Adrienne O'Neill
METLIFEAbout Adrienne O'Neill
Adrienne O’Neill is Executive Vice President and Chief Accounting Officer at MetLife (effective September 2, 2025). She is 44 years old, holds a BBA (Honors) from Wilfrid Laurier University, and is both a CFA and CPA (recognized as a CPA fellow in 2023) . Her remit spans corporate accounting, external reporting, and FP&A; compensation will follow MetLife’s pay-for-performance framework where variable pay is aligned to Adjusted ROE and relative TSR via performance shares . Company performance context: 2024 net income was $4.426B and revenues were $70.046B; EBITDA was $6.259B (see table below) * *.
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Manulife Financial Corp. | CFO, Asia Segment | Feb 2025–Feb 2025 | Led finance for Asia, overseeing multi-country performance and planning . |
| Manulife Financial Corp. | Global Controller & Group Chief Accounting Officer | Jul 2021–Feb 2025 | Directed global accounting policy, controls, and external reporting . |
| Manulife Financial Corp. | Global Head of Investor Relations | Sep 2018–Jun 2021 | Led capital markets communications and investor engagement strategy . |
| Manulife Financial Corp. | Various roles in Global Wealth & Asset Management, General Account Investments, Canadian Segment | 2007–2018 | Built multi-asset finance, investments, and business unit experience . |
External Roles
None disclosed beyond professional recognitions (CPA fellow in 2023) .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Terms | Effective/Grant Timing | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $525,000 per annum | Effective Sep 2, 2025 | Per 8-K appointment . |
| Annual Incentive (AVIP) | Discretionary incentive award; 2025 pro-rated | Annual cycle | Determined per MetLife plans and Committee assessment . |
| Sign-on Cash | Eligible for certain sign-on cash payments | Near start date | Intended to replace forfeited compensation (amounts not disclosed) . |
Performance Compensation
| Incentive Type | Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual/Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Shares (LTI) | Adjusted ROE vs Business Plan | Part of 70% perf-based LTI | Company-set; not disclosed for O’Neill | Not applicable yet | Three-year overlapping periods . |
| Performance Shares (LTI) | TSR relative to peers | Part of 70% perf-based LTI | Company-set; not disclosed for O’Neill | Not applicable yet | Three-year overlapping periods . |
| Restricted Stock Units (LTI) | Share value at settlement | Remainder of LTI | Not applicable | Not applicable yet | Typically vest one-third annually over 3 years; some awards cliff-vest at 3 years . |
| Sign-on Stock-Based LTI | Replacement awards | Aggregate grant date value $1,950,000 | Not applicable | Replacement only | Intended to replace forfeited comp; structure (RSU/PSU) not disclosed . |
MetLife’s annual AVIP funding is based on performance vs Business Plan; individual awards reflect holistic Committee assessments without formulaic individual targets .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Sign-on stock-based LTI award aggregate grant date value of $1,950,000; structure not disclosed .
- Executive share ownership guidelines apply to SVP+ (retain 100% of net shares until guideline met; guidelines vary by role; NEO examples range from 4x base salary to 7x for CEO) .
- Hedging and pledging are prohibited for directors and employees, including executive officers .
- Clawback policies: performance-based recoupment for misconduct or materially inaccurate metrics, and mandatory recovery for certain restatements under Dodd-Frank, regardless of fault .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Employment Agreement | U.S.-based executive officers do not have individual employment contracts | Programmatic plans govern; consistent disclosure . |
| Severance (No CIC) | Officer-level program: 28 weeks base salary + 1 week per year of service (cap at 52 weeks); half-sized payout if terminated for performance | Requires separation agreement; outplacement provided . |
| Change-in-Control (CIC) | Double-trigger only; up to 2x total annual cash comp (salary + average annual cash incentive); no excise tax gross-up | LTI may be substituted by equivalent value awards; otherwise vesting accelerates on CIC . |
| Death/Disability | Immediate vesting of unvested PSUs at target and RSUs; options become fully exercisable through expiration | Lump-sum settlement . |
| Award Timing Practices | Regular LTI grants in February; new-hire grants timed to forfeited awards and role changes; no MNPI timing | No options/SARs granted within blackout window tied to MNPI filings . |
Performance & Track Record
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Deep finance leadership across accounting, reporting, FP&A, IR, and investments from 18 years at Manulife, culminating in CFO Asia and Group CAO roles .
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Company-level performance context (USD):
Metric FY 2022 FY 2023 FY 2024 Revenues ($) 68,729,000,000* 68,839,000,000* 70,046,000,000 EBITDA ($) 4,294,000,000* 2,925,000,000* 6,259,000,000* Net Income ($) 5,284,000,000* 1,578,000,000* 4,426,000,000 Values retrieved from S&P Global.*
Governance, Risk Indicators & Shareholder Feedback
- Say-on-pay support: 95% approval in 2024; long-term average ~96% since 2011 .
- No repricing of options without shareholder approval; no single-trigger CIC severance or vesting; no excise tax gross-ups and limited tax gross-ups (relocation/transition only) .
- Insider trading policy prohibits hedging/pledging; strong risk oversight via three lines of defense and multi-committee board oversight .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- High variable pay orientation: majority of executive Total Compensation is performance-linked and share-based, with 70% of LTI in performance shares tied to Adjusted ROE and relative TSR .
- Sign-on stock LTI ($1.95M) indicates retention-focused design to replace forfeited compensation, aligning incentives to remain through vesting cycles .
- Program avoids shareholder-unfriendly practices (no pledging/hedging, no option repricing, no excise tax gross-ups) and applies robust clawbacks .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Base salary of $525k with AVIP and performance share-heavy LTI should align O’Neill’s incentives with Adjusted ROE and relative TSR performance, consistent with MetLife’s pay-for-performance design .
- Retention and potential supply: Sign-on LTI and standard 3-year vesting cadence can reduce near-term selling pressure; policy prohibitions on hedging/pledging lower alignment risk .
- Downside protection: No single-trigger CIC; capped CIC severance (≤2x cash) and strong clawbacks limit adverse shareholder outcomes in transitions or restatements .
- Context: 2024 financials improved versus 2023 and strong say-on-pay support (95%) reduce governance and payout risk while reinforcing credibility of the incentive framework * .