Kamlesh Shah
About Kamlesh Shah
Chief Accounting Officer at Motorcar Parts of America (MPAA) since November 2019; joined MPAA in 2007 and previously served as Assistant Controller and then Vice President, Corporate Controller. Age 62; Certified Public Accountant; degree in Finance and Accounting from University of Bombay with diplomas in Financial Management and Computer Management . Company performance in FY2025: net sales up 5.5% to $757.4M, gross profit up 16.1% to $153.8M, cash from operations $45.5M; net bank debt reduced by $32.6M to $81.4M . Stock price increased from $4.75 (June 11, 2024) to $9.72 (June 9, 2025) around annual earnings releases, reflecting improved operating execution and shareholder-focused incentives .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| MPAA | Assistant Controller | 2007–2016 | Core finance, controllership; foundation for later promotion |
| MPAA | Vice President, Corporate Controller | 2016–Nov 2019 | Led corporate accounting; prepared for CAO role |
| MPAA | Chief Accounting Officer | Nov 2019–Present | Oversees accounting and reporting; Section 16 officer |
| Leiner Health Products Inc. | Assistant Controller | ~2000–2007 | Private label vitamins/pharma; cost/controls experience |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Leiner Health Products Inc. | Assistant Controller | ~2000–2007 | Pre-MPAA role in manufacturing/CPG accounting |
| Various domestic/international companies | Accounting positions | Pre-2000 | Early career accounting roles |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $300,446 | $315,468 |
| Target Bonus ($) | $120,178 | $126,187 |
| Actual Bonus Paid ($) | $90,134 | $150,541 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $29,089 | $49,574 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive Plan – FY2025 (Company-only metrics)
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | % of Target | Payout Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Income after Adjustments | 25% | $14,611,500 | $17,190,000 | $19,768,500 | $16,556,000 | 87.7% | 21.9% |
| Net Sales | 25% | $743,563,000 | $761,022,000 | $778,480,000 | $757,354,000 | 89.5% | 22.4% |
| Cash from Operating Activities | 50% | $20,391,200 | $25,489,000 | $30,586,800 | $45,477,000 | 150% | 75.0% |
| Total credit vs target | — | — | — | — | — | — | 119.3% |
Result: Shah’s total FY2025 cash incentive payout $150,541 vs $126,187 target (119.3% factor), driven by outsized cash generation .
Annual Cash Incentive Plan – FY2024 (Company-only metrics; individual component removed)
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | % of Target | Payout Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EBITDA after Adjustments | 25% | $93,130,000 | $95,885,000 | $98,640,000 | $84,233,000 | 0% | 0% |
| Gross Profit after Adjustments | 25% | $165,507,000 | $169,045,000 | $172,583,000 | $156,339,000 | 0% | 0% |
| Cash from Operating Activities | 50% | $17,645,000 | $19,536,000 | $21,427,000 | $39,172,000 | 150% | 75% |
| Total credit vs target | — | — | — | — | — | — | 75% |
Result: Shah’s FY2024 cash incentive $90,134 vs $120,178 target; paid solely on cash generation .
PSU Design and Outcomes
| Grant | Metric | Performance Window | Threshold | Target | Max | Shah Target Units | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2025 PSUs | Relative TSR vs Russell 3000 (ex-Financials/RE) | 3 years from grant | 30th pctile | 55th pctile | 80th pctile | 13,941 | In-progress (3-year) |
| FY2024 PSUs | Absolute stock price hurdles ($10/$15/$20; 30-day avg) | 3 years from 6/19/2023 | 50% tranche vesting | 100% tranche vesting | 150% top tranche | 26,132 | In-progress (hurdle-based) |
| FY2022 PSUs | EBITDA (40%), Net Sales (30%), Relative TSR (30%) | 3 years to 6/20/2025 | Per table | Per table | Per table | 5,213 | 1,912 vested (36.7% of target) |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Stock ownership guidelines: NEOs must hold 2x base salary; as of March 31, 2025, Shah held less than 2x and has until July 26, 2029 to comply . Hedging and pledging of MPAA securities are prohibited by policy; 10b5-1 plans permitted within policy .
- Clawback: Dodd-Frank/Nasdaq-compliant recovery policy applies to Section 16 officers for incentive comp tied to financials, including time- and performance-vested equity .
- Section 16 filings: one Form 4 with two transactions was filed late on June 24, 2024 (2025 proxy); prior proxy notes four transactions filed late on one Form 4 on June 24, 2024 .
Outstanding Awards (as of March 31, 2025)
| Instrument | Status | Quantity | Key Terms | Carrying/Market Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Options | Exercisable | 1,567 @ $9.32; plus legacy grants at $31.13/$28.68/$27.40/$19.00/$19.93/$15.12 | 10-year term; 9/20/2033 expiry for $9.32 grant; 1/3 vest annually | N/A |
| Stock Options | Unexercisable | 3,133 @ $9.32 (retention grant 9/20/2033) | Same as above | N/A |
| RSUs (2010 Plan) | Unvested | 1,737 | 1/3 annual vesting from 6/20/2022 | $16,502 |
| RSUs (6/21/2024) | Unvested | 8,365 | 1/3 annual vesting from grant date | $79,468 |
| RSUs (11/25/2024) | Unvested | 5,575 | 1/3 annual vesting from grant date | $52,963 |
| PSUs (6/20/2022) | Earned | 1,912 | Vested at 36.7% of target on 6/20/2025 | $18,164 |
| PSUs (6/19/2023) | Outstanding (target est.) | 17,421 | Stock price hurdles; 30-day avg; estimate 100% vesting per proxy | $165,500 |
| PSUs (6/21/2024) | Outstanding (max est.) | 12,548 | Relative TSR (3-year); estimate 150% performance | $119,201 |
| PSUs (11/25/2024) | Outstanding (max est.) | 8,364 | Relative TSR (3-year); estimate 150% performance | $79,458 |
FY2025 Equity Grants (at grant)
| Instrument | Grant Date | Units | Grant-Date Fair Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs | 2024 awards (aggregate) | 13,940 | $94,931 |
| PSUs (Relative TSR) | 2024 awards (aggregate) | 13,941 | $121,872 |
FY2024 Equity Grants (at grant)
| Instrument | Grant Date | Units | Strike | Grant-Date Fair Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs (Absolute stock price hurdles) | 6/19/2023 | 26,132 | N/A | $109,842 |
| Stock Options (Retention) | 9/21/2023 | 4,700 | $9.32 | $17,625 |
Vesting/Settlement Activity
| Fiscal Year | Shares Vested (All Stock Awards) | Value Realized |
|---|---|---|
| FY2025 | 12,961 | $119,671 |
| FY2024 | 3,907 | $25,647 |
Employment Terms
- Change-of-control and termination economics (equity): Estimated equity acceleration value for Shah upon change-in-control with involuntary termination: $364,159; and $196,859 for “change in control with involuntary termination” scenario per FY2025 table methodologies (performance awards generally at target/max as specified) . FY2024 analogous equity values: $210,101 (change in control) and $127,836 (with involuntary termination) .
- Insider Trading Policy: Prohibits short sales, hedging/monetization, and pledging; incorporates 10b5-1 pre-clearance and short-swing considerations .
- Clawback: Applies to erroneously paid incentive compensation tied to financial reporting measures for Section 16 officers (including equity) after Oct 2, 2023 .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment improving: Cash generation is a dominant bonus lever (50% weighting), and FY2025 bonus over-achievement was driven by strong operating cash flow; equity grants mix is 50/50 RSU/PSU in FY2025 with PSUs tied to relative TSR, following FY2024’s shareholder-driven shift to absolute stock-price hurdles .
- Vesting and selling pressure: Multiple RSU tranches from 2024 grants vest annually, plus retention options vest one-third over three years; monitor Form 4s around vest dates for tax-related sales; late filings in 2024/2025 indicate activity but policy prohibits hedging/pledging, mitigating alignment concerns .
- Ownership alignment: Below 2x-salary ownership guideline with a 2029 compliance deadline; near-term alignment relies on unvested equity and policy constraints rather than large outright holdings .
- Change-of-control dynamics: Equity acceleration under CoC scenarios provides retention value; PSU designs combining TSR and price hurdles tie long-term payouts to market-relative and absolute performance, aligning comp with shareholder outcomes .
- Governance/sentiment: Say-on-pay support at 90% (2025) and 88% (2024) suggests investor acceptance of pay design changes emphasizing cash and TSR/price hurdles; peer group includes auto/industrial comparables used by WTW for calibration .
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