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Alexander Shvartsman

Senior Vice President, Controller and Principal Accounting Officer at Madison Square Garden SportsMadison Square Garden Sports
Executive

About Alexander Shvartsman

Senior Vice President, Controller and Principal Accounting Officer at Madison Square Garden Sports Corp. since April 2020; age 52. Previously held progressively senior accounting roles at MSGS since 2010, and earlier roles at CIT Group Inc., American Standard Inc., and KPMG LLP . Company performance metrics used to determine executive pay emphasize Adjusted Operating Income (AOI) and Revenues; FY2025 company results were Revenue $1.04B, Operating Income $14.8M, AOI $38.2M, with annual incentive funded based on AOI and modified to a 95.0% payout level; long-term PSUs vest on Revenues/AOI and the FY2023 PSU cycle paid at 106.7% of target . Over the recent period captured in Pay vs Performance, cumulative TSR from a $100 base reached 148.92 (company) vs 155.90 (peer group) in FY2025, with AOI used as the primary company-selected measure .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
MSGSSVP, Controller & Principal Accounting OfficerApr 2020 – PresentLeads corporate accounting, reporting, controls for Knicks/Rangers holding company
MSGSSVP & Assistant Controller2016 – Apr 2020Strengthened controllership and close/process discipline
MSGSVP, External Reporting & Consolidations2015 – 2016Drove SEC reporting and consolidation improvements
MSGSVP, Technical Accounting & Accounting PolicyMar 2015 – Oct 2015Established technical accounting policies
MSGSDirector, Technical Accounting & Accounting Policy2013 – 2015Advanced treatment of complex transactions
MSGSDirector, External Reporting2010 – 2013Managed SEC filings and disclosures

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
CIT Group Inc.Various rolesNot disclosedCorporate finance/accounting experience
American Standard Inc.Various rolesNot disclosedIndustrial accounting/operations exposure
KPMG LLPVarious rolesNot disclosedPublic accounting foundation

Fixed Compensation

MetricFY 2022FY 2023FY 2024
Base Salary ($)375,000 386,539 435,000
Target Bonus (% of Salary)Not disclosedNot disclosed40% (per employment agreement)
Bonus ($)18,792
All Other Compensation ($)21,687 23,519 24,639
Total ($)950,192 909,696 964,186

Notes:

  • “Bonus ($)” column reflects any special or adjusted bonus separate from MPIP; MPIP payout is shown under Performance Compensation .

Performance Compensation

ComponentMetricWeightingTargetActualPayoutVesting
Annual Incentive (MPIP) – FY2024AOI100%Not disclosedNot disclosed$187,050 cash Paid Sept 2024
Annual Incentive (MPIP) – FrameworkAOI (pool) + strategic modifierCommittee-set AOI targetCompany-wideFY2025 payout factor 95.0% (company program reference) Paid Sept annually
Long-Term PSUs (2022 cycle, measured FY2024)Revenues & AOI (50/50)100%Committee-setRevenues 108.7% of target; AOI 110.0% of target109.3% of target Cliff at later of Sept 15 and certification
Long-Term PSUs (2023 cycle, measured FY2025)Revenues & AOI (50/50)100%Committee-setNot disclosed106.7% of target (company-wide PSU result) Cliff at later of Sept 15 and certification
Long-Term RSUs (standard)Stock priceN/A (time-based)Ratable over 3 years; Sept 15 annually

Equity Awards Detail (grants and vesting)

Grant DateAward TypeTarget UnitsThreshold/Max UnitsGrant-Date Fair Value ($)Vesting Schedule
Aug 28, 2023PSUs834 751 / 917 149,353 Later of Sept 15, 2026 and FY2026 certification
Aug 28, 2023RSUs834 N/A149,353 Ratable: Sept 15, 2024/2025/2026
FY2024 VestingRSUs Vested2,128 shares $379,103 value realized Sept 15, 2023 and Apr 1, 2024 vest dates
PSU Vesting Reference (company)PSUs (2022 cycle)Paid at 109.3% of target (measured FY2024)

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemValue
Beneficial Ownership – Class A shares (as of Apr 14, 2025)4,681 shares
Unvested RSUs (excluded from ownership table)1,655 units
Unvested PSUs at target (excluded from ownership table)2,485 units
Ownership % of Class A outstanding~0.024% (4,681 / 19,488,096 Class A shares)
Hedging/PledgingCompany policy prohibits hedging and pledging of company stock

Employment Terms

  • Current agreement effective April 17, 2023; role: SVP, Controller and Principal Accounting Officer .
  • Base salary ≥ $435,000; target annual bonus ≥ 40% of base; expected long-term incentive target ≥ $330,000 (subject to grant) .
  • Severance (through Apr 17, 2026): if terminated without cause or for good reason, not less than the sum of annual base salary + annual target bonus; prior-year unpaid and pro-rata current-year bonus payable .
  • Non-compete: one year post-termination .
  • Change-of-control terms (award agreements): RSUs receive cash or replacement award with accelerated vesting under specified conditions; PSUs vest at target upon change in control (company-wide award terms) .
  • Pension/Deferred: Not a participant in frozen MSGE Cash Balance or Excess Cash Balance plans .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Cash vs equity mix remained balanced: stock awards $326,765 (FY2022), $273,612 (FY2023), $298,705 (FY2024); annual incentive plan payouts $226,740 (FY2022), $226,026 (FY2023), $187,050 (FY2024) .
  • Company-wide compensation levers emphasize at-risk pay tied to AOI and Revenues (PSUs) and AOI (annual incentive), with explicit clawback policy effective Dec 1, 2023 .
  • Compensation benchmarking: no specific peer group used for FY2025 program design given limited comparables (company-wide) .

Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • 2024 say-on-pay approval: 97.9% of votes cast; Class A approval approximately 92.1% .
  • Company engaged holders of over 60% of Class A in FY2025 on governance and compensation .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • Hedging/pledging prohibited per Insider Trading Policy; Clawback Policy aligned with NYSE listing rule effective Oct 2, 2023; no delinquent Section 16 reports noted for FY2025 .
  • Related party transactions largely reflect Dolan family control and intercompany arrangements; no specific related party transactions disclosed for Shvartsman .

Investment Implications

  • Pay-for-performance alignment is clear: annual incentives funded by AOI, and PSUs measured on Revenues/AOI; PSU cycles have paid modestly above target (e.g., 106.7% for FY2025 cycle, 109.3% for FY2024 cycle), supporting discipline in financial execution .
  • Retention risk appears moderate: severance economics (≥1x salary+target bonus), one-year non-compete, and multi-year vesting (RSUs/PSUs) create ongoing retention hooks; low personal share ownership (~0.024% of Class A) reduces alignment but is typical for non-NEO technical executives .
  • Governance safeguards (anti-hedging/pledging, clawback) and strong say-on-pay support suggest low compensation-related controversy risk; continued Dolan family control remains a structural governance consideration at the company level .