Emelie Tirre
About Emelie Tirre
Emelie C. Tirre, 55, is Chief Commercial Officer of Monster Beverage Corporation (MEC) since June 2024; she joined MEC in July 2010 and previously served as President of the Americas, Chief Commercial Officer for North America, and Senior Vice President of Sales for North America, with over 33 years of beverage industry experience . Company performance during her recent tenure includes record net sales of $7.49 billion in 2024 (+4.9% YoY), gross margin of 54% (+0.9 pts YoY), and five-year TSR of 65.4% (2020–2024) . Her 2024 annual incentive award (AIA) tied to adjusted operating income paid out at ~85% of target overall (80.4% for the financial component; 100% for individual performance), with the Compensation Committee noting “record sales domestically and abroad” for Ms. Tirre .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Monster Beverage Corporation (MEC) | President of the Americas | Not disclosed | Contributed to record sales domestically and abroad in 2024 (basis for individual performance at 100%) |
| Monster Beverage Corporation (MEC) | Chief Commercial Officer, North America | Not disclosed | Senior commercial oversight in North America markets |
| Monster Beverage Corporation (MEC) | SVP Sales, North America | Not disclosed | Senior sales leadership |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Not disclosed in proxy filings | — | — | Executive biography lists internal roles only |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 770,000 | 820,000 | 870,000 |
| Bonus ($) | 350,000 (one-time recognition; earned 2022, paid 2023) | - | - |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 43,047 | 45,834 | 65,752 |
Notes:
- Initial base salary under Tirre Employment Agreement set at $870,000 (effective June 13, 2024) .
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Incentive Award (AIA) Structure and Outcome
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Payout (vs. Target) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Operating Income ($) | 75% | 1.9924B | 2.2138B | 2.4352B | 2.1271B | 80.4% |
| Individual Performance | 25% | — | — | — | — | 100% (record sales domestically and abroad) |
| AIA Opportunity (2024) | Target ($) | Actual Paid ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Emelie C. Tirre | 652,500 | 556,583 |
Long-Term Incentive (LTI) Mix – 2024 Grants
| Executive | Options (time-vested) | RSUs (time-vested) | PSUs |
|---|---|---|---|
| Emelie C. Tirre | ~28% weighting | ~24% weighting | ~48% weighting |
2024 Grants of Plan-Based Awards (Grant Date: March 14, 2024)
| Award Type | Shares/Units | Exercise Price ($) | Grant Date Fair Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs | 6,000 | — | 361,800 |
| PSUs (Threshold/Target/Max) | 6,000 / 12,000 / 24,000 | — | 723,600 (probable outcome at grant) |
| Stock Options | 18,000 | 60.30 | 417,161 |
PSU Design and Results
| PSU Grant | Performance Period | Metric | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Payout | Shares Delivered to Tirre |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 PSU | 2022–2024 | 3-yr cumulative adjusted diluted EPS | $4.328 | $4.556 | $4.784 | $4.510 | 90% of target | 24,480 |
| 2024 PSU | 2024–2026 | 3-yr cumulative adjusted diluted EPS | — | Target shares: 12,000 | — | — | Earn-outs 0–200% of target | Earned at period end (cliff vest) |
Vesting Schedules (Key Dates; 2024 LTI)
| Award | Vesting Dates | Annual Tranche Sizes | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs (6,000 granted 3/14/2024) | 3/14/2025; 3/14/2026; 3/14/2027; 3/14/2028; 3/14/2029 | 600; 900; 1,200; 1,500; 1,800 | Subject to continued employment |
| Options (18,000 granted 3/14/2024) | 3/14/2025; 3/14/2026; 3/14/2027; 3/14/2028; 3/14/2029 | 1,800; 2,700; 3,600; 4,500; 5,400 | Exercise price $60.30; expire 3/14/2034 |
| PSUs (2024 grant) | Cliff vest after 3-year period ending 12/31/2026 | Earn 0–200% of target | Metric: cumulative adjusted diluted EPS |
Outstanding Equity at FY-End (12/31/2024) – Emelie C. Tirre
| Grant Date | Type | Exercisable (#) | Unexercisable (#) | Exercise Price ($) | Expiration | Unvested RSUs (#) | Unvested PSUs (Target) (#) | Value of Unvested RSUs ($) | Value of Unvested PSUs ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 03/14/2024 | Options | 0 | 18,000 | 60.30 | 03/14/2034 | — | — | — | — |
| 03/14/2024 | RSUs | — | — | — | — | 6,000 | — | 315,360 | |
| 03/14/2024 | PSUs | — | — | — | — | — | 12,000 | — | 630,720 |
| Earlier grants (sample) | Options/RSUs/PSUs | See proxy table for details | — | — | — | RSUs: 4,200 (2020), 3,080 (2021), 10,200 (2022), 6,120 (2023) | PSUs: 24,480 (2022 actual), 13,600 (2023 target) | RSU values shown at $52.56 close (12/31/2024) | PSU values shown at $52.56 close (12/31/2024) |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| As-of Date | Beneficial Ownership (Shares) | Percent of Class |
|---|---|---|
| 04/06/2023 | 272,584 | <1% |
| 04/12/2024 | 197,615 | <1% |
| 04/11/2025 | 156,333 | <1% |
- Executive Officer Stock Ownership Guidelines (amended Feb 2024) require Section 16 Officers (including Ms. Tirre) to hold stock equal to 3× base salary; unexercised options and unearned performance-based awards do not count; if not in compliance, must retain at least 50% of shares received after settlement until compliant; during 2024, each NEO was in compliance .
- Anti-hedging and anti-pledging policies prohibit hedging and pledging; as of April 11, 2025, only two employees (Messrs. Sacks and Schlosberg) had pledges (~0.3% of their holdings); no pledging disclosed for Ms. Tirre .
Employment Terms
| Term | Detail |
|---|---|
| Role | Chief Commercial Officer of MEC |
| Agreement Effective Date | June 13, 2024 |
| Initial Term | Through June 13, 2026; auto-renews for successive one-year periods unless notice by April 13 of renewal year |
| Base Salary | Initially $870,000; subject to annual review |
| AIA Eligibility | Eligible for annual incentive award (AIA) per program |
| Non-Solicit | Twelve-month post-termination employee non-solicitation covenant |
| Voluntary Termination Notice | 60 days |
| Severance (no CIC) | 1× base salary paid over 12 months plus benefit premiums up to 12 months; vacation and unreimbursed expenses; PSU vesting limited to vesting date proximity |
| CIC+Qualifying Termination | 1.5× base salary paid over 18 months plus benefit premiums up to 18 months; vacation and unreimbursed expenses; double-trigger acceleration for RSUs and options; PSUs convert to RSUs on CIC (details below) |
Potential Payments Upon Termination or Change in Control (as disclosed)
| Scenario | Base Salary ($) | Bonus ($) | Vacation ($) | Benefit Plans ($) | Automobile ($) | Acceleration of Equity ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Death | 870,000 | - | 76,962 | 10,029 | 12,000 | - | 968,991 |
| Disability | 870,000 | - | 76,962 | 10,029 | 12,000 | - | 968,991 |
| Non-Renewal by Executive | - | 556,583 | 76,962 | - | - | - | 633,545 |
| Cause | - | - | 76,962 | 836 | - | - | 77,798 |
| Voluntary Termination | - | 556,583 | 76,962 | - | - | - | 633,545 |
| Termination by MEC (Other Than for Cause/Disability) or by Executive for Good Reason | 870,000 | 556,583 | 76,962 | 10,029 | - | - | 1,513,574 |
| Termination Without Cause or For Good Reason Following a Change in Control | 1,305,000 | 556,583 | 76,962 | 15,043 | - | 5,375,658 | 7,329,246 |
Change-of-control equity treatment:
- Double-trigger vesting for RSUs and stock options within 24 months following CIC if involuntary termination without cause or for good reason .
- PSUs convert to RSUs upon CIC:
- If CIC within first year of performance period and awards are assumed/replaced: convert at target shares; as-scheduled vesting unchanged; all unvested converted RSUs vest on qualifying termination within 24 months post-CIC .
- If CIC within the second or third year and awards are assumed/replaced: convert based on actual performance for elapsed portion; as-scheduled vesting unchanged; all unvested converted RSUs vest on qualifying termination within 24 months post-CIC .
- Under certain 2011 plan option agreements, Board may make outstanding non-exercisable options immediately exercisable upon CIC; unexercised options may be canceled at CIC .
Clawback: The Board adopted a Dodd-Frank compliant clawback policy on December 1, 2023 applicable to current/former Section 16 Officers, supplementing the 2011 and 2020 omnibus plans .
Multi-Year Compensation (Summary – Emelie C. Tirre)
| Year | Salary ($) | Stock Awards ($) | Option Awards ($) | Non-Equity Incentive (AIA) ($) | All Other Compensation ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 770,000 | 1,493,892 | 542,335 | 192,500 | 43,047 | 3,391,774 |
| 2023 | 820,000 | 1,036,728 | 751,992 | 1,076,250 | 45,834 | 3,730,804 |
| 2024 | 870,000 | 1,085,400 | 417,161 | 556,583 | 65,752 | 2,994,896 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment Policies (Highlights)
- Anti-hedging: Directors, officers, and employees are prohibited from hedging Company securities (prepaid variable forwards, collars, exchange funds) .
- Anti-pledging: Pledging is prohibited, with rare exceptions; as of April 11, 2025, only Messrs. Sacks and Schlosberg had pledges; none disclosed for Ms. Tirre .
- Stock ownership guidelines: Section 16 Officers must hold 3× base salary; retention rule requires at least 50% of post-tax shares from vested awards to be retained until in compliance; all NEOs were in compliance during 2024 .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: AIA uses a financial metric (adjusted operating income) with linear payout from threshold to max (80.4% achieved in 2024), plus an individual component (100% in 2024 for Ms. Tirre due to record sales), supporting incentive linkage to operational outcomes .
- LTI design emphasizes equity and long-term EPS growth: PSUs (48% of 2024 LTI for Ms. Tirre) cliff vest on 3-year cumulative adjusted diluted EPS; 2022 PSUs paid at 90% due to EPS under target, indicating measured payout sensitivity .
- Vesting calendar creates potential liquidity events: RSU and option tranches vest annually on March 14 (2025–2029), potentially adding insider selling pressure around these dates; however, anti-hedging/anti-pledging policies and ownership guidelines temper misalignment risks .
- Retention and change-in-control economics: Severance is moderate (1× base; 1.5× base on CIC with double-trigger equity vesting), and non-solicit extends 12 months, suggesting balanced retention with controlled shareholder risk .
- Ownership “skin in the game”: Direct beneficial ownership is <1% and has declined across reported dates (2023→2025), typical for non-founder NEOs; compliance with 3× salary ownership guideline mitigates alignment concerns .