
Hilton Schlosberg
About Hilton Schlosberg
Hilton H. Schlosberg (age 72) is Vice Chairman and Co-CEO of Monster Beverage Corporation, and will become sole CEO effective June 13, 2025; he has served on the Board since November 1990 and previously served as President/COO (1990–2021) and CFO (1996–2021), bringing deep financial and operating expertise from 35+ years of co-leadership with Rodney Sacks . Monster delivered 2024 net sales of $7.49B (+4.9% YoY), gross profit margin of 54% (+0.9 pp YoY), and five-year TSR of 65.4% (2020–2024), underscoring sustained value creation under this leadership team . 2024 say‑on‑pay approval was 93.9% and the Board affirmed a pay-for-performance framework centered on adjusted operating income and multi-year EPS-based PSUs .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Monster Beverage Corporation | Vice Chairman and Co-CEO; sole CEO effective 6/13/2025 | 2021–present (sole CEO from 6/13/2025) | Co-leads strategy and operations; transitions to sole CEO to separate Chair and CEO roles . |
| Monster Beverage Corporation | President, COO and Secretary | 1990–2021 | Day-to-day operations leadership during scale-up phase . |
| Monster Beverage Corporation | Chief Financial Officer | 1996–2021 | 24 years as CFO; high financial literacy and capital allocation leadership . |
| Monster Beverage Corporation | Director; Executive Committee member | Director since 1990; Exec. Committee since 1992 | Foundational governance continuity; helps manage business between Board meetings . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Monster Energy Company (subsidiary) | Vice Chairman, Co-CEO, Director | Ongoing | Affiliated operating subsidiary roles; not a separate public company directorship . |
| — | — | — | No other public company board roles disclosed in the proxy for Mr. Schlosberg . |
Fixed Compensation
- Targeted to be below median cash vs. peers, with equity above median to align with shareholders; Co‑CEOs are compensated equally given complementary leadership .
| Year | Base Salary ($) | All Other Comp ($) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 1,200,000 | 76,955 | 2024 salary increased to maintain positioning; perqs include company auto, 401(k) match, benefits, personal security . |
| 2023 | 1,100,000 | 71,749 | — |
| 2022 | 1,000,000 | 81,114 | — |
Perquisite detail (2024): company automobile $19,884; 401(k) match $13,800; benefits $36,373; personal security $6,300; equipment $598; total $76,955 .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive (AIA)
- Structure: 75% adjusted operating income; 25% individual performance; linear payout 0–200% of target; Co‑CEOs each at 150% of salary target .
- 2024 outcome: Adjusted operating income achieved at 80.4% of target; individual performance certified at 100%; total payout ≈85% of target .
| Item | Target | Actual 2024 | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|
| Target bonus (% of base) | 150% | — | — |
| Adj. Operating Income ($) | $2.2138B target; $1.9924B threshold; $2.4352B max | $2.1271B (80.4% of target) | 80.4% on 75% weight |
| Individual component | 100% target | 100% | 100% on 25% weight |
| AIA paid ($) | $1,800,000 target | — | $1,535,400 (cash) |
Long-Term Incentives (LTI)
- Mix (2024): 50% PSUs (3‑yr EPS), 25% RSUs (time-based), 25% Stock Options (time-based), consistent with pay-for-performance emphasis .
- 2024 grants to Schlosberg:
- PSUs: 116,100 target shares (58,050 threshold; 232,200 max); performance period 2024–2026; metric = 3‑yr cumulative adjusted diluted EPS; payout 0–200% .
- RSUs: 58,000 vesting 1/3 annually on 3/14/25, 3/14/26, 3/14/27 .
- Options: 153,500 @ $60.30, vesting 1/3 annually on 3/14/25, 3/14/26, 3/14/27; expiration 3/14/2034 .
| Grant (3/14/2024 unless noted) | Quantity | Terms | Accounting FV ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs (2024–2026) | 116,100 target (58,050 thr.; 232,200 max) | Earn on 3‑yr cumulative adj. diluted EPS; cliff vest after period | 7,000,830 |
| RSUs | 58,000 | Vest 19,333 on 3/14/2025; 19,333 on 3/14/2026; 19,334 on 3/14/2027 | 3,497,400 |
| Stock Options | 153,500 @ $60.30 | Vest 51,167 each on 3/14/2025, 3/14/2026, 3/14/2027; expire 3/14/2034 | 3,557,455 |
Recent PSU vesting performance: the 2022 PSU grants (2022–2024 EPS) paid at 90% of target; Schlosberg received 165,960 shares vs. 184,400 target .
| PSU Cohort | Perf. Metric | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual Result | Shares Delivered |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022–2024 | 3‑yr cumulative adj. diluted EPS | $4.328 | $4.556 | $4.784 | $4.510 (90% of target) | 165,960 |
Multi‑Year Compensation Summary (Co‑CEO)
| Year | Salary ($) | Stock Awards ($) | Option Awards ($) | Non‑Equity Incentive ($) | All Other ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 1,200,000 | 10,498,230 | 3,557,455 | 1,535,400 | 76,955 | 16,868,040 |
| 2023 | 1,100,000 | 10,306,296 | 3,440,363 | 2,887,500 | 71,749 | 17,805,908 |
| 2022 | 1,000,000 | 10,127,709 | 3,435,577 | 750,000 | 81,114 | 15,394,400 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership and Pledging
| Holder | Shares Beneficially Owned | % of Class | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hilton H. Schlosberg | 76,387,248 | 7.8% | Includes 2,354,994 direct; LP interests in Brandon No.1 (11,291,136), Brandon No.2 (58,773,888), Hilrod XV (276,109), Hilrod XVIII (231,754); and presently exercisable options across multiple grants; 100,000 shares pledged . |
- Anti‑pledging policy prohibits pledging except limited cases approved by compliance; as of April 11, 2025, only Messrs. Sacks and Schlosberg had pledges, totaling approximately 0.3% of their beneficially owned shares; Schlosberg has 100,000 shares pledged .
Stock Ownership Guidelines (executives)
- CEOs and CFO: at least 6x base salary; other Section 16 Officers: 3x; compliance monitored; all NEOs compliant in 2024 .
Options Snapshot (selected)
| Grant Date | Exercisable Options (#) | Exercise Price ($) | Expiration |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3/14/2016 | 630,000 | 21.99 | 3/14/2026 |
| 3/14/2017 | 611,000 | 23.14 | 3/14/2027 |
| 3/14/2018 | 528,000 | 29.37 | 3/14/2028 |
| 3/14/2019 | 583,200 | 29.84 | 3/14/2029 |
| 3/13/2020 | 382,800 | 31.20 | 3/13/2030 |
| 3/12/2021 | 259,800 | 44.47 | 3/12/2031 |
| 3/14/2022 | 194,266 ex.; 97,134 unex. | 36.62 | 3/14/2032 |
| 3/14/2023 | 61,000 ex.; 122,000 unex. | 50.82 | 3/14/2033 |
| 3/14/2024 | 153,500 unex. | 60.30 | 3/14/2034 |
Note: The proxy values unvested PSUs as of 12/31/2024 using a closing price of $52.56, implying options with strikes below $52.56 were in‑the‑money on that date .
Upcoming Vesting and Potential Selling Pressure
| Instrument | Vesting Dates | Quantity |
|---|---|---|
| RSUs (2024 grant) | 3/14/2025; 3/14/2026; 3/14/2027 | 19,333; 19,333; 19,334 |
| Options (2024 grant) | 3/14/2025; 3/14/2026; 3/14/2027 | 51,167 each tranche |
| PSUs (2023 grant) | Performance period 2023–2025; settle after FY2025 | As earned per plan |
| PSUs (2024 grant) | Performance period 2024–2026; settle after FY2026 | As earned per plan |
Insider policy prohibits hedging and generally pledging/margin accounts (limited exceptions); trading is subject to policy and window controls, which can mitigate forced selling dynamics .
Deferred Compensation
| Executive Contributions (2024) | Aggregate Balance (12/31/2024) |
|---|---|
| $817,500 (Schlosberg) | $3,312,150 |
Employment Terms
Employment Agreement (Co‑CEO)
- Original agreement dated March 18, 2014; auto-renews annually unless notice by June 30; confidentiality and six‑month post‑termination non‑compete .
- Eligible for AIA, equity awards, and perquisites; severance detailed below .
Severance and Change‑of‑Control (Schlosberg)
| Scenario (Assumed at 12/31/2024) | Key Cash/Benefits | Equity Treatment | Total Illustrative Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| Death/Disability | 12 months base salary; benefits; auto; vacation | — | $1,441K–$1,442K |
| Voluntary resignation | 6 months base; 6 months benefits; vacation | — | $803,188 |
| Termination without cause / Constructive Termination / Non‑renewal by Company | 2x base salary; pro‑rata prior‑year bonus; 18 months benefits and auto; vacation; 2 weeks’ notice pay | Unvested PSUs forfeited unless termination on/after vest date; RSU/Options continue per plan | $4,251,715 |
| CIC + termination without cause or good reason (double‑trigger within 24 months) | 2x base + pro‑rata bonus; benefits as above | Immediate vest of RSUs and options; PSUs convert to RSUs at target (if CIC in year 1) or based on actual performance to date (if CIC in years 2–3), then vest; immediate vest upon qualifying termination | $42,082,727 incl. $37,831,012 equity acceleration |
- All 2021+ awards have double‑trigger acceleration; no tax gross‑ups; clawback policies under both plans and Dodd‑Frank 10D‑1 adopted Dec 1, 2023 .
- Non‑compete: six months post‑termination .
Board Governance
- Board service: Director since 1990; currently Vice Chairman and Co‑CEO; Executive Committee member (manages business between Board meetings) .
- Leadership structure: From June 13, 2025, Chair (Sacks) and CEO (Schlosberg) roles separated; Lead Independent Director (Vidergauz) in place .
- Independence: Schlosberg is not independent; eight directors determined independent in 2024; independent directors held nine executive sessions in 2024 .
- Board meetings: Six in 2024; all then‑acting directors except Mr. Hall attended ≥75% .
- Committee roles: Schlosberg is an executive director (not a member of Audit, Compensation, or Nominating committees) .
Say‑on‑Pay & Compensation Committee
- Say‑on‑pay approval: 93.9% in 2024; no program changes made solely in response to this vote .
- Compensation Committee: Independent directors Jackson, Vidergauz (Chair), Fayard; uses F.W. Cook as independent advisor; peer benchmarking spans 16 consumer/food/beverage names (e.g., Mondelez, Starbucks, Hershey, Smucker, Keurig Dr Pepper, Brown‑Forman) .
- Philosophy: Below‑median cash; above‑median equity; strong linkage to adjusted operating income and multi‑year EPS PSU outcomes .
Related Party Transactions (Governance Risk)
- Promotional items purchased from IFM Group, LLC totaled $5.9M in 2024; Schlosberg family members own ~53% of IFM; Sacks‑related trusts own ~27%. Audit Committee oversees related‑party transactions; directors recuse where conflicted .
Expertise & Qualifications
- Track record: 35+ years co‑leadership; 24 years as CFO; high financial literacy; sustained growth and profitability with five‑year TSR of 65.4% and expanding gross margin in 2024 .
- Governance mitigants: Lead Independent Director, separated Chair/CEO roles from 6/13/2025, anti‑hedging/pledging policies, robust ownership guidelines, and clawbacks .
Compensation Structure Analysis (Signals)
- Cash vs equity mix: Continued emphasis on equity (PSUs ~50% of LTI); Co‑CEO target cash kept below median peers; total comp above 75th percentile aligned to strong top‑ and bottom‑line performance vs peers .
- Metrics rigor: 2024 AIA paid at ~85% of target with adj. operating income at 80.4% of target; 2022–2024 PSUs paid at 90%—near‑target performance without windfalls .
- Vesting cadence and pressure: Meaningful 3/14 annual tranches (options/RSUs) plus multi‑year PSU cliffs can create episodic liquidity; insider policy restricts hedging/pledging and imposes trading windows .
- CIC protections: Double‑trigger vesting; significant equity acceleration under CIC scenarios; no gross‑ups .
Equity Ownership & Alignment (Detail)
| Component | Amount / Terms |
|---|---|
| Directly owned common | 2,354,994 shares . |
| LP interests (Brandon No.1 / No.2 / Hilrod XV / XVIII) | 11,291,136 / 58,773,888 / 276,109 / 231,754 shares, respectively . |
| Options (presently exercisable at various strikes) | 630,000 (2016, $21.99), 611,000 (2017, $23.14), 528,000 (2018, $29.37), 583,200 (2019, $29.84), 382,800 (2020, $31.20), 259,800 (2021, $44.47), plus partially exercisable 2022–2023 grants . |
| Pledged shares | 100,000 shares . |
| Ownership guidelines (status) | 6x salary; in compliance . |
| Anti‑hedging/pledging policy | Hedging prohibited; pledging generally prohibited unless approved (limited exceptions) . |
Employment Terms (Detail)
| Term | Key Provision |
|---|---|
| Agreement | March 18, 2014; auto‑renews annually unless notice by June 30 . |
| Non‑compete | Six months post‑termination . |
| Severance (without cause / constructive termination / non‑renewal) | 2x base salary; pro‑rata prior‑year bonus; 18 months benefits & auto; two weeks’ notice pay; PSUs mostly forfeited if unvested . |
| CIC (double‑trigger) | RSUs/options vest; PSUs convert to RSUs at target (year 1 CIC) or based on actual-to-date (years 2–3), then vest; immediate vest on qualifying termination within 24 months post‑CIC . |
| Clawbacks | Plan-level and Dodd‑Frank compliant policy adopted Dec 1, 2023 . |
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: Large beneficial ownership (7.8%) and stringent ownership guidelines align incentives; equity‑heavy pay with multi‑year PSU metrics supports long‑term orientation; six‑month non‑compete and severance framework mitigate near‑term retention risk .
- Execution track record: AIA paid below target (80.4% financial component) and PSUs at 90% underscore rigorous targets amid 2024 growth; five‑year TSR 65.4% and expanding gross margin support continued value creation under Schlosberg’s operational/financial leadership .
- Governance risk checks: Related‑party IFM spend ($5.9M) and limited pledging (100k shares) are notable but managed via Audit Committee oversight and anti‑pledging policy; separation of Chair/CEO and active Lead Independent Director strengthen governance as Schlosberg becomes sole CEO .
- Trading dynamics: March 14 vesting cadence (RSUs/options) plus PSU cliffs could create periodic selling windows; hedging is prohibited and pledging restricted, which may moderate selling pressure but does not eliminate it .