Jeff Raich
Moelis &About Jeff Raich
Jeffrey Raich, 58, is Co-President and Managing Director of Moelis & Company; he is a Co‑Founder and has served as Co‑President since September 2015 and as a Managing Director since 2007. He previously served as a Director from April 2014 to April 2021. Raich holds a B.S. in Commerce with Distinction from the University of Virginia’s McIntire School of Commerce. The Compensation Committee evaluates his pay with emphasis on firmwide performance and his direct revenue contributions as an experienced M&A banker with deep private equity relationships; firm policy emphasizes variable, equity‑linked pay and multi‑year vesting/sale restrictions to align incentives and retention .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| UBS | Joint Global Head of Mergers & Acquisitions | 2001–2007 | Senior leadership of global M&A franchise |
| Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette (DLJ) | Managing Director; Head of West Coast M&A | 1996–2000 | Expanded West Coast M&A coverage and deal execution |
| PaineWebber | Investment Banker | 1989–1996 | Began career; foundational transaction experience (moved to DLJ in 1996) |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| UVA McIntire School of Commerce | Advisory Board Member | Not disclosed | Academic/industry linkage; talent and curriculum input |
| UCLA Health System | Board Member | Not disclosed | Healthcare sector insights; community engagement |
| UCLA Lung Health Advisory Board | Co‑Chair | Not disclosed | Healthcare advocacy; strategic advisory |
| The Posse Foundation | National Board of Directors | Not disclosed | Education access; nonprofit governance |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 400,000 | 400,000 | 400,000 |
| Cash Bonus ($) | 30,000 | 100,000 | 300,000 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 9,150 | 10,720 | 12,720 |
| Total ($) | 5,978,043 | 2,595,072 | 3,219,346 |
Notes:
- Employment agreement (April 2014) sets base salary at $400,000 and eligibility for discretionary annual bonus; Raich can terminate anytime; company may terminate only for “cause” .
Performance Compensation
Summary of Stock Awards ($)
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Awards ($) | 5,538,893 | 2,084,352 | 2,506,626 |
Grants and Vesting/Redemption Schedules
| Grant Date | Instrument | Units (#) | Grant Date Fair Value ($) | Vesting/Redemption Terms |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feb 2022 (for 2021 perf.) | Restricted LP Units | 82,109 | Not disclosed | Vests in equal installments on Feb 23 of 2025–2027 |
| Feb 2022 (for 2021 perf.) | Three‑Year Deferred LP Units | 34,094 | Not disclosed | Vested at grant; restricted 3 years |
| Feb 2023 (for 2022 perf.) | Deferred LP Units | 56,273 | Not disclosed | Eligible for redemption/exchange: 40% on ~Feb 23, 2025; 20% each on Feb 23 of 2026–2028 |
| Feb 2021 (for 2020 perf.) | Restricted LP Units | 32,986 | Not disclosed | Vests in equal installments on Feb 23 of 2025 and 2026 |
| Feb 2020 (for 2019 perf.) | RSUs + Dividend Equivalents | 13,018 + 5,740 | Not disclosed | 100% vesting on Feb 23, 2025 |
| Feb 15, 2024 (for 2023 perf.) | Deferred LP Units | 54,898 | 2,506,626 | Redemption/exchange: 40% on Feb 23, 2026; 20% each on Feb 23 of 2027–2029 |
| Feb 13, 2025 (for 2024 perf.) | Deferred LP Units + Restricted LTI LP Units | 35,705 + 12,751 | 3,221,857 (aggregate) | LTI LP Units vest 33% on Feb 23 of 2028, 2029, 2030; Deferred LP Units redemption: 40% on or about Feb 23, 2027; 20% each on or about Feb 23 of 2028–2030 (award terms) |
Additional program features:
- No stock options or SARs granted; equity is delivered via LP Units and RSUs with five‑year vesting or multi‑year sale restrictions designed to align long‑term value creation .
- Clawback policy consistent with SEC/NYSE rules; RSUs/LP Units forfeited for detrimental activities; continued vesting or acceleration under certain termination/CoC scenarios (see Employment Terms) .
Stock Vested in 2024
| Name | Shares Acquired on Vesting (#) | Value Realized ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Jeffrey Raich | 84,875 | 4,464,435 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership – Class A shares | 54,794 shares; <0.1% of Class A outstanding |
| Shares outstanding basis | 74,183,429 Class A; 4,324,418 Class B at record date |
| Outstanding unvested RSUs/Restricted LP Units (12/31/2024) | 101,010 units; market value $7,462,586 (at $73.88) |
| Alternative outstanding incl. Deferred LP Units (12/31/2024) | 246,275 units; market value $18,194,765 (at $73.88) |
| Hedging policy | Hedging of company stock prohibited |
| Pledging policy | Pledging company stock prohibited |
| Ownership guideline | Each NEO owns equity >5x base salary (indicative of alignment) |
Notes:
- LP Units (including Deferred) are profits interests redeemable for Class A shares once conditions are met; redemption subject to sale restrictions and non‑compete/forfeiture provisions .
Employment Terms
| Term | Details |
|---|---|
| Agreement date | April 2014 employment agreement |
| Base salary & bonus | $400,000 base; eligible for discretionary annual performance bonus |
| Senior committee rights | Right to be a member of Group LP’s most senior decision/policy committee (Group Management Committee) during employment |
| Termination rights | Executive may terminate at any time; company may terminate only for “cause” (as defined) |
| Non‑solicit | 6 months post‑termination for employees/contractors/suppliers |
| Severance | No contractual entitlements to severance; historically no guarantees |
| Equity treatment – RSUs/Restricted LP Units | Continued vesting after termination without cause/good reason/disability; immediate vesting upon death; CoC: immediate vesting if termination within 12 months after CoC |
| Equity treatment – Deferred LP Units | Vested at grant but subject to sale/transfer/non‑compete restrictions; undelivered units forfeited for cause or detrimental activity |
| Clawback | Recovery of erroneously awarded compensation for financial restatements per SEC/NYSE |
Potential Payments upon Termination or Change in Control (Equity only; as of 12/31/2024)
| Scenario | Incremental Value ($) |
|---|---|
| Termination without cause (continuation of vesting) | 7,462,586 |
| Retirement (continuation of vesting) | 7,462,586 |
| Disability (continuation of vesting) | 7,462,586 |
| Death (acceleration) | 7,462,586 |
| Change in control (acceleration) | 7,462,586 |
Investment Implications
- Pay‑for‑performance alignment with retention: Raich’s compensation is heavily equity‑based with five‑year vesting or multi‑year sale restrictions; Deferred LP Unit redemption windows stagger across 2025–2030 (e.g., 2023 award: 40% in 2025; 20% in 2026–2028; 2024 award: 40% in 2026; 20% in 2027–2029; 2025 awards: LTI LP Units vest 2028–2030), creating sustained alignment but predictable potential supply events around late‑February each year .
- Insider selling pressure risk: Upcoming delivery/redemption schedules could increase trading liquidity around Feb 23 in 2026–2029; note forfeiture/non‑compete restrictions temper immediate monetization and pledging/hedging is prohibited, reducing leverage‑driven sell pressure .
- Retention and execution: No guaranteed severance and only “cause” termination by company, with continued vesting on certain separations, suggests incentives to remain through vesting cycles; committee explicitly links Raich’s pay to direct revenue contributions and strategic leadership (e.g., diversification of Healthcare franchise), supporting alignment with firm performance execution .
- Change‑of‑control economics: RSUs/Restricted LP Units accelerate if terminated within 12 months post‑CoC; Deferred LP Units have strict forfeiture for detrimental activity; overall CoC equity treatment is meaningful but lacks cash parachutes/tax gross‑ups, limiting shareholder‑unfriendly optics .
- Governance and ownership: Beneficial ownership is modest in Class A (<0.1%), but significant unvested/deferred equity exposure (>246K units at YE 2024) underpins skin‑in‑the‑game; firmwide prohibition on hedging/pledging and clawbacks support investor‑friendly governance .