Lyndon Oliver
METLIFEAbout Lyndon Oliver
Lyndon Oliver is Regional President, Asia at MetLife and a member of the executive leadership team, with over 35 years in the insurance and financial services industry . He previously served as Executive Vice President and Treasurer of MetLife, signing multiple SEC documents and financing agreements in 2020–2021, evidencing his leadership in capital markets and corporate treasury functions . During his Asia tenure, Oliver has discussed growth drivers and headwinds, including FX-rate advantages for foreign currency products, VII variability, and surrender dynamics in Japan, providing operational insight into segment performance . Company-level performance context: 2024 Core Adjusted ROE was 15.2% (above 13–15% target), Core Adjusted Earnings were $5.8B, and Core Adjusted EPS was $8.11; MetLife returned ~$4.7B to shareholders, and the Company’s five-year total shareholder return (value of $100) exceeded the peer index in 2024 per Pay vs Performance disclosures .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| MetLife, Inc. | Executive Vice President and Treasurer | 2020–2021 (signatory dates) | Signatory for capital markets instruments and corporate filings (e.g., credit agreements, preferred stock certificates, redemption-related filings) |
External Roles
- No external public-company board roles disclosed for Oliver in available MetLife investor materials .
Fixed Compensation
- Not disclosed: Oliver is not listed among the Named Executive Officers (NEOs) with individual compensation reported in the proxy’s Summary Compensation Table .
Performance Compensation
MetLife’s executive LTI structure and annual incentive framework (applies enterprise-wide to executive officers; Oliver participates as a senior executive):
| Component | Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual/Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Shares (PSUs) | Adjusted ROE vs Business Plan | 50% of PSU factor | Three-year Business Plan goal; for 2024–2026 set within 15–17% range | PSU performance factor determined after three years; overall PSU cap at 100% if absolute TSR ≤ 0% | 3-year performance period; shares delivered based on factor |
| Performance Shares (PSUs) | Relative TSR vs insurance TSR peer group | 50% of PSU factor | Peer percentile targets: 25th=threshold, 50th=target, 87.5th=max | 0–175% factor scale; overall PSU cap at 100% if absolute TSR ≤ 0% | 3-year performance period; shares delivered based on factor |
| Restricted Stock Units (RSUs) | Time-based | 30% of total LTI as of 2025 (options sunset) | N/A | N/A | Vests in thirds over 3 years (some grants cliff-vest at 3 years) |
| Annual Variable Incentive Plan (AVIP) | Adjusted Earnings (with VII collar) | Company-wide funding driver | Funding calibrated to Business Plan; VII collar excludes >±10% VII swing | 2024 AVIP funded at 101.4% of target company-wide | Annual cash; individual payouts reflect role/performance |
Notes:
- LTI grant mix shifted to 70% PSUs / 30% RSUs in 2025; stock options ceased for new grants to align with investor feedback and market practice (no change to previously granted options) .
- PSU factor scale: threshold 25%, target 100%, max 175% for each metric; combined with safeguards (negative absolute TSR cap) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Executive share ownership guidelines apply to SVP+ and executive officers, with required multiples of base salary and a 100% net-share retention rule until guidelines are met; NEOs disclosed as compliant (Oliver’s specific holdings/guideline status not disclosed) .
- Hedging and pledging of MetLife securities are prohibited for directors and employees, including executive officers .
- Stock-based award timing practices avoid MNPI timing; grants occur around regular February meetings .
Employment Terms
| Topic | Terms |
|---|---|
| Severance (no CIC) | Officer-level severance generally equals 28 weeks of base salary plus 1 week per year of service, capped at 52 weeks; outplacement provided; pro-rata cash for certain forfeited awards depending on eligibility and separation agreement . |
| Change-in-Control (CIC) structure | Double-trigger; LTI may be substituted with equivalent awards; absent substitution, unvested PSUs/RSUs delivered at target on CIC; options may be accelerated/cashed for intrinsic value . |
| CIC Severance | 2x (base + average bonus of prior 3 years) and benefits continuation up to 3 years; modified cap to avoid excise tax; no gross-ups . |
| Restrictive covenants | Post-employment competitive service or violation of property/non-solicit/non-disparagement agreements can lead to forfeiture of awards; Rule of 65 preserves vesting in many cases for age+service ≥ 65 . |
Vesting Schedules and Potential Insider Selling Pressure
- RSUs generally vest in thirds over 3 years; certain retention/sign-on RSUs cliff-vest after 3 years .
- PSUs vest after 3-year performance periods; payouts depend on Adjusted ROE and relative TSR factors .
- Options (legacy grants) vest one-third annually over 3 years and have 10-year terms; no new options granted starting 2025 .
- Insider transactions for Oliver not available in the proxy or filings reviewed; Form 4 data was not accessible via the insider trades tool within this session (no Oliver-specific selling data disclosed in these documents) .
Compensation Governance, Peer Group, and Say-on-Pay
- Key program safeguards: clawbacks (performance-based and Dodd-Frank erroneous compensation), hedging/pledging prohibitions, CRO risk review of plans annually, negative TSR cap on PSU outcomes .
- Comparator group (for pay benchmarking) spans global insurers and diversified financials; TSR peer group focuses on insurance competitors for PSU relative TSR .
- Strong say-on-pay support: 95% in 2024; average ~96% since 2011, with shareholder engagement informing program design and option sunset decision .
Performance & Track Record (Asia Insights)
- FX-rate dynamics in Japan and U.S. rates have supported foreign currency annuity product demand; however, currency fluctuations can temper uptake .
- Q2 2025 Asia commentary: lower year-over-year earnings driven by weaker VII; strengthening yen reduced surrender income (near-term headwind) but improved persistency and supported AUM and future earnings outlook; underlying earnings expected to remain strong and in line with guidance .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Oliver’s pay is governed by MetLife’s performance-heavy design (70% PSUs in LTI, AVIP driven by Adjusted Earnings with a VII collar, hedging/pledging bans, clawbacks), which ties realized compensation strongly to ROE/TSR outcomes and mitigates misalignment risk .
- Retention risk: Multi-year vesting and Rule of 65 provisions, coupled with net-share retention until guideline compliance, support retention of senior leaders; absence of single-trigger CIC severance and lack of tax gross-ups further align with shareholder-friendly practices .
- Trading signals: No Oliver-specific insider sales data were found in the reviewed documents; without Form 4 visibility here, selling pressure signals cannot be assessed; program-wide safeguards reduce incentives for opportunistic trading .
- Execution risk: Asia segment exposure to VII variability, FX, and surrender behavior creates reported-earnings volatility, but management commentary points to supportive sales/AUM trends and product economics improving with higher yen rates—factors to monitor for forward earnings trajectory under Oliver’s remit .