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Susan Krohne

Chief Legal Officer at M/I HOMESM/I HOMES
Executive

About Susan Krohne

Susan E. Krohne, age 53, is Senior Vice President, Chief Legal Officer and Secretary of M/I Homes, serving since June 2021 after 18 years as Senior Vice President and Chief Legal Counsel at Pedcor Investments, a leading developer and manager of affordable housing . Her compensation is tied primarily to company Adjusted Pre‑Tax Income, with long‑term equity that is service‑based RSUs; PSUs in the program use cumulative Adjusted Pre‑Tax Income (80%) and relative TSR (20%), though PSUs were not awarded to her in 2024 . Company performance in 2024 was strong: revenue rose 12% to $4.5B, net income increased 21% to $564M, and diluted EPS grew 22% to $19.71, driving maximum annual bonus payouts for all NEOs including Krohne .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Pedcor InvestmentsSenior Vice President and Chief Legal Counsel2003–2021Legal leadership at a leading developer and manager of affordable housing

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Not disclosed in latest proxy

Fixed Compensation

Metric202220232024
Base Salary ($)450,000 450,000 475,000
All Other Compensation ($)116,901 14,110 14,574
NotesRelocation expenses in 2022 $101,730 Vehicle allowance $10,200; 401(k) $3,910 Vehicle allowance $10,200; 401(k) $4,374

Performance Compensation

Annual Cash Performance Bonus (2009 Annual Incentive Plan)

MetricWeightingThreshold ($)Target ($)Maximum ($)Actual 2024 Payout ($)Vesting/Payment
Adjusted Pre‑Tax Income100% based on company API 171,000 552,900 627,000 627,000 (maximum earned; API $743M) Annual cash bonus

• In 2025, the maximum bonus opportunity increases to 165% of base salary for Krohne (from 132% in 2024) to align with peer opportunities .

Long‑Term Equity Awards

Award TypeGrant DateUnits/SharesGrant Date Fair Value ($)Vesting SchedulePerformance Metrics
RSUs (Annual service-based)2/15/20243,609 449,898 Vests 1/3 on first three anniversaries of grant; settled in common shares (dividends accrue and pay at vest) None (service‑based)
RSUs (Annual service-based)2/20253,761 Aggregate grant date fair value ~same as 2024 Vests 1/3 on first three anniversaries of grant None (service‑based)
PSUsPSUs awarded only to CEO/CFO in 2024 (80% cumulative Adjusted Pre‑Tax Income; 20% relative TSR vs peer group)

Options (Historical service-based)

GrantExercisable (#)Unexercisable (#)Strike ($)ExpirationVesting
8/20/20212,500 5,000 63.40 8/20/2031 20% annually over 5 years
2/17/20229,000 47.59 2/17/2032 20% annually over 5 years
2/15/202314,000 58.73 2/15/2033 20% annually over 5 years

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Total Beneficial Ownership9,829 common shares (<1% of class)
ComponentsIncludes 9,000 shares underlying currently exercisable options
RSUs Unvested (12/31/2024)3,609 units; market value $479,817
Options (12/31/2024 snapshot)As detailed above, with specified strikes and 10‑year terms
Ownership GuidelinesNo minimum share ownership requirement for executive officers
Hedging/PledgingProhibited (including derivatives, short sales, margin accounts, pledging); applies to executives and household members
Deferred CompensationExecutives may defer bonus into phantom stock units; none of the NEOs deferred 2024; Krohne account value $0 at 12/31/2024

Employment Terms

• No employment agreement; no pension or special retirement plans; equity awards have multi‑year vesting; no option repricing; double‑trigger CIC cash severance applies only to CEO/CFO .

Potential Payments (as of 12/31/2024)

ScenarioSeverance Benefits ($)Accelerated Options ($)Accelerated RSUs ($)Annual Incentive Plan Payment ($)Total ($)
Death2,155,070 479,817 627,000 3,261,887
Disability2,155,070 479,817 627,000 3,261,887
Involuntary Not for Cause Termination627,000 627,000
Change in Control2,155,070 479,817 552,900 (target level) 3,187,787
Involuntary Not for Cause Termination or Voluntary for Good Reason After a Change in Control2,155,070 479,817 522,900 3,187,787

• RSUs accelerate upon change in control, death, disability, or retirement (if eligible); options and PSUs follow LTIP terms; as of 12/31/2024, Krohne did not qualify for “retirement” under LTIP or the Annual Incentive Plan .

Performance & Track Record

• Company 2024 results: revenue $4.5B (+12%), net income $564M (+21%), diluted EPS $19.71 (+22%); homes delivered 9,055 (+12%); shareholders’ equity $2.9B (+17%) .
• 2024 bonus program targets raised significantly (API target $610M; max $650M vs 2023 $300M/$450M); actual API $743M, resulting in maximum bonus for Krohne .
• 2025 program maintains base salary at $475,000; increases max bonus to 165% of base; awards 3,761 RSUs vesting over three years .

Governance, Policies, and Shareholder Feedback

• Clawback: Mandatory recovery of incentive compensation tied to financial reporting measures within a three‑year look‑back upon a required accounting restatement (SEC/NYSE compliant) .
• Insider Trading Policy: Prohibits hedging/monetization, derivatives trading, short sales, margin accounts, and pledging for executives and certain family members .
• Say‑on‑Pay: 91% approval in 2024; historical average ~95% since 2011 .

Investment Implications

• Pay‑for‑performance alignment: Krohne’s annual bonus is fully driven by Adjusted Pre‑Tax Income, which paid at maximum in 2024 on record profitability; long‑term equity is service‑based RSUs (no PSUs awarded to her), emphasizing retention over performance risk .
• Retention and selling pressure: RSUs vest annually over three years from each grant, creating predictable vest events; options vest 20% annually, with multiple strikes and long expiries; RSUs fully accelerate upon change in control, reducing retention risk in a transaction scenario .
• Alignment and risk controls: Modest personal ownership (<1%) with exercisable options; no executive ownership minimums, but strict prohibitions on hedging/pledging and a robust clawback policy mitigate misalignment and governance risk .
• Severance/CIC economics: No cash CIC agreement for Krohne; value realization primarily via accelerated equity and target‑level annual incentive plan payments under CIC scenarios—lower parachute risk vs CEO/CFO, implying limited change‑of‑control cash burden tied to her role .