | 12,283 shares; value realized $1,586,896 |
| Unvested RSUs (as of 12/31/2024) | 3,221 shares total: 2022 LTIP 1/4/2022 unvested 437; 2022 LTIP 4/1/2023 unvested 1,474; 2023 LTIP 1/4/2023 unvested 1,310 |
| Options outstanding | None; no NEOs hold stock options |
| Ownership guidelines | NEOs must own ≥2× base salary within 3 years; all NEOs in compliance |
| Holding requirement | Must retain ≥50% of net shares until retirement/termination or NEO status ends; 100% compliance |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited: hedging, short sales, derivatives, margin use, pledging; no exceptions allowed prospectively; after the Annual Meeting, no directors or executive officers will have pledged shares |
Selected vesting schedule details:
- 2024 Service RSUs issued 1/4/2024: 2,426 shares; vest 33.33% annually on each anniversary .
- 2024 FAD PSUs earned/issued 4/1/2025: 4,119 shares; vest 50% on each anniversary of 4/1/2025 and 4/1/2026 .
- Prior awards (examples): 2022 LTIP 4/1/2023 issue 2,947 shares, vest 50% annually from 4/1/2024 (1,474 unvested at 12/31/2024); 2023 LTIP 1/4/2023 issue 1,964 RSUs, vest 33.33% annually from 1/4/2024 (1,310 unvested) .
Employment Terms
| Agreement Type | Key Terms | Economics |
|---|---|---|
| Employment agreement | None; only CEO has an employment agreement | — |
| Change-in-control agreement | Applies to DelPriore; double-trigger termination by MAA without cause or by NEO for good reason in anticipation of/on/within specified period after a change in control; no single‑trigger agreements | 2.99× base salary ($1,743,224), 2.99× bonus ($3,099,326; average of prior two years), pro‑rated bonus ($757,923), accelerated equity awards ($6,805,253), insurance ($26,281); total $12,432,007 (values at $154.57 stock price as of 12/31/2024) |
| Termination without cause / good reason (no CIC) | NEOs (other than CEO) receive no cash severance; only certain equity awards per plan terms | Equity awards value: $3,824,750; total $3,824,750 for DelPriore |
| Clawback policy | Restatement-based recoupment of incentive-based compensation paid in preceding 3 years | |
| Tax gross-ups | No tax gross‑ups for excess parachute payments | |
| Deferred compensation | Employer match to Executive Deferred Compensation Plan $45,845 (2024); 401(k) match $13,800; total other compensation $118,326; 401(k) balance $428,471 |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- 2024 base salary increased 3.5% (cost of living) for DelPriore; no changes to Target AIP or Target LTIP multiples vs prior year .
- Majority of compensation is performance‑based and equity; AIP paid at Core FFO 100%, SS NOI 95%, functional goals 90%; LTIP service 117%, FAD 132%, TSR 0%—clear linkage to operational/market outcomes .
- No options outstanding; shift historically toward RSUs/PSUs with explicit vesting and at‑risk forfeiture; dividends on unvested service RSUs accrue; PSUs do not accrue dividends during performance period .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Strong prohibitions on hedging/pledging and a 50% net‑share holding requirement plus 2× salary ownership guideline reduce misalignment risk and dampen forced selling pressure around vest dates; management reports full compliance .
- Near‑term equity deliveries: DelPriore has ~3,221 unvested RSUs and 4,119 FAD PSUs issued 4/1/2025 that vest over 2025–2026, creating scheduled equity deliveries; however, mandated retention mitigates wholesale disposals .
- Pay-for-performance: AIP/PSU outcomes tracked operational metrics (Core FFO at target; SS NOI below target; FAD above target) and market TSR paid 0%, signaling discipline and reducing windfall risk; watch SS NOI recovery to drive AIP and PSU payouts in 2025 .
- Change‑in‑control economics: Double‑trigger CIC terms with 2.99× multiples plus accelerated equity create meaningful retention but also sizable potential exit cost ($12.43 million for DelPriore), relevant for M&A scenarios and potential governance scrutiny; no single trigger and no tax gross‑ups are positives .