Richard Wong
METTLER TOLEDO INTERNATIONAL INC/About Richard Wong
Richard Wong is Head of Asia/Pacific at Mettler-Toledo International Inc. and has led the region since 2009; he joined the company in 2008 after regional leadership roles at Agilent Technologies and earlier commercial and finance roles at Hewlett Packard starting in 1991 . He is 60 years old (FY2024 10-K) . Company performance metrics guiding executive incentives include adjusted EPS, net cash flow, and group sales under the POBS Plus plan; in 2024, adjusted EPS was $41.11 vs. a $40.67 target, net cash flow was $1,093.9M vs. a $1,053.2M target, and group sales were $3,905.1M vs. a $3,887.5M target . Long-run alignment is reinforced by rTSR-based PSUs; the company cites 20-year TSR of 2,285% vs. 618% for the S&P 500, supporting pay-for-performance alignment .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Agilent Technologies | Regional management including Life Sciences Field Operations for North Asia (Beijing, then Tokyo) | 1998–2008 | Led North Asia commercial field operations in life sciences; regional growth and go-to-market execution |
| Hewlett Packard | Sales, Marketing, and Finance roles of increasing responsibility | 1991–1998 | Built commercial and financial execution experience foundational to later regional leadership |
External Roles
No external public-company board or committee roles disclosed for Richard Wong in company filings .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 378,657 | 389,789 | 401,856 |
| Target Cash Incentive (% of Base) | 45% (other NEOs) | 45% (other NEOs) | 45% (other NEOs) |
| Actual Cash Incentive ($) | 264,924 | 57,831 | 209,712 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 33,136 | 58,205 | 32,831 |
| Base Salary Increase (effective date) | — | — | +3.0% effective Apr 1, 2024 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive (POBS Plus) – 2024 Design and Outcomes
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Payout Impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Non-GAAP EPS | Part of 75–80% Group/OU bucket | $39.43 | $40.67 | $44.39 | $41.11 | Contributed to payout (Wong total 52% of base) |
| Net Cash Flow (Ops CF – taxes – capex – restructuring) | Part of 75–80% Group/OU bucket | $999.2M | $1,053.2M | $1,215.2M | $1,093.9M | Contributed to payout (Wong total 52% of base) |
| Group Sales (budgeted FX) | Part of 75–80% Group/OU bucket | $3,809.0M | $3,887.5M | $4,123.0M | $3,905.1M | Contributed to payout (Wong total 52% of base) |
| Individual Objectives | 12–17% of incentive | — | — | — | — | Committee-evaluated |
| ESG Targets (E, S, G quantitative goals) | 8% of incentive | — | — | — | — | Committee-evaluated |
| 2024 Cash Incentive Paid (as % of Base) | — | — | — | — | — | 52% for Richard Wong |
Notes: Annual incentive targets are set to be “challenging and ambitious”; average NEO target achievement over last five years was 108% .
Long-Term Incentives – Grants and Vesting
| Instrument | Grant Date | Quantity | Vesting | Performance/Exercise Terms |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs (target) | 11/03/2022 | 124 units | 3-year cliff; vests each January post performance | rTSR vs S&P 500 Healthcare & Industrials; 0% at ≤30th percentile; 100% at 60th; 200% at ≥75th; capped at 100% if absolute TSR negative |
| PSUs (target) | 11/09/2023 | 159 units | 3-year cliff; vests each January post performance | As above |
| PSUs (target) | 11/12/2024 | 157 units | 3-year cliff; vests each January post performance | As above |
| Stock Options | 11/05/2020 | 430 exercisable / 215 unexercisable | 20% per year over 5 years | $1,103.74 exercise; expires 11/05/2030 |
| Stock Options | 11/04/2021 | 474 exercisable / 316 unexercisable | 20% per year over 5 years | $1,484.40 exercise; expires 11/04/2031 |
| Stock Options | 11/03/2022 | 300 exercisable / 450 unexercisable | 20% per year over 5 years | $1,225.87 exercise; expires 11/03/2032 |
| Stock Options | 11/09/2023 | 175 exercisable / 700 unexercisable | 20% per year over 5 years | $1,024.55 exercise; expires 11/09/2033 |
| Stock Options | 11/12/2024 | 0 exercisable / 730 unexercisable | 20% per year over 5 years | $1,260.97 exercise; expires 11/12/2034 |
| RSUs (unvested) | 11/09/2023 | 440 units; $538,419 MV at $1,223.68 close | Ratably over 3 years from first anniversary of grant | Restricted stock units |
| 2025 LTI (May tranche) | 05/08/2025 | PSUs: 84; Options: 230; RSUs: 90 | General vesting unchanged; two-tranche 2025 (May & Nov) | Bifurcated grant structure; 1/3 PSUs, 1/3 options, 1/3 RSUs |
Additional PSU vesting schedule (linear interpolation): 45th percentile=50%; 67.5th=150% .
Option/PSU value-at-maximum examples (company-wide table provided; individual PSU max values listed for other NEOs; Wong’s PSU maximum values shown for 11/2022 and 11/2023: $336,600 and $350,827, respectively) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Stock ownership guidelines: Other executive officers must hold equity equal to 2× base salary; CEO $5.5M; CFO 3× salary. All officers satisfy the guidelines .
- Counting toward guidelines: Direct shares, vested RSUs, and in-the-money value of vested options; 5-year ramp for CEO with specified thresholds .
- Hedging/pledging: Board members and executive officers are prohibited from hedging and generally restricted from pledging company securities; insider trading policy applies to all personnel .
- Share Purchase Plan: Executives may elect to receive annual cash incentive in shares at market price; such shares are restricted from sale/pledge for 5 years .
- Insider selling pressure: Wong had no option exercises in 2024 and only 5 RSUs vested ($5,831 value), suggesting limited realized selling pressure in the period .
Outstanding Awards Snapshot (Year-end 2024)
| Category | Quantity | Reference Value/Terms |
|---|---|---|
| Unvested RSUs | 440 units; $538,419 market value at $1,223.68 close | 3-year ratable vesting from 11/09/2023 |
| PSUs (target, unearned) | 124 (2022), 159 (2023), 157 (2024) | rTSR 3-year cliff vesting |
| Options (by grant year) | See table above | 10-year term; 5-year ratable vesting |
Employment Terms
| Term | Provision |
|---|---|
| Contract Term | No fixed term; agreements effectively 6–12 months due to notice period |
| Compensation During Notice | Base salary, target cash incentive, and benefits continue during notice period |
| Non-Compete | 6–12 months post-termination; geographic scope tied to business |
| Severance | No severance payment entitlements upon termination |
| Change-in-Control | No automatic acceleration or vesting of equity; no payouts upon CIC |
| Clawback | NYSE-compliant clawback for incentive-based compensation over prior 3 fiscal years upon qualifying restatement; no recoveries required as of 12/31/2024 |
| Hedging/Pledging Policy | Hedging prohibited; pledging generally restricted for directors and executive officers |
Compensation Program Context and Governance
- Elements and performance measures: Base salary, annual cash incentive, and LTI (options & PSUs). Annual cash incentive tied to EPS, net cash flow, sales, and individual/ESG targets (ESG = 8%) .
- LTI mix and retentive design: 2025 bifurcated LTI grants (May/Nov) with composition of 1/3 PSUs, 1/3 options, 1/3 RSUs; Committee explicitly cited improved retention/motivation objectives in current environment; vesting schedules unchanged .
- Say-on-Pay: 84% approval in 2024, reflecting investor support for NEO compensation .
- Pay versus performance framing: Company emphasizes non-GAAP EPS as the most important financial performance metric linking compensation to outcomes ; peer TSR benchmarking uses SIC 3826 index; rTSR PSU peer set is S&P 500 Healthcare & Industrials .
- Independent compensation consultant: Pearl Meyer & Partners engaged; Committee monitors consultant independence; no consultant stock ownership or executive relationships noted .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: Wong’s compensation is highly performance-based (45% target cash incentive of base; LTI with rTSR PSUs and 5-year option vesting); 2025 bifurcated LTI grants add near-term retentive value with unchanged vesting schedules . Equity ownership guidelines (2× salary) and hedging/pledging restrictions reduce misalignment risks; all officers meet ownership requirements .
- Payout sensitivity to operating performance: 2024 payouts reflect attainment above targets on adjusted EPS and net cash flow, with Wong’s cash incentive at 52% of base; incentives are explicitly tied to EPS, cash flow, and sales, plus ESG/individual goals, reinforcing pay-for-performance .
- Low realized selling pressure in 2024: No option exercises and minimal RSU vest value ($5,831) for Wong suggest limited near-term selling pressure; substantial unexercisable option balance and unearned PSUs maintain long-term alignment and retention hooks .
- Governance risk mitigation: No severance or CIC acceleration, NYSE-compliant clawback, and strict hedging/pledging policy curb shareholder-unfriendly outcomes and reduce event-driven compensation risk .