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Mike Milotich

Mike Milotich

Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer at MarqetaMarqeta
CEO
Executive
Board

About Mike Milotich

Marqeta’s Interim Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer. Age 48. Tenure: CFO since Feb 2022; appointed Interim CEO in Feb 2025 while retaining CFO responsibilities . Education: MBA in Strategy and Finance (NYU Stern), BA in Business Economics (UC Santa Barbara) . 2024 operating context: Total Processing Volume +31% YoY to $291B; Net Revenue -25% (Cash App contract/pricing and presentation change), Gross Profit +7% to 69% margin; Net Income improved to $27M (helped by $145M SBC reversal); Adjusted EBITDA rose to $29M from a loss, +$31M YoY . Marqeta notes TSR underperformed the peer group in 2024 despite improvements in gross profit and earnings; compensation actually paid to NEOs was negative due to share price declines .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Visa Inc.SVP, Head of Corporate Finance and Investor Relations2018–2022Led corporate finance and IR at a global payments platform; prior roles since 2011 included VP Corporate FP&A and IR leadership .

External Roles

  • No public company directorships or external board roles disclosed in the proxy for Mr. Milotich .

Fixed Compensation

  • Base salary (2024): $490,000; increased from $475,000 in 2023 (+3.2%) .
  • Target bonus: 75% of base salary (unchanged YoY for 2024) .
  • 2025 Interim CEO package: base salary $550,000; target bonus remains 75% of salary (prorated for interim period) .
  • 2024 non-equity incentive earned: $309,068 (84.1% of target after committee downward adjustment) .

Multi-year compensation (NEO SCT totals):

Metric202220232024
Salary ($)292,179 475,000 487,500
Bonus ($)100,000 (sign-on)
Stock Awards ($)7,999,994 1,160,202 5,066,891
Option Awards ($)7,997,367 1,499,101
Non-Equity Incentive ($)413,000 428,000 309,068
All Other Comp ($)17,001 14,303 18,010
Total ($)16,819,541 3,576,606 5,881,469

Performance Compensation

Annual cash incentive (ACI) design and 2024 outcomes:

  • 2024 metrics and weights: Revenue Growth (15%), Gross Profit (35%), Adjusted EBITDA (35%), Discretion (15%) .
  • Corporate funding result: 104.1% of target; discretion paid 0% to reflect shareholder experience; individual downward adjustment applied to Milotich yielding 84.1% payout of target .
  • 2025 plan changes: metrics revised to Gross Profit 50%, Adjusted EBITDA 30%, Revenue 20%; discretion eliminated .

PSUs and RSUs:

  • 2024 long-term mix for NEOs: 70% RSUs / 30% PSUs; options discontinued beginning FY2024 .
  • PSU performance framework (2024): 1-year performance period; Gross Profit (70%) with 50–200% payout band; Adjusted EBITDA (30%) with 50–200% payout band; if Adjusted EBITDA below threshold, Gross Profit payout capped at target; linear interpolation between points .
  • 2024 PSU achievement: weighted vesting at 107.88%; Milotich’s PSUs earned 276,049 vs target 255,903 .
  • Vesting: RSUs generally over 3 years; earned PSUs 1/3 at certification, remaining 2/3 quarterly over next 2 years .

2024 individual awards:

TypeGrant detailsQuantity/ValueVesting
RSUsMar 15, 2024 grant; value $3,546,827597,109 units 1/12 quarterly over 3 years (6)
PSUsMar 15, 2024 grant (two tranches)Targets: 179,132 and 76,771; totals target 255,903; actual earned 276,049 at 107.88% Earned: 1/3 at certification; 1/12 quarterly thereafter (8)

2025 retention award (Interim CEO):

  • One-time $2,000,000: 50% cash at earlier of 12 months post-appointment or upon new CEO appointment (requires service through that date); 50% RSUs vest 6 months post new CEO appointment; RSUs fully accelerate if terminated without cause after appointment, subject to release .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

  • Beneficial ownership (as of Apr 21, 2025): 2,392,948 Class A shares beneficially owned; comprised of 601,889 owned shares, 1,640,466 options exercisable within 60 days, 127,590 RSUs vesting within 60 days, 23,003 PSUs vesting within 60 days; less than 1% of Class A outstanding .
  • Outstanding awards at 12/31/2024 include RSUs (447,832 from 2024 grant; plus prior grants) and PSUs (179,132 and 76,771 targets from 2024 grant), and multiple option grants with exercise prices $4.07–$9.84 .
  • Underwater options: all unvested options for NEOs had $0 intrinsic value at FY2024 year-end, reducing near-term exercise-driven selling pressure .
  • Stock ownership guidelines: CEO 5x salary; other executives 1.5x salary; compliance by Feb 2028 or 5 years from hire/promotion; unvested RSUs/PSUs and unexercised options excluded; must retain 50% of net shares until compliant; hedging and pledging prohibited .
  • Rule 10b5-1 plans: permitted under policy and used by officers/directors with required conditions .

Employment Terms

  • Employment: at-will; offer letter sets salary/bonus/equity eligibility; subject to proprietary information/inventions agreements .
  • Executive Severance Plan (non-CIC): for non-CEO executives, 9 months base salary, 75% of target bonus, up to 9 months COBRA; CEO receives 12 months base, 100% of target bonus, 12 months COBRA; release required .
  • CIC provisions (double-trigger): if qualifying termination within 3 months before to 12 months after change in control, 100% acceleration of unvested equity (performance awards per agreement mechanics); 280G cutback if beneficial .
  • Estimated severance economics (Milotich): $365,625 salary severance; $275,625 bonus severance; $28,557 health; $4,142,064 value of accelerated vesting in CIC-related qualifying termination .
  • Clawback: Dodd-Frank–compliant Compensation Recovery Policy adopted Aug 2023 .

Board Service and Governance

  • Board service: Mr. Milotich is disclosed as an executive officer (Interim CEO and CFO) and is not listed among directors or nominees as of the April 21, 2025 record date; no committee roles disclosed for him .
  • Dual-role implications: He serves simultaneously as Interim CEO and CFO; governance mitigants include an independent Chair (Jud Linville), 91% independent board, and fully independent Audit, Compensation, and Nominating committees; executive sessions of independent directors held regularly; hedging/pledging prohibited .

Performance & Track Record

  • 2024 performance context: TPV +31% to $291B; Net Revenue -25% (pricing/presentation impacts from Cash App renewal); Gross Profit +$22M (+7%) with 69% margin; Net Income improved to $27M; Adjusted EBITDA +$31M to +$29M .
  • Say-on-pay: 95% approval at 2024 annual meeting (up 10 pts vs 2023), indicating investor support for compensation program changes (introduction of PSUs, elimination of options for NEOs) .
  • TSR: Company stated TSR underperformed peer group during 2024; compensation actually paid to PEO and non-PEO NEOs was negative due to stock decline .

Compensation Committee and Peer Group

  • Compensation Committee (independent): Chair Najuma Atkinson; members Alpesh Chokshi, Jud Linville, Kiran Prasad; uses Compensia as independent consultant; annual risk assessment conducted .
  • 2024 peer group (selected fintech/internet/software firms, revenue 0.5x–2.5x, cap 0.3x–3.0x): ACI Worldwide, Affirm, Alteryx, AppFolio, BILL, BlackLine, Confluent, Elastic, Five9, Guidewire, LendingClub, PagerDuty, Paylocity, Paymentus, Payoneer, Q2, Shift4, Smartsheet, SoFi, Zuora .

Director Compensation (context)

  • Not applicable to Mr. Milotich (not a director). Non-employee director compensation policy summarized for board context: $50k cash retainer; $200k annual RSU; $400k initial RSU; chair premiums; accelerated vesting upon “sale event” .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • Hedging/pledging prohibited (reduces misalignment risk) .
  • No CIC tax gross-ups; severance plan standardized and conditioned on release .
  • Underwater options at year-end (reduced immediate exercise incentives) .
  • 2023 material weaknesses remediated/transitioned auditors in 2024; Audit Committee oversight active (KPMG engaged for 2024) .

Detailed Tables

2024 ACI metrics and funding:

MetricWeightTargetActualAttainmentFunding
YoY Revenue Growth ($M)15%515.7507.098%104.1% overall corporate factor
Gross Profit ($M)35%354.3352.699.3%
Adjusted EBITDA ($M)35%32.550.7156%
Discretion15%N/A00%

2024 PSU performance:

MeasureWeightThreshold (50%)Target (100%)Max (200%)ActualPayout
Gross Profit70%$265.5M$354.0M$531.0M$351.849M98.78%
Adjusted EBITDA30%-$30.0M$0$100.0M$29.093M129.093%
Weighted Average107.88%

Beneficial ownership (as of 4/21/2025):

HolderClass A SharesNotes
Mike Milotich2,392,948Includes 601,889 owned, 1,640,466 options exercisable <60d, 127,590 RSUs and 23,003 PSUs vesting <60d; <1% of Class A .

Outstanding equity snapshot (12/31/2024):

AwardQuantity/Terms
RSUs447,832 from 2024 grant outstanding (plus prior RSUs) .
PSUs (2024 targets)179,132 and 76,771; earned 276,049 at 107.88% .
OptionsMultiple tranches exercisable/unexercisable at $4.07–$9.84; unvested options had $0 intrinsic value at FY-end .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: 2024 compensation tightened pay-for-performance with PSUs tied to Gross Profit and Adjusted EBITDA (no options), strong stock ownership guidelines, and prohibitions on hedging/pledging—favorable for long-term alignment; 95% say-on-pay in 2024 reinforces investor acceptance .
  • Near-term selling pressure: Majority of equity in RSUs/PSUs with staged vesting; options underwater at FY-end; beneficial ownership includes sizable options but less incentive to exercise; 10b5-1 use permitted but hedging/pledging barred—net moderate selling pressure risk tied mainly to scheduled RSU/PSU deliveries and tax withholdings .
  • Retention: Interim CEO retention package ($2M split cash/RSUs with service conditions) and standardized severance/CIC protection reduce near-term departure risk during CEO transition; double-trigger CIC acceleration standard for the sector .
  • Dual-hat risk: Interim CEO and CFO roles concentrate authority; mitigated by independent chair, highly independent board, and fully independent committees with frequent executive sessions .
  • Execution signals: 2024 showed improving profitability metrics (Gross Profit, Adjusted EBITDA) amid revenue presentation/pricing headwinds; PSU payout >100% reflects operational progress, but company acknowledges TSR underperformance—equity value realization remains dependent on sustaining margin improvement and growth re-acceleration .