Christopher Briggs
MITEK SYSTEMSAbout Christopher Briggs
Christopher Briggs, age 55, served as Mitek’s Chief Product Officer from April 2022 until his resignation effective September 19, 2025 . He holds a BA from Rice University and an MBA from the University of Virginia, with prior product and strategy leadership roles at Airside, Equifax, and Experian, and academic/industry engagements as a professor at Seneca College and Thought Leader on the Forbes Technology Council . Company performance during FY2024 included revenue of $172.1 million, net income of $3.3 million, and cash from operations of $31.7 million, while executive performance equity emphasizes relative stock performance vs. the Russell 2000, aligning pay with TSR outcomes; the FY2025 plan further shifted cash incentives to a 50/50 mix of revenue and adjusted EBITDA .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Airside | Chief Product Officer | Apr 2021 – Apr 2022 | Led product management in travel-focused identity verification |
| Equifax | Head of Product; Chief Marketing Officer; VP of Strategy | Jul 2015 – Oct 2020 | Senior product/strategy leadership in data, analytics, and technology |
| Experian | Senior Director; VP Product Management | Jan 2007 – May 2015 | Product management in multinational data analytics/credit reporting |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years |
|---|---|---|
| Seneca College | Professor (product management and marketing) | Since May 2021 |
| Forbes Technology Council | Thought Leader | Since May 2023 |
| Industry Recognition | Press quote on AI-enabled fraud defenses (Digital Fraud Defender) | 2025 (Datos Insights award press release) |
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base Salary ($) | Target Bonus (% of Salary) | Actual Bonus Paid ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | 325,000 | 50% (CPO target “remained at 50%”) | 128,156 |
| 2024 | 335,000 (3.1% increase) | 50% | 103,850 |
| 2025 | 335,000 (effective Jan 1, 2025) | 50% | — |
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Cash Incentive (structure and outcome)
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout (as % of Target) | Vesting/Timing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Identity revenue | 70% total revenue component (primary/secondary mix possible) | Board-approved operating plan | 90% of target | Contributed to 62% payout for Briggs | Paid in Q4 2024 |
| Deposits revenue | Portion of 70% revenue component | Board-approved operating plan | 97% of target | Contributed to 62% payout for Briggs | Paid in Q4 2024 |
| Non-GAAP operating margin | 30% | Operating margin target per plan | 80% of target | Contributed to 62% payout for Briggs | Paid in Q4 2024 |
Notes:
- 2025 plan changed to 50% revenue and 50% adjusted EBITDA (director-level and above), max 200% of target, with Board discretion ±10% for CEO’s direct reports .
Equity Incentives (structure)
| Award Type | Grant Date | Units | Grant Date Fair Value ($) | Performance Metric | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSU | 12/01/2023 | 28,635 | Included in $758,403 total equity value | N/A | 25% per year over 4 years; fully vests 12/01/2027 |
| PSU (max case) | 12/01/2023 | 38,084 (max; target 33% lower) | Included in $758,403 total equity value | Relative stock performance vs. Russell 2000; over-achievement increases payout | Equal annual tranches over 3 years; fully vests 12/01/2026 if criteria met |
| RSU | 11/30/2022 | 18,329 | — | N/A | 25% per year over 4 years; fully vests 11/30/2026 |
| PSU | 11/30/2022 | 16,292 | — | Relative stock performance vs. Russell 2000 | Equal annual tranches over 3 years; fully vests 11/30/2025 if criteria met |
| RSU | 05/16/2022 | 14,738 | — | N/A | 25% per year over 4 years; fully vests 05/16/2026 |
| 2025 RSU | Approved 12/08/2024 | 27,593 | — | N/A | Equal annual installments over 4 years |
| 2025 PSU | Approved 12/08/2024 | 27,593 | — | Relative stock performance; 100% potential over-achievement (revised) | Annual tranches over 3 years |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership | 29,401 shares (as of Jan 17, 2025) |
| Shares outstanding (basis for % calc) | 45,231,214 (as of record date Jan 17, 2025) |
| Ownership as % of shares outstanding | ~0.065% (29,401 ÷ 45,231,214) |
| Unvested RSUs/PSUs (9/30/2024) | RSU 14,738 (5/16/2022) ; RSU 18,329 (11/30/2022) ; PSU 16,292 (11/30/2022) ; RSU 28,635 (12/01/2023) ; PSU 28,635 (12/01/2023) |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited by insider trading policy (no shorting, derivatives, margin accounts, or pledging) |
| Stock ownership guidelines (executives) | Not disclosed; director guidelines exist (5x cash retainer) |
Employment Terms
| Term | Details |
|---|---|
| Role and dates | Chief Product Officer since April 2022; resigned effective September 19, 2025 |
| Severance (no CoC) | Lump sum equal to 50% of base salary, plus six months company health plan premiums; accrued but unpaid compensation |
| Change-of-control (double trigger) | If terminated without Cause or resigns for Good Reason within 2 months pre- or 12 months post-CoC: 50% base salary; six months health premiums; 100% accelerated vesting of all outstanding equity awards |
| Definitions | “Cause” and “Good Reason” defined (include breach, relocation >50 miles, material diminution; cure periods) |
| Clawback | Nasdaq Rule 10D-1 compliant clawback adopted Oct 2, 2023; recovery of erroneously awarded incentive compensation upon required restatements |
| Non-compete / non-solicit | Not disclosed |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and at-risk pay: Briggs’ cash incentive target remained at 50% of base (director-level and above); long-term equity balanced between RSUs (time-based) and PSUs (performance-based) with PSU metrics tied to relative stock performance vs. Russell 2000, indicating strong pay-for-performance linkage .
- 2024 outcomes: Actual annual cash incentive payout of $103,850 (62% of target), reflecting below-target achievement on operating margin and varying revenue attainment across segments .
- Program changes (2025): Company increased emphasis on adjusted EBITDA in cash incentives (50/50 revenue/adjusted EBITDA), and refined PSU over-achievement mechanics to strengthen performance alignment after a 64% say-on-pay support in 2024 .
Performance & Track Record
| Indicator | Detail |
|---|---|
| Stock/TSR alignment in equity | PSUs vest based on relative stock performance vs. Russell 2000; over-/under-performance adjusts vesting proportionally |
| 2024 vesting activity (value realized) | 40,508 shares vested for Briggs, value realized $511,879 (includes shares tendered for taxes) |
| Company operating highlights (FY2024) | Revenue $172.1m; Net income $3.3m; Cash from operations $31.7m |
| Recognition | Industry award for AI-enabled fraud defenses; Briggs highlighted multilayered defense against deepfakes and injection attacks |
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Hedging/pledging banned; no pledging disclosed for Briggs (alignment positive) .
- Clawback policy in place under Nasdaq Rule 10D-1 (governance positive) .
- Internal control remediation ongoing (five material weaknesses remaining as of Jan 2025, with detailed remediation plan), a company-level risk backdrop for incentive metrics tied to financial reporting quality .
- Resignation of Briggs effective Sept 19, 2025 introduces transition/continuity risk in product leadership; resignation noted as not due to disagreement with the company .
Compensation Peer Group and Shareholder Feedback
- Peer group: 14 tech/application software and internet services companies used for benchmarking (e.g., A10 Networks, Agilysys, OneSpan, PROS Holdings, Model N, etc.) .
- Say-on-pay: 64% approval in 2024; company engaged top holders and adjusted 2025 compensation design (greater at-risk for CEO, EBITDA emphasis, PSU mechanics) .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: PSU design tied to relative TSR vs. Russell 2000 and prohibition of hedging/pledging support shareholder alignment; Briggs’ 2024 incentive outcome (62% of target) indicates disciplined payouts vs. performance .
- Retention/transition: Briggs’ resignation in Sept 2025 elevates execution risk around product roadmap continuity; monitor succession and retention of key product talent .
- Program quality: Post-2024 investor feedback drove meaningful improvements (50/50 revenue/adjusted EBITDA in cash incentives, refined PSU over-achievement), suggesting improving compensation governance and stronger performance linkage going forward .
- Ownership signal: Briggs’ direct beneficial stake is modest (~0.065%); unvested RSUs/PSUs were substantial as of 9/30/2024, creating potential selling pressure upon scheduled vest dates—tempered by forfeiture risk tied to employment status and performance hurdles .