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John McGinnis

Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer at ManpowerGroupManpowerGroup
Executive

About John McGinnis

John “Jack” T. McGinnis is Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of ManpowerGroup, appointed in February 2016; he oversees worldwide finance, internal audit, enterprise risk, information security and privacy, and strategic sourcing, and in March 2025 also assumed responsibility for Global Technology, Information Security & Data Privacy, and Enterprise-wide Transformation . He holds a BBA in public accounting from Loyola University Chicago, is a CPA (Illinois), and has completed executive education at Harvard Business School . Age disclosed as 58 in 2025 investor materials . Company 2024 performance used in incentive calculations: EPS as calculated under comp plans $4.33, ROIC 6.8%, revenue $18.3B, and Adjusted EBITA Margin Percent 2.26% .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
ManpowerGroupEVP & CFO2016–presentGlobal finance leadership; broadened remit to technology, infosec, privacy, and transformation (March 2025)
Morgan StanleyGlobal Controller2014–2016Led financial accounting/controls, SEC/regulatory reporting, FP&A for large U.S. bank
HSBC North America Holdings / HSBC Bank USACFO, Controller2010–2014 (various)CFO roles across NA and US bank; strengthened reporting and control environment
Ernst & YoungPartner (earlier Senior Manager)1989–2000sAudit/Advisory leadership across US and Canada

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
ManpowerGroup Greater China LimitedDirectorCurrentGovernance for Greater China JV/affiliate
City Year MilwaukeeExecutive Board memberCurrentCommunity investment and education impact

Fixed Compensation

Metric202220232024
Salary ($)746,750 769,153 769,153
Stock Awards ($) (Grant-date fair value)5,499,981 3,000,035 3,073,437
Non-Equity Incentive ($)740,000 296,354 349,700
All Other Compensation ($)126,301 132,293 79,056
Total ($)7,113,032 4,197,835 4,271,346

Additional comps/updates:

  • Target bonus opportunity: 110% of salary (threshold 37%, outstanding 220%) .
  • 2025 adjustment: base salary increased to $808,000 given expanded remit .

Performance Compensation

ComponentWeightingTargetActual/PayoutVesting
Annual EPS25% $6.67 Below threshold; payout 0% Cash, annual
Annual ROIC25% 9.7% 6.8%; below threshold; payout 0% Cash, annual
Annual Revenue20% $19.0B $18.3B (between threshold/target); payout 12.7% of salary ($97,759) Cash, annual
Strategic KPIs30% Committee-setBelow target; payout 32.8% of salary ($251,941) Cash, annual
PSUs (2022–2024 cycle)Predominant LTI EBITA Margin % avg; gate; KPI modifier (pre-2024) 2.80% average EBITA Margin; payout 62% of target; McGinnis PSUs earned 11,402 (incl. dividend equivalents) Earned based on 3-year performance; settled Feb 2025
PSUs (granted 2024)60% of LTI EBITA Margin % avg with rTSR modifier (+/−25%) In-flight (2024–2026)3-year, subject to EBITA gate and rTSR modifier
RSUs (granted 2024)40% of LTI N/AGranted 17,058 units; fair value $1,200,030 3-year cliff vest; dividend equivalents

Equity Ownership & Alignment

MetricValue
Beneficial ownership (common)223,263 shares
Right to acquire within 60 days140,196 shares (options/vested RSUs)
Ownership as % of shares outstanding<1% (company notes “* Less than 1%”)
Executive ownership guideline4× salary; target value $2,400,000; target shares 32,994
Shares counted for guideline (as of 12/31/2024)140,961; status: in compliance (√)
Hedging/pledgingProhibited for all covered persons (incl. executives)

Outstanding equity (12/31/2024) summary:

  • RSUs unvested: 12,261 (vesting 2025), 14,738 (vesting 2026), 17,812 (vesting 2027), career shares 25,544 (vesting 2027); market values at 12/31/2024 provided in proxy .
  • PSUs in-flight (target-level): 22,107 (vesting 2026 with KPI modifier) and 26,717 (vesting 2027 with rTSR modifier) .
  • Options outstanding: multiple legacy grants (e.g., strikes $75.07–$122.87; expiries 2026–2031); all unvested options out-of-the-money at $57.72 on 12/31/2024 .

Employment Terms

ProvisionTerms
Severance (no change-in-control)Lump sum equals base salary + target annual incentive; CFO capped at 2× base salary
Change-in-control (double trigger)3× (base + target incentive) for CFO; health benefits for 18 months; outplacement up to one year
Prorated bonus upon qualifying terminationProrated based on year of termination (actual financial metrics + target for KPIs for certain scenarios)
Equity treatmentDeath/disability: options/RSUs vest; PSUs at target; retirement and CoC treatments as specified (PSUs pro-rata or target; RSUs vest per policy)
Non-compete1-year post-termination (exceptions in certain CoC scenarios)
ClawbackSenior Executive Compensation Recovery Policy compliant with SEC/NYSE; broad-based recovery policy for non-senior employees
Hedging/PledgingProhibited; no tax gross-ups; double-trigger required for CoC benefits

Investment Implications

  • Pay-for-performance alignment: 2024 annual incentive heavily reduced by below-threshold EPS and ROIC, with revenue delivering only partial payout; PSUs paid 62% for the 2022–2024 cycle on EBITA Margin, reinforcing profitability-focused long-term incentives .
  • Enhanced shareholder alignment: 2024 PSU grants add an rTSR modifier (+/−25%), increasing sensitivity to relative stock performance; executive ownership guidelines are met, requiring 4× salary for the CFO and limiting share sales until compliant .
  • Selling pressure risk appears contained: legacy options were out-of-the-money at year-end 2024, and corporate policy prohibits hedging/pledging; RSU/PSU vesting creates scheduled supply but with strong ownership limits and performance-dependence .
  • Retention/transition considerations: Severance is competitive (3× under CoC, double-trigger), non-compete is one year, and 2025 salary increase reflects expanded remit (technology and transformation), suggesting organizational reliance and retention focus .

2024 company metrics used in incentive calculations (EPS $4.33; ROIC 6.8%; revenue $18.3B; Adjusted EBITA Margin % 2.26%) underscore a challenging environment and explain reduced cash incentive payouts, while the shift to rTSR in PSUs raises performance beta to shareholder returns .