Katie Evans
About Katie Evans
Katie Evans (age 39) is President, Operations at Magnite, appointed January 2025; she previously served as Chief Operating Officer (September 2020–December 2024) and General Manager, CTV (April–August 2020). She joined Magnite via Telaria, where she was COO (March 2017–April 2020) and SVP, Strategy & Operations (November 2015–March 2017). Evans holds a B.S. in Business Administration from the University of Richmond. Under her senior operating tenure, Magnite delivered 2024 record revenue of $668.2M (+7.8% YoY), Contribution ex‑TAC of $606.9M (+10.5% YoY), and Adjusted EBITDA of $196.9M; company pay‑versus‑performance data shows TSR recovery in 2023–2024 relative to the Russell 2000 peer context .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Magnite | President, Operations | Jan 2025–present | Senior operating leader overseeing company operations |
| Magnite | Chief Operating Officer | Sep 2020–Dec 2024 | Led enterprise operations during CTV/omnichannel scaling |
| Magnite | General Manager, CTV | Apr 2020–Aug 2020 | Led CTV business integration post‑Telaria merger |
| Telaria | Chief Operating Officer | Mar 2017–Apr 2020 | Ran operations at SSP predecessor to Magnite |
| Telaria | SVP, Strategy & Operations | Nov 2015–Mar 2017 | Strategy and ops leadership before promotion to COO |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years |
|---|---|---|
| Not disclosed in proxy | — | — |
Fixed Compensation
Multi‑year cash compensation and realized bonus for Katie Evans:
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 470,500 | 490,000 | 490,000 |
| Target Bonus (% of Base) | — | 70% | 70% |
| Target Bonus ($) | — | 343,000 | 343,000 |
| Actual Bonus Paid ($) | 228,047 | 285,170 | 371,229 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 10,185 | 10,035 | 10,485 |
| Total Compensation ($) | 2,747,930 | 2,530,576 | 2,396,449 |
2024 annual bonus was paid at 108.23% of target, driven by achievement of CTV Contribution ex‑TAC, DV+ Contribution ex‑TAC, and Adjusted EBITDA less Capex targets .
Performance Compensation
Annual performance cash program (2024 design and outcomes)
| Performance Goal | Weight | Threshold | Target (100% payout) | Maximum (150%) | 2024 Actual | Payout Driver |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CTV Contribution ex‑TAC ($) | 35% | 201.6M (50%) | 252.0M | 264.6M | 260.2M | Above target |
| DV+ Contribution ex‑TAC ($) | 35% | 286.2M (50%) | 357.7M | 375.6M | 346.8M | Slightly below target |
| Adj. EBITDA less Capex ($) | 30% | 105.9M (40%) | 151.2M | 181.5M | 144.6M | Below target |
| Weighted payout | — | — | — | — | — | 108.23% of target |
Long‑term equity awards (2024 grants)
| Award Type | Grant Date | Shares/Units | Fair Value ($) | Vesting | Performance Metric |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs | 1/2/2024 | 113,821 | 1,047,153 | Time‑based over ~4 years (see schedule below) | N/A |
| PSUs (target) | 1/2/2024 | 40,602 | 477,582 | Relative TSR, three tranches; earned 0–150% of target; cap at 100% if negative TSR; earned shares subject to time‑based vest through year 3 | TSR vs Russell 2000 |
PSU vesting curve (applies to 2024 awards):
| Relative TSR Percentile vs Russell 2000 | Vesting (% of Target) |
|---|---|
| ≥80th | 150% |
| 55th | 100% |
| 20th | 25% |
| <20th | 0% |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership (shares) | 437,992 |
| Shares outstanding (reference) | 141,376,139 (record date Apr 7, 2025) |
| Ownership as % of SO | ~0.31% (437,992 ÷ 141,376,139) |
| RSUs vesting within 60 days (Apr 7, 2025 reference) | 21,269 |
| Options exercisable within 60 days | 234,284 (231,413 already vested) |
| Stock ownership guidelines | 2× salary minimum for NEOs; sale restrictions until compliant |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited by Insider Trading Policy |
Option awards outstanding (as of Dec 31, 2024)
| Grant Date | Exercisable (#) | Unexercisable (#) | Exercise Price ($) | Expiration |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2/1/2022 | 48,794 | 20,092 | 13.90 | 2/1/2032 |
| 4/1/2021 | 16,248 | 1,478 | 42.80 | 4/1/2031 |
| 4/1/2020 | 69,470 | — | 5.28 | 4/1/2030 |
| 2/28/2019 | 33,546 | — | 5.16 | 2/27/2029 |
| 2/27/2018 | 56,137 | — | 3.61 | 2/26/2028 |
RSU vesting schedules (specific dates/amounts)
2024 RSU grant (113,821 units; granted 1/2/2024):
| Vest Date | Shares |
|---|---|
| Feb 15, 2025 | 30,826 |
| May 15, 2025 | 7,114 |
| Aug 15, 2025 | 7,114 |
| Nov 15, 2025 | 7,114 |
| Feb 15, 2026 | 7,114 |
| May 15, 2026 | 7,114 |
| Aug 15, 2026 | 7,114 |
| Nov 15, 2026 | 7,114 |
| Feb 15, 2027 | 7,114 |
| May 15, 2027 | 7,114 |
| Aug 15, 2027 | 7,114 |
| Nov 15, 2027 | 7,114 |
| Feb 15, 2028 | 4,741 |
2023 RSU grant (61,653 units; granted 1/1/2023):
| Vest Date | Shares |
|---|---|
| Feb 15, 2025 | 7,114 |
| May 15, 2025 | 7,114 |
| Aug 15, 2025 | 7,114 |
| Nov 15, 2025 | 7,114 |
| Feb 15, 2026 | 7,114 |
| May 15, 2026 | 7,114 |
| Aug 15, 2026 | 7,114 |
| Nov 15, 2026 | 7,114 |
| Feb 15, 2027 | 4,741 |
Employment Terms
| Scenario | Cash Severance ($) | Bonus ($) | Health Continuation ($) | Equity Acceleration ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination without cause / resignation for good reason (no change in control) | 490,000 | 343,000 (pro‑rata) | 36,290 | 2,332,105 (12 months time‑vested awards; PSU proration per rules) | 3,201,395 |
| Double‑trigger (termination in connection with change in control) | 490,000 | 343,000 (pro‑rata) | 36,290 | 5,208,361 (full acceleration of time‑vested awards; PSUs earned to date) | 6,077,651 |
Key terms:
- Double‑trigger required for CIC benefits; time‑based equity fully accelerates, PSUs earned based on TSR through CIC then vest at termination .
- Non‑solicit of employees for one year; indefinite confidentiality; benefits contingent on release of claims .
- No excise tax gross‑ups; payments reduced only if it increases executive’s after‑tax benefit .
- Clawback policy compliant with Rule 10D‑1; recovery of incentive comp tied to restatements and misconduct provisions .
- Insider Trading Policy bans hedging and pledging; equity award repricing and buyouts prohibited absent shareholder approval .
Performance & Track Record
| Company Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue ($M) | 619.7 | 668.2 |
| Contribution ex‑TAC ($M) | 549.1 | 606.9 |
| Adjusted EBITDA ($M) | — | 196.9 |
| Net leverage ratio | — | 0.4× at YE 2024 (from 6.2× at Q2 2021) |
| TSR ($100 initial, 12/31/2019 base) | $114 (2023) | $195 (2024) |
Major strategic actions highlighted include debt refinancing/repricing to reduce interest, and key customer wins/renewals (Netflix, Disney, LG Ads, Samsung Ads, etc.) .
Compensation Peer Group (used to inform 2024 decisions)
| Peer Companies |
|---|
| Blackline; Cardlytics; Digital Turbine; DoubleVerify; EverQuote; fuboTV; Integral Ad Science; LivePerson; LiveRamp; MediaAlpha; New Relic; PubMatic; QuinStreet; SPS Commerce; TechTarget; Upland Software; Zeta Global |
Say‑on‑Pay & Governance Signals
- 2024 Say‑on‑Pay approval: ~93% support, with no program changes made directly in response .
- Compensation program features include significant at‑risk pay, formulaic cash incentives with 150% caps, ownership guidelines and holding requirements, clawback policy, independent consultant (Semler Brossy), and prohibitions on hedging/pledging and option repricing .
Investment Implications
- Pay‑for‑performance alignment: Evans’ mix (70% RSUs, 30% PSUs for non‑CEO NEOs) ties a meaningful portion of realized pay to relative TSR and multi‑year service vesting, with negative TSR cap reducing windfalls in down markets .
- Insider selling pressure: Detailed RSU schedules show sizable periodic vests (e.g., 30,826 shares on 2/15/2025; quarterly 7,114‑share tranches thereafter), which can create mechanical sell pressure around vest dates; monitoring trading windows and Form 4 filings around these dates is prudent .
- Retention risk: Double‑trigger CIC protections and 12‑month severance, plus PSU proration rules, provide moderate retention incentives; absence of non‑compete but presence of one‑year non‑solicit indicates standard retention posture for growth tech .
- Ownership alignment: Beneficial ownership of 437,992 shares (~0.31% of SO) and executive ownership guidelines (2× salary) plus bans on hedging/pledging indicate alignment; no disclosure of pledged shares, consistent with policy prohibitions .
- Governance quality: High Say‑on‑Pay support (93%), strong committee independence, and transparent PSU design reduce governance red flags; continued focus should be on TSR realization against the Russell 2000 and execution on CTV/DV+ Contribution ex‑TAC to sustain cash incentive payouts .