Nuria Garcia
METLIFEAbout Nuria Garcia
Nuria Garcia is Regional President for Europe, Middle East & Africa (EMEA) at MetLife and Head of Global Sustainability, overseeing businesses across more than 20 markets; she joined MetLife in 2013 and was appointed Head of EMEA in January 2021 . Under her remit, EMEA adjusted earnings were $265 million in 2023 and $283 million in 2024, reflecting steady contribution to enterprise performance . MetLife’s executive long-term incentives are heavily performance-based (70% Performance Shares) tied to Adjusted ROE and TSR; the 2022–2024 Performance Shares vested at a 114.3% performance factor, evidencing pay-to-performance alignment .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| MetLife France | Head of Direct Sales, Marketing & Communication | 2013 | Grew business, diversified distribution, developed protection products and brand |
| MetLife (Western & Central Europe) | Head of Direct-to-Consumer Distribution | 2015 | Built DTC channel across region |
| MetLife Europe | Chief Distribution Officer, Europe | 2015–2019 | Led multi-channel distribution strategy |
| MetLife Europe | Chief Operating Officer | 2019 | Drove operations, risk, and efficiency initiatives |
| MetLife EMEA | Deputy Head of EMEA | Apr 2020 | Prepared for regional leadership transition |
| MetLife EMEA | Regional President (Head of EMEA) | Jan 2021–present | Oversees >20 markets; responsible for growth and returns |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Junior Achievement Europe | Board member | Ongoing | Education and youth economic empowerment engagement |
| UN COP (Sharm El Sheikh) | Panel speaker (“Role of Insurance in Increasing Climate Resilience”) | 2022 | Highlighted green investments and climate commitments as EMEA Regional President |
Fixed Compensation
- MetLife’s executive pay program comprises base salary, Annual Variable Incentive Plan (AVIP), and stock-based long-term incentives; for 2024, AVIP funding was set at 101.4% of target based on Adjusted Earnings and plan factors .
- The proxy does not disclose Nuria Garcia’s individual base salary, target bonus, or actual bonus; detailed compensation is provided only for Named Executive Officers (NEOs) .
Performance Compensation
| Component | Metric | Weighting | Target/Threshold | Max/Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Shares (PSUs) | Adjusted ROE vs 3‑yr Business Plan | 50% | Threshold 80% of goal → 25%; Target 100% → 100% | Max 120% of goal → 175%; cap at 100% if TSR ≤ 0 | 3 years (overlapping cycles) |
| Performance Shares (PSUs) | TSR vs TSR Peer Group percentile | 50% | Threshold 25th pct → 25%; Target 50th pct → 100% | Max 87.5th pct → 175%; cap at 100% if TSR ≤ 0 | 3 years (overlapping cycles) |
| RSUs | Share value at vest | — | — | — | 3 years |
| AVIP (annual cash) | Adjusted Earnings and qualitative factors | — | Company and individual performance | Determined by Committee judgment | Annual |
Recent realized outcomes:
- 2022–2024 Performance Shares settled at 114.3% performance factor (company-wide), reflecting achievement against ROE/TSR goals .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Executive share ownership guidelines apply to Senior Vice President level and above and require retention of 100% of net shares from awards until guideline compliance; the company sets multiples by responsibility level (e.g., CEO 7x salary; other NEOs 4x) but Garcia’s specific multiple and compliance status are not disclosed .
- Hedging and pledging of MetLife stock are prohibited for directors and all employees, including officers, reducing misalignment and leverage risk .
- Stock-based award timing excludes use of MNPI; no options or SARs were granted during blackout-adjacent windows in 2024 .
Employment Terms
- U.S.-based executive officers have no individual employment contracts; the proxy does not state terms for non-U.S. executives, and no contract for Garcia is disclosed .
- Change-in-control economics: no single-trigger CIC cash severance or single-trigger LTI vesting; CIC cash severance is capped at 2x total annual cash compensation; no excise tax gross-ups; option repricing/replacement requires shareholder approval .
- Clawbacks: robust recoupment policies apply to all employees and executive officers, including Dodd-Frank recovery for restatements regardless of fault, and performance-based recoupment for misconduct or materially inaccurate performance measures .
Segment Performance Context (EMEA)
| Metric | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Adjusted earnings available to common shareholders ($USD Millions) | $265 | $283 |
Company performance references (inform executive pay context):
- Core Adjusted ROE: 15.2% in 2024 (above 13–15% target range) .
- Core Direct Expense Ratio: 12.1% in 2024 (better than 12.3% target) .
- Free cash flow ratio (two-year 2023–2024): 72% within 65–75% target .
Governance, Policies, and Peer Benchmarking
- Executive pay design maintains strong pay-for-performance alignment; 70% of LTI in Performance Shares with equally weighted Adjusted ROE and relative TSR metrics .
- TSR Peer Group reviewed and unchanged for 2025 awards; payout grid uses peer percentiles (25th/50th/87.5th) for threshold/target/max .
- Say-on-Pay support: 95% approval in 2024; long-term average ~96% positive since 2011 .
- Compensation Committee oversight with independent consultant (Meridian); clawbacks, anti-hedging/pledging, and share ownership guidelines are core risk mitigants .
Expertise & Qualifications
- Education: Degree in economics and business administration (University of Oviedo, Spain); MBA (Deusto University, Spain); Master’s in finance engineering (EM Lyon, France) .
- Early career: Société Générale corporate finance analyst; 15 years at GE (Healthcare, CNBC, GE Money Bank) across FP&A, treasury, risk, marketing, business development, direct-to-consumer .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: Strong enterprise-wide policies (no hedging/pledging, share retention until guideline met, performance-weighted LTI) limit misalignment and near-term selling pressure; Garcia participates in the same framework, supporting long-term orientation in EMEA execution .
- Performance linkage: With ROE/TSR-driven PSUs and AVIP tied to Adjusted Earnings, EMEA contributions (rising adjusted earnings in 2024) can translate to higher realized pay, signaling accountability for regional value creation .
- Risk controls: No single-trigger CIC, capped severance, clawbacks, and no gross-ups reduce governance risk and pay inflation; option repricing prohibited mitigates shareholder-unfriendly actions .
- Watch items: Individual ownership, vesting schedules, and any Form 4 activity for Garcia are not disclosed in the proxy; monitor future filings (8‑K 5.02 and Section 16) for changes in role or comp to assess retention risk and trading signals .