Maureen Mulholland
About Maureen Mulholland
Maureen E. Mulholland is Executive Vice President — Chief Legal Officer and Secretary of Monro, Inc. She joined Monro in October 2003 as General Counsel, was named Vice President in May 2012, promoted to Senior Vice President — General Counsel and Secretary in August 2017, and to her current role in August 2020. She is age 54 (as of 2025) and holds a J.D. from the University of Notre Dame Law School . Monro’s executive pay program tied annual cash incentives to Operating Income and Comparable Store Sales in FY2025 (both below threshold; zero payout) and to Pre-tax Income and Comparable Store Sales in FY2024 (also below threshold; zero payout), while long-term PSUs shifted from ROIC (FY2024 cohort) to relative TSR versus the S&P Composite Specialty Retail Index (FY2025 cohort) . In FY2024, Monro’s pay-versus-performance table reported $1,276.8M revenue and $37.6M net income, with an initial $100 Company TSR value at 86 for FY2024 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Monro, Inc. | General Counsel | Oct 2003–May 2012 | Built internal legal function; corporate governance support |
| Monro, Inc. | Vice President | May 2012–Aug 2017 | Expanded legal leadership; compliance oversight |
| Monro, Inc. | SVP — General Counsel & Secretary | Aug 2017–Aug 2020 | Corporate secretary; disclosure and governance processes |
| Monro, Inc. | EVP — Chief Legal Officer & Secretary | Aug 2020–present | Executive legal leadership; ESG oversight participation via Board committee reporting |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Underberg & Kessler LLP | Associate Attorney | Pre-2003 | Corporate and commercial legal practice experience |
| Harris Beach, PLLC | Associate Attorney | Pre-2003 | Litigation/regulatory exposure; foundational legal training |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY 2023 | FY 2024 | FY 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 346,887 | 369,376 | 379,686 |
| Target Bonus (% of Salary) | — | 60% | 60% |
| Actual Annual Bonus Paid ($) | — | $0 (below threshold) | $0 (below threshold) |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Mechanics and Outcomes
| Metric (FY2025) | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Income ($000s) | 70% | 60,200 | 75,200 | 90,200 | 38,700 | 0% (below threshold) |
| Comparable Store Sales (%) | 30% | -2.0% | 2.0% | 6.0% | -3.5% | 0% (below threshold) |
| Metric (FY2024) | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Comparable Store Sales (%) | 50% | 3.0% | 5.0% | 7.0% | -2.0% | 0% (below threshold) |
| Pre-tax Income ($000s) | 50% | 71,800 | 81,600 | 91,400 | 51,880 | 0% (below threshold) |
Equity Award Grants and Vesting Design
| Grant Year | Grant Date | Instrument | Quantity (#) | Grant-Date Fair Value ($) | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2025 | 05/09/2024 | Stock Options | 25,646 | 168,646 | Options generally vest in equal installments over 4 years; 6-year life typical |
| FY2025 | 05/09/2024 | RSUs (time-vesting) | 6,270 | 168,726 | RSUs vest in equal installments over 4 years (annual anniversaries) |
| FY2025 | 05/09/2024 | PSUs (target) | 12,541 | 337,478 | rTSR vs S&P Composite Specialty Retail Index; measured end of FY2027; 0–200% vesting |
| FY2024 | 06/19/2023 | Stock Options | 11,278 | 132,613 | Options vest in equal installments over 4 years; 6-year life typical |
| FY2024 | 06/19/2023 | RSUs (time-vesting) | 3,797 | 149,982 | RSUs vest in equal installments over 4 years |
| FY2024 | 06/19/2023 | PSUs (target) | 7,595 | 300,003 | ROIC measured end of FY2026; threshold 11% to max 13.5% |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| As of June 23, 2025 | Count |
|---|---|
| Common shares beneficially owned | 10,187 |
| Shares acquirable within 60 days (options/RSUs) | 37,548 |
| Ownership as % of shares outstanding | <1% |
| Options — Exercisable | 23,508 |
| Options — Unexercisable | 42,820 |
| RSUs — Unvested | 11,441 |
| PSUs — Target not vested | 27,132 |
- Stock ownership guidelines: NEOs required to hold common stock equal to at least 3× base salary; compliance required within 4 years . As of March 29, 2025, all covered NEOs were in compliance .
- Anti-hedging/pledging: Monro prohibits hedging and pledging by directors, officers, and employees .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Term |
|---|---|
| Form of arrangement | Executive letter agreement (no separate employment agreement disclosed for Mulholland) |
| Severance (involuntary termination without cause or resignation for good reason) | One year’s base salary ($382,500) + pro rata annual bonus; accelerate unvested time-based equity; options exercisable for 90 days; PSUs eligible if performance goals achieved |
| Change-in-control (double trigger within 2 years) | Two years’ base salary ($765,000) + pro rata annual bonus; accelerate unvested options and RSUs; PSUs eligible on pro rata basis if goals achieved |
| Single-trigger cash severance | Not provided solely upon change-in-control |
| Clawback | Mandatory recoupment policy compliant with SEC/Nasdaq rules |
| Non-compete / Non-solicit | Required for prescribed periods (specific durations not disclosed) |
| Tax gross-ups | No excise tax gross-ups for change-in-control |
| Deferred Compensation Plan | Executive contributions $15,159; Company contributions $6,984; Aggregate earnings $11,336; Aggregate balance $249,500 (FY2025) |
| Perquisites (FY2025) | Company match $10,500; Life insurance $900; Executive health premium $9,300; Auto perq $13,600; Total $34,300 |
Performance & Track Record
Company-level trends (context for pay-for-performance and alignment):
| Metric | FY 2021 | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 | FY 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues ($) | 1,125,721,000* | 1,359,328,000* | 1,325,382,000* | 1,276,789,000* | 1,195,334,000* |
| EBITDA ($) | 149,542,000* | 183,226,000* | 156,787,000* | 150,191,000* | 109,678,000* |
Values retrieved from S&P Global.
Note: Monro reported FY2024 pay-versus-performance data showing Revenue of $1,276,789,000 and Net Income of $37,571,000; Company TSR initial $100 value at 86 in FY2024 .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Shift of PSU metric from ROIC (FY2024) to rTSR (FY2025) increases external market alignment but may lower line-of-business controllability; vesting scale now 0–200% of target based on TSR percentile .
- Annual incentive payout curve widened to 200% max in FY2025, but outcomes were zero due to underperformance versus Operating Income and Comparable Store Sales thresholds .
- Base salary increased 5% for Mulholland effective May 26, 2024 to better align with peer market; post-increase, her base approximated the peer group’s 25th percentile, signaling conservative cash positioning .
- Independent compensation consultant (Exequity) retained; peer group updated and applied for benchmarking .
Compensation Peer Group and Say-on-Pay
- FY2025 peer benchmarking considered 18 companies across automotive aftermarket and specialty retail; examples include Valvoline, Driven Brands, National Vision, Dorman Products .
- Say-on-Pay approval: ~99% of votes cast supported executive compensation at the 2024 annual meeting .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Strong governance signals (clawbacks; anti-hedging/pledging; ownership guidelines with full compliance) reduce agency risks and support investor alignment .
- Near-term selling pressure: Time-vested RSUs and options vest annually; as of FY2025 year-end, Mulholland had 11,441 unvested RSUs and 23,508 exercisable/42,820 unexercisable options, implying scheduled equity deliveries that could create modest, predictable supply over the vesting horizon .
- Incentive design: Annual cash tied to Operating Income and Comparable Store Sales with zero payouts in FY2025/FY2024 emphasizes disciplined operational execution; PSUs tied to rTSR may introduce market beta into realized pay outcomes .
- Retention and CoC risk: Double-trigger CoC benefits (2× salary, equity acceleration) balance retention and shareholder protection; no gross-ups mitigate cost escalation risk .
- Execution risk context: Revenue and EBITDA contraction into FY2025 alongside zero annual incentive payouts indicate performance headwinds; tracking TSR and PSU achievement versus the specialty retail benchmark will be critical for forward pay-for-performance calibration .